Nomura Holdings Issuer Summary

Report date: 2026-05-11
Issuer: Nomura Holdings, Inc.
Relevant bond context: Nomura Holdings senior and TLAC-eligible debt, with operating subsidiary ratings used for structural comparison

1. Business Snapshot and Recent Developments

Nomura Holdings, Inc. ("Nomura") is not a commercial bank. It is an integrated securities and market-based financial group that combines domestic retail securities, wealth management, investment management, global markets, investment banking, and trust/banking functions. The starting point for credit analysis is therefore to view Nomura as a financial holding company with a domestic client franchise, rather than as a megabank-style deposit-and-loan credit. From the fiscal year ended March 2026, the group presents its business through four divisions: Wealth Management, Investment Management, Wholesale, and Banking. Domestic client assets and AUM support the floor of credit quality, while Wholesale market revenue, unsecured funding, repo and derivative collateral, ratings, TLAC, and the holdco structure are the main sources of volatility for bondholders.

In one sentence, Nomura is a market-based financial issuer with a deep domestic client base. At end-March 2026, Wealth Management client assets were JPY175.8tn and Investment Management AUM was JPY136.9tn. As of December 2025, the number of accounts exceeded six million, and as of April 1, 2025, the group had 104 domestic offices. These figures show the scale and depth of client contact as a domestic securities firm. However, this depth is different from stable insured deposits. Client asset balances, mutual funds and discretionary investment products, bond distribution, wealth solutions, and succession-related services increase recurring revenue, but they remain exposed to market prices, investor sentiment, sales flows, and issuance conditions.

The most important recent change is that FY2025/26 results confirmed both a shift toward recurring revenue and a recovery in market businesses. In the results presentation filed as an SEC Form 6-K on April 30, 2026, Nomura reported FY2025/26 net revenue of JPY2,167.7bn, income before income taxes of JPY539.8bn, net income attributable to shareholders of JPY362.1bn, and ROE of 10.1%. Four-segment income before income taxes was JPY506.9bn, which the company described as a record high. This was not merely a market rebound; it showed that Wealth Management, Investment Management, Wholesale, and Banking each broadened the earnings base in different ways.

In Wealth Management, Q4 FY2025/26 income before income taxes was JPY61.2bn, and recurring revenue covered 72% of expenses. This signals a transition from a securities company dependent on trading turnover toward a financial group with revenue linked to client asset balances. In Investment Management, after completion of the acquisition of Macquarie's U.S. and European public asset management business, AUM expanded to JPY136.9tn. AUM expansion thickens the recurring revenue base, but client retention, talent retention, fee rates, cost synergies, and goodwill/intangible asset management remain items to verify.

At the same time, the strong FY2025/26 figures should not redefine Nomura as a low-volatility bank-style credit. Wholesale was strong, with full-year income before income taxes of JPY200.6bn, but it is highly affected by rates, equities, credit, foreign exchange, client flows, M&A, and underwriting conditions. As a financial holding company, holdco creditors depend on dividends from subsidiaries, capital upstreaming, and intragroup funding movements, and are not free from subsidiary regulation, resolution rules, or TLAC design. The latest results positively reinforce the credit view, but they do not change Nomura's evaluation axis. The central axis remains the degree to which stable revenue can absorb volatility in market-based revenue.

The credit meaning of recent changes is summarized below.

2. Industry Position and Franchise Strength

Nomura's core business base is its Japanese retail securities and wealth management franchise. Its 104 domestic offices, more than six million accounts, and JPY175.8tn of Wealth Management client assets show that the company is not simply an execution broker, but a platform offering securities, bonds, mutual funds, insurance, discretionary investment products, real estate referrals, inheritance and business succession support, and corporate solutions to wealthy individuals, retail clients, corporates, regional financial institutions, educational institutions, and other clients. This client contact is different from low-cost online brokerage account growth and also different from the institution- and corporate-centered model of foreign investment banks.

For credit purposes, this domestic base has two meanings. First, the more recurring revenue linked to client assets increases, the more likely an earnings floor remains even during market dislocation. Second, the domestic client base creates cross-business revenue opportunities in bond distribution, mutual fund sales, wealth succession, corporate M&A, and capital markets transactions, so the group is not dependent only on annual trading turnover. The 72% recurring revenue cost coverage ratio in Wealth Management is an important indicator of this transition.

However, the depth of client assets is not the same as deposit stability. Client assets fluctuate with market prices, and during market declines, asset values, investor sentiment, sales flows, and demand for risk products can all weaken at the same time. Nomura's domestic base supports credit quality, but it does not imply megabank-like funding stability. Investors should focus less on client assets themselves and more on how much recurring revenue they generate and how much they absorb fixed costs and market-business volatility.

The expansion of Investment Management is changing the quality of Nomura's franchise. AUM was JPY89.3tn at end-March 2025 and rose to JPY136.9tn at end-March 2026. Since this includes the contribution from the Macquarie acquisition, it should not all be read as organic growth, but the larger asset management and advisory balance increases the thickness of fee-based and balance-linked revenue. If this comes with margins and client retention, Nomura's credit story moves closer to a market-based financial group with balance-driven revenue, rather than a securities company dependent on market conditions.

In Wholesale, Nomura has strengths in Japan- and Asia-originated investment banking, global markets, cross-border transactions, and flows in bonds, equities, rates, and foreign exchange. FY2025/26 investment banking revenue was strong both in Japan and overseas, and the results materials also showed strong records in M&A Japan and ECM Japan. Still, the more accurate view is not that Nomura has the full global competitiveness of the largest U.S. investment banks, but that it combines a domestic client base with competitive positions in selected areas.

The distinctiveness of this business base makes the credit assessment difficult to simplify in one direction. Domestic retail and wealth management make Nomura more defensive than a pure market-based investment bank. On the other hand, the group is not protected by stable deposit, lending, and payment revenue to the same degree as a commercial bank. Nomura is neither as insensitive to markets as a megabank nor as single-track as a pure investment bank. Its credit strengths lie in the combination of domestic client base, AUM, capital markets access, and institutional position as a G-SIB. Its constraints remain the sensitivity of earnings, funding, and collateral to market sentiment.

3. Segment Assessment

Nomura's segment assessment should separate the size of earnings from the contribution to credit quality. Wealth Management is the division that most stably supports credit quality, and Investment Management reinforces stabilization through the expansion of balance-based revenue. Wholesale is a major source of profit, but also the largest source of volatility. Banking remains small, but should be viewed as a future complementary function linking client funds, trusts, private products, and lending.

Wealth Management stabilizes Nomura's credit quality most directly. The more the division earns recurring revenue from mutual funds, discretionary investment products, insurance, lending, and level-fee assets instead of only trading commissions or one-off product sales, the easier it is to absorb fixed costs even in a poor market year. In Q4 FY2025/26, recurring revenue reached a record high, partly reflecting semiannual receipt of investment advisory fees. For credit analysis, the key point is not only the level of divisional profit, but whether the recurring revenue cost coverage ratio can be maintained in weak markets.

Investment Management is the second pillar of stabilization. AUM rose sharply in FY2025/26, but income before taxes was slightly lower year on year. This reflected acquisition-related expenses and impairment on investments, and shows that AUM growth does not translate automatically into higher profit. The division is therefore both a credit improvement factor through scale expansion and an area to monitor for acquisition integration and cost control. Fee rates, client retention, talent retention, cost absorption, and goodwill management matter more than the absolute AUM figure.

Wholesale significantly lifted FY2025/26 earnings, but it should be the division viewed most cautiously in credit analysis. A strong year in both Global Markets and Investment Banking demonstrates earnings capacity and market presence. But if rates, credit, equities, and foreign exchange are stressed at the same time, investment banking activity stalls, client flows shrink, hedging costs rise, or counterparty concerns increase, funding terms and collateral burdens may deteriorate before reported profit. When measuring Nomura's credit quality, the focus should be less on Wholesale profit in a strong year and more on how far losses and funding stress can be contained in a weak year.

Banking was established in April 2025 and is not yet large enough to drive the group profile. Lending, mutual funds, trusts, assets under management at Nomura Bank Luxembourg, and the deposit sweep concept could extend client fund retention and strengthen links with Wealth Management over the long term. In FY2025/26, however, upfront investment reduced income before taxes, so the short-term profile is more cost burden than earnings stabilization. Credit analysis should value Banking as a future stabilization option without overrating it at this stage.

The central point across the segments is that the earnings sources have become more multi-dimensional, but volatility has not disappeared. As Wealth Management and Investment Management thicken, Nomura's earnings floor rises. Yet as long as Wholesale remains large and the holdco structure and market-based funding dependence remain, Nomura will not be fully insensitive to market stress. The current improvement lifts the credit floor; it does not remove the ceiling constraints.

Segment-level RWA, segment-level economic capital, and capital consumption by business line have not been verified in this report. The segment assessment above is therefore a credit reading based on earnings and major KPIs. For Wholesale in particular, profit contribution and capital consumption/RWA volatility cannot be fully matched here. In the next update, segment-level capital consumption or risk measures should be checked where available.

4. Financial Profile and Analysis

Nomura's financial analysis should consider not only the increase in net revenue and net income, but also earnings quality, cost growth, ROE, shareholders' equity, RWA, liquidity, and TLAC. FY2025/26 numbers are strong, but in a securities group, RWA, total assets, collateral/transaction volumes, and compensation costs tend to increase when earnings are strong. Repayment and refinancing capacity therefore depend not just on the absolute level of profit, but on whether capital, liquidity, and funding access can support the enlarged balance sheet.

Note: FY2023/24 figures are based on FY2024/25 results materials, and FY2024/25 and FY2025/26 comparisons are based on FY2025/26 results materials. FY2023/24 segment presentation used the prior three-division format before the Banking division was established, so segment comparisons are not fully like-for-like.

The most positive point in the table is the clear improvement in income before taxes and ROE from FY2023/24 to FY2025/26. ROE rose from 5.1% in FY2023/24 to around 10% in both FY2024/25 and FY2025/26. This looks less like a one-year coincidence and more like the combined result of recurring revenue growth in Wealth Management, AUM expansion in Investment Management, and a Wholesale earnings recovery.

Costs also increased over the same period. FY2025/26 non-interest expenses were JPY1,627.9bn, up 15% year on year. These included compensation, acquisition impact, IT, business process standardization, and upfront investment in Banking. Cost growth with revenue growth is absorbable, but if the same cost base remains in a weaker market, it widens downside profit volatility. Acquisition-related costs in Investment Management, upfront Banking investment, and performance-linked Wholesale compensation all require monitoring for flexibility after a good year.

For a financial institution, capital ratios and liquidity are as important as ROE. Nomura's total assets were JPY62.6tn at end-March 2026, up from JPY56.8tn at end-March 2025. When total assets increase, a lower CET1 ratio and higher RWA are natural, but for a securities group, balance sheet expansion is directly linked to funding, collateral, liquidity, and leverage. The evaluation focus is therefore whether stronger earnings can support the enlarged balance sheet.

FY2025/26 profit levels support ratings and market access. Income before taxes of JPY539.8bn, net income attributable to shareholders of JPY362.1bn, and ROE of 10.1% support the current investment grade profile. But these numbers should not be treated as future normalized earnings without adjustment. In years when Wholesale is strong, equity markets are healthy, and investment banking activity is good, earnings can overshoot. Whether Nomura's credit improvement is durable depends on how far Wealth Management and Investment Management can support fixed costs, capital market access, and funding sensitivity in weaker market years.

5. Structural Considerations for Bondholders

The most important structural issue for bondholders is that the issuer, Nomura Holdings, is a financial holding company, while much of the main business, assets, regulated entities, and liquidity reside in subsidiaries. Holdco creditors rely on dividends from key subsidiaries, repayment of intragroup loans, capital upstreaming, and liquidity transfers. These flows are affected by subsidiary regulation, capital requirements, liquidity needs, local resolution regimes, and group management decisions.

This structure matters because a strong consolidated group does not automatically mean direct access to operating subsidiary cash flows. Nomura Securities, The Nomura Trust and Banking, and overseas regulated subsidiaries are the entities that conduct much of the business and hold client relationships, regulated capital, and liquidity. In stress, regulators may prioritize the soundness of operating subsidiaries, market functions, and client protection. Holdco bondholders therefore face structural subordination to creditors and regulatory claims at subsidiary level.

Ratings across entities show this structure. As of April 20, 2026, Nomura Holdings was rated BBB+ / Positive by S&P, while the key subsidiary Nomura Securities was rated A- / Positive. Moody's rated Nomura Holdings Baa1 / Stable and Nomura Securities A3 / Stable. This difference shows that rating agencies distinguish between operating subsidiary functions, client franchise, and regulatory position, and the structural subordination of holdco creditors. Bond investors should separate the strength of the Nomura group franchise from direct access to holdco debt recovery sources.

Nomura's debt structure includes market funding, repo, secured funding, derivative collateral, CP, domestic and international senior bonds, subordinated debt, and TLAC-eligible debt. Because the structure is not centered on commercial-bank deposits, ratings, spreads, counterparty credit lines, collateral posting, and market-making capacity can directly affect credit perception. If non-financial risks such as reputation, conduct, AML/sanctions compliance, or cyber incidents materialize, counterparty behavior and funding costs may change before earnings do.

This issuer summary has not reviewed bond-by-bond offering circulars, TLAC eligibility, bail-in or write-down language, covenants, change of control, cross default, governing law, or whether subsidiary guarantees exist. The structural assessment here is therefore issuer-level credit analysis. Before investing in a specific bond, term-sheet and covenant-level review is required. This limitation does not invalidate the issuer credit view, but it should be explicit so that recovery ranking and statutory loss absorption are not overstated.

6. Capital Structure, Liquidity and Funding

For capital, liquidity, and funding, it is necessary to distinguish the end-March 2026 results presentation from the official regulatory capital disclosure as of end-December 2025 published on April 10, 2026. In the end-March 2026 results presentation, HQLA and LCR are final, while other end-March capital and TLAC indicators are preliminary. As of May 11, 2026, the FY2025/26 Form 20-F had not yet been posted on the official SEC filings page, limiting a detailed update on legal-entity liquidity, maturity profile, funding by currency, and secured/unsecured funding mix.

Note: End-March 2026 HQLA and LCR are final in company materials; other end-March capital and TLAC indicators are preliminary. Gross leverage is total assets divided by Nomura Holdings shareholders' equity as disclosed by the company. Net leverage is total assets minus securities purchased under agreements to resell and borrowed securities divided by Nomura Holdings shareholders' equity, as defined by the company. TLAC ratios are company-disclosed external TLAC divided by RWA or total exposure; this report has not assessed TLAC eligibility of specific bonds. The liquidity portfolio is the company's liquidity buffer definition and is separate from HQLA and LCR. End-December 2025 CET1 of 13.07%, Tier 1 of 15.31%, total capital of 16.10%, and external TLAC of 27.23% / 10.01% were confirmed in the official regulatory capital release dated April 10, 2026.

Based on this table, Nomura's capital and liquidity do not point to immediate weakness. A JPY10.7tn liquidity portfolio, JPY7.9tn HQLA, and 214.0% LCR provide an initial defense line for a securities group. The TLAC ratio of 26.8% on an RWA basis and 9.7% on a total exposure basis support regulatory headroom and market access in normal times.

Capital indicators require caution. The CET1 ratio declined from 14.5% at end-March 2025 to 12.9% at end-March 2026, while RWA increased from JPY21.5tn to JPY24.5tn. This reflects business expansion, market businesses, Basel III finalization measurement, and higher transaction volume. It is not an immediate danger level, but when growth investment, share buybacks, dividends, and acquisition integration proceed together, the conservatism of capital policy should be monitored.

The practical funding question is not simply whether Nomura can issue debt, but which entity can raise which currency and maturity, on what terms, and whether this remains possible in volatile markets. Nomura is a large issuer with access to domestic and international bond markets and investment grade ratings. However, for a market-based financial group, wider spreads, weaker rating outlooks, counterparty collateral requirements, repo haircuts, and additional derivative CSA collateral can affect liquidity perception before earnings deteriorate. High liquidity portfolio and LCR are supportive, but they do not eliminate sensitivity to market funding.

The FY2025/26 annual dividend was JPY51 per share, and on April 15, 2026 the company announced completion of a share buyback program with a maximum of JPY60bn. Given current earnings and capital ratios, this does not look excessive. For bondholders, however, shareholder returns are always ambiguous. In a strong year they improve capital efficiency, but if market reversal, acquisition integration costs, upfront Banking investment, and Wholesale RWA growth coincide, the balance with capital retention becomes important. Future monitoring should focus on whether achievement of ROE targets is directed too aggressively toward shareholder returns and how conservatively TLAC and liquidity are maintained.

7. Rating Agency View

As of April 20, 2026, Nomura Holdings' main ratings were R&I A+ / Stable, JCR AA- / Stable, Moody's Baa1 / Stable, S&P BBB+ / Positive, and Fitch A- / Stable. The interpretation below is based on rating levels and outlooks confirmed on Nomura's official ratings page and on differences between holdco and key subsidiary ratings. It is not a direct summary of the latest full rating reports from R&I, Moody's, S&P, or Fitch. The gap between domestic and global ratings reflects Nomura's credit profile. Emphasizing the domestic franchise, systemic position, client base, and regulatory capital leads to a higher assessment, while emphasizing market-based revenue, holdco structure, and funding sensitivity leads to a more cautious one.

The key rating interpretation is to consider S&P's Positive outlook and Moody's Baa1 / Stable together. S&P's Positive outlook suggests upside if recurring revenue, capital management, and earnings improvement continue. Moody's Baa1 indicates investment grade, but also reflects market-based earnings, funding dependence, and holdco constraints from a global financial institution perspective. Nomura is therefore a financial credit with improvement potential, not one that has already removed its constraints.

Relatively high domestic ratings show that the domestic client base and systemic position are viewed strongly. This is consistent with the perspective of domestic Japanese investors. For foreign-currency bonds and overseas investors, however, holdco structural subordination, TLAC eligibility, market funding sensitivity, and cross-jurisdiction regulatory/liquidity constraints are more likely to be emphasized. The rating table should therefore be used not only as a level comparison, but also as an indication of which constraints each investor base may weight more heavily.

This report has not reviewed the latest full text reports from all rating agencies. The JCR rating list and Nomura's official ratings page were checked, but detailed upgrade and downgrade triggers in the R&I, Moody's, S&P, and Fitch reports remain items for the next update or for pre-investment review. Still, current ratings and outlooks are consistent with this report's view of Nomura as an improving investment grade credit that still has market-based financial constraints.

8. Credit Positioning

Nomura is best positioned between megabanks, domestic securities firms, and global investment banks. Compared with MUFG, SMFG, and Mizuho, which have deep deposit, lending, and payment bases, Nomura is more sensitive to market volatility, unsecured funding, collateral, and counterparty behavior. Compared with pure global investment banks, Nomura has a domestic client base in retail securities, wealth management, mutual funds, discretionary investment, inheritance, and business succession.

This report does not make relative value judgments using market spreads or CDS, because the normal project environment does not provide access to Bloomberg or live bond price/OAS data. Therefore, it does not state buy/sell/hold or cheap/rich views. On fundamentals, Nomura is best described as an investment grade financial issuer that is more market-sensitive than a megabank and has a thicker domestic client base than a pure investment bank.

This positioning looks different in normal times and stress. In normal times, recurring revenue and AUM expansion are likely to be valued, and S&P's Positive outlook highlights potential upside. In stress, Wholesale, repo and derivative collateral, unsecured issuance, ratings, and TLAC become more prominent, and the market may price Nomura more cautiously than megabanks sooner. Nomura should be treated not as a utility-like credit for passive holding, but as a financial credit whose progress in recurring revenue is positive while sensitivity to market stress remains.

9. Key Credit Strengths and Constraints

Nomura's first strength is its deep domestic Wealth Management client base. Client assets of JPY175.8tn, more than six million accounts, and 104 nationwide offices show not only securities-company scale, but also multi-layered revenue opportunities. If client assets generate more recurring revenue and recurring revenue covers more fixed costs, the group earnings floor is easier to protect in weak Wholesale years.

The second strength is the expansion of Investment Management AUM. AUM of JPY136.9tn thickens balance-fee recurring revenue. The addition of Macquarie's U.S. and European public asset management business expands geographies, clients, and products. If relatively capital-light asset management revenue increases, the quality of credit for a securities group improves.

The third strength is Nomura's G-SIB regulatory capital, TLAC, liquidity management, and market access. The end-March 2026 liquidity portfolio of JPY10.7tn, HQLA of JPY7.9tn, LCR of 214.0%, and TLAC ratio of 26.8% on an RWA basis support the credit in normal times. Continuous access to domestic and international capital markets is also important for a securities group.

The first constraint is Wholesale market sensitivity. FY2025/26 was strong, but if rates, equities, credit, foreign exchange, investment banking activity, and client flows all weaken, earnings can shrink rapidly. To upgrade the view of Nomura's credit, it is necessary to confirm how far the overall group can withstand a poor year, not just how good Wholesale profit is in a strong year.

The second constraint is holdco structure and TLAC. Creditors of Nomura Holdings are economically dependent on the value and cash flows of key subsidiaries, but legally can sit behind subsidiary creditors and regulatory constraints. TLAC-eligible debt is both debt of a major investment grade financial group and a loss-absorbing instrument in resolution. If this dual nature is ignored, ordinary senior debt and statutory loss-absorbing debt may be evaluated with the same intuition.

The third constraint is sensitivity to market funding and reputation risk. In a securities group, rating downgrades, spread widening, conduct issues, AML/sanctions problems, or cyber incidents can affect client behavior, repo, derivative collateral, and unsecured funding costs. Funding prices may change before the P/L turns negative.

The fourth constraint is the balance between capital policy and growth investment. FY2025/26 profit levels appear to absorb dividends and buybacks. But if Macquarie integration, upfront Banking investment, Wholesale RWA growth, and market reversal coincide, the priority among shareholder returns, growth investment, TLAC maintenance, and capital retention will matter. For bondholders, conservatism under stress is more important than capital efficiency.

10. Downside Scenarios and Monitoring Triggers

The most realistic downside is simultaneous global market stress. If rates, equities, credit, and foreign exchange become volatile, client flows shrink, and investment banking activity stalls, Wholesale earnings would fall first. Then trading assets, hedges, VaR, RWA, collateral posting, and repo haircuts could pressure capital and liquidity. If rating tone and market sentiment deteriorate further, unsecured funding costs and counterparty behavior could be affected. In this channel, funding terms may change before the P/L fully deteriorates.

The second downside is failure to deliver the recurring revenue story. If market declines reduce Wealth Management client assets, lower the recurring revenue cost coverage ratio, and weaken sales flows, Nomura's earnings floor would be lower than expected. In Investment Management, if the post-Macquarie acquisition period brings client outflows, talent outflows, higher costs, fee-rate pressure, or goodwill/intangible impairments, the credit improvement story from AUM expansion would weaken. This would not necessarily imply an immediate liquidity crisis, but it would reduce rating upside and market revaluation potential.

The third downside is a non-financial event spilling into funding. Conduct, AML, sanctions, cyber, or major internal control failures can cause a securities group to see simultaneous deterioration in client flows, counterparty credit, collateral requirements, ratings, and investor appetite. Nomura's domestic client base may prevent an immediate broad credit crisis, but the larger the institution, the more market attention it attracts.

The fourth downside is a case where shareholder returns and growth investment undermine conservatism. If buybacks and dividends continue on the back of strong profit while acquisition integration, Banking investment, and Wholesale balance sheet expansion proceed, capital headroom may look thin when markets turn. The end-March 2026 CET1 ratio of 12.9% is not immediately concerning, but it is down from end-March 2025 and RWA has increased. Further RWA growth or losses would make capital policy an important monitoring point.

Monitoring items are Wealth Management client assets, net inflows, recurring revenue cost coverage, Investment Management AUM, client retention, talent retention, costs, Wholesale quarterly revenue, VaR, RWA, CET1, Tier 1, total capital, leverage ratio, HQLA, LCR, TLAC, unsecured issuance record, rating outlooks, maintenance of S&P Positive, the balance between shareholder returns and growth investment, and major conduct, AML, or cyber incidents.

Before investing in a specific bond, investors should check TLAC eligibility, issuing entity, legal ranking, subordination, bail-in or write-down language, covenants, change of control, cross default, collateral, and governing law. An issuer report does not need to include all of these in the body, but they should remain explicit structural uncertainties.

11. Credit View and Monitoring Focus

Current credit quality is sufficiently stable for investment grade, and the main focus is not a near-term downgrade concern. However, the credit quality should be evaluated as a major securities and market-based financial credit affected by market conditions and unsecured funding terms, not as a megabank-style stable deposit credit. The direction of credit quality is moderately improving because of the thickness of Wealth Management and Investment Management, but that improvement has not yet become stable enough to fully offset Wholesale cyclicality. Given FY2025/26 results, client assets of JPY175.8tn, AUM of JPY136.9tn, and regulatory capital/TLAC/liquidity levels, the probability of rapid near-term credit deterioration is not high. But if market stress and a weaker unsecured funding environment overlap, spreads and rating tone may react before reported earnings.

The credit is supported by the domestic retail client base, recurring revenue growth in Wealth Management, AUM expansion in Investment Management, G-SIB regulatory capital/TLAC/liquidity, and continued access to domestic and overseas capital markets. These factors make Nomura stronger than a simple flow-dependent securities company and have raised the credit floor compared with several years ago. In particular, if Wealth Management and Investment Management can support fixed costs and the earnings floor even in weak markets, the group's repayment and refinancing capacity should remain meaningfully protected when Wholesale is weak.

The main constraint is that Wholesale cyclicality and market funding sensitivity still set the ceiling of the credit assessment. Strong Wholesale results cannot be fixed as normal earnings, and in market stress, weaker earnings, RWA growth, collateral posting, repo terms, unsecured funding costs, and counterparty behavior can deteriorate together. Holdco creditors depend on capital upstreaming from subsidiaries, and TLAC-eligible debt has statutory loss absorption. Even when consolidated capital and liquidity look strong, investors need to separate issuing entity, ranking, TLAC eligibility, and bail-in/write-down language for each bond.

A further improvement in the credit view would require the Wealth Management recurring revenue cost coverage ratio to remain durable rather than market-dependent, Investment Management AUM expansion to come with margins and client retention, the group to protect earnings and capital even in weak Wholesale quarters, and CET1, TLAC, LCR, and the liquidity portfolio to remain conservative. Conversely, a simultaneous Wholesale reversal, AUM outflows, Macquarie integration issues, weaker rating outlooks, higher unsecured funding costs, and aggressive capital returns would require the current improving view to be revisited.

For bond investors, the practical view is not simply that Nomura is an improved major securities firm, but that it is a financial holding company with growing recurring revenue depth whose funding conditions and structural subordination become important in market stress. Without market spread data, relative value remains unverified. Fundamentally, support for investment grade has strengthened, but it is still too early to treat Nomura as a megabank-style stable holding credit. Monitoring should focus on recurring revenue, Wholesale volatility, capital/TLAC/liquidity, Macquarie integration, rating outlooks, and the balance between shareholder returns and growth investment.

12. Short Summary & Conclusion

Nomura Holdings is a major Japanese integrated securities and market-based financial group with end-March 2026 client assets of JPY175.8tn, AUM of JPY136.9tn, and more than six million accounts as of December 2025. FY2025/26 results and the depth of client assets/AUM support credit improvement, but Wholesale market volatility, holdco structure, TLAC, and unsecured funding sensitivity remain the main constraints. Monitoring points are recurring revenue, Wholesale revenue, capital/TLAC/LCR, Macquarie integration, rating outlooks, and the balance between shareholder returns and growth investment.

13. Sources

Primary company sources

• Nomura Holdings, Inc., Consolidated Results of Operations (US GAAP), Fourth quarter, year ended March 2026, presentation summary, April 2026 / filed as 6-K on April 30, 2026. Used to confirm FY2025/26 results, segment revenue, end-March 2026 capital/liquidity/TLAC, HQLA/LCR, AUM, and recurring revenue data.
  https://www.nomuraholdings.com/en/investor/download/2026/main/0/teaserItems1/0/tableContents/06/multiFileUpload60/link/2026_full_pres.pdf
• Nomura Holdings, Inc., Consolidated Results of Operations (US GAAP), Fourth quarter, year ended March 2025, presentation summary. Used to confirm FY2023/24 and FY2024/25 comparative financials and prior-segment trends.
  https://www.nomuraholdings.com/en/investor/summary/finance/main/02/teaserItems5/0/linkList/0/link/2025_full_pres.pdf
• Nomura Holdings, Inc., Financial Results / Quarterly Earnings page, accessed 2026-05-11. Used to confirm the location of FY2025/26 results materials, 6-K filings, and historical materials.
  https://www.nomuraholdings.com/en/investor/summary/finance.html
• Nomura Holdings, Inc., SEC Filings page, accessed 2026-05-11. Used to confirm that the FY2025/26 Form 20-F had not yet been posted, that the latest 20-F was filed on June 23, 2025, and that 6-K filings dated April 30 and May 7, 2026 were posted.
  https://www.nomuraholdings.com/en/investor/library/sec.html
• Nomura Holdings, Inc., Nomura Announces Consolidated Regulatory Capital and Liquidity Coverage Ratios, April 10, 2026. Used to confirm end-December 2025 CET1, Tier 1, total capital, leverage, and external TLAC ratios.
  https://www.nomuraholdings.com/en/news/nr/nhi20260410.html
• Nomura Holdings, Inc., Nomura Announces Acquisition of Macquarie's U.S. and European Public Asset Management Business, April 22, 2025. Used to confirm target assets, approximately USD180bn of client assets, purchase price, and strategic rationale.
  https://www.nomuraholdings.com/en/news/nr/news20250422.html
• Macquarie Group, Macquarie Group completes sale of Macquarie Asset Management's public investments business in North America and Europe to Nomura, December 1, 2025. Used as supplementary confirmation of closing date and transferred asset scale.
  https://www.macquarie.com/nl/en/about/news/2025/macquarie-group-completes-sale-of-macquarie-asset-managements-public-investments-business-in-north-america-and-europe-to-nomura.html
• Nomura Holdings, Inc., Nomura Announces Results of Share Buyback Program from Market, April 15, 2026. Used to confirm completion of the share buyback program with a JPY60bn cap and cumulative repurchases of JPY59,999,879,300.
  https://www.nomuraholdings.com/en/news/nr/nhi20260415.html
• Nomura Holdings, Inc., Wealth Management, accessed 2026-05-11. Used to confirm domestic office count, client assets, account count, and business description.
  https://www.nomuraholdings.com/en/services/retail.html
• Nomura Holdings, Inc., Wealth Management Client Assets, accessed 2026-05-11. Used to confirm end-March 2026 client assets of JPY175.8tn.
  https://www.nomuraholdings.com/en/investor/summary/business/client.html
• Nomura Holdings, Inc., Assets under Management, accessed 2026-05-11. Used to confirm end-March 2026 AUM of JPY136.9tn.
  https://www.nomuraholdings.com/en/investor/summary/business/asset.html
• Nomura Holdings, Inc., Credit Ratings, as of April 20, 2026. Used to confirm ratings for Nomura Holdings, Nomura Securities, and The Nomura Trust and Banking.
  https://www.nomuraholdings.com/en/investor/creditor/ratings.html
• Nomura Holdings, Inc., Creditor Information, accessed 2026-05-11. Used to confirm location of bond, rating, and creditor information.
  https://www.nomuraholdings.com/en/investor/creditor.html

Rating agency sources

• Japan Credit Rating Agency, Nomura Holdings rating list, accessed 2026-05-11. Used to confirm JCR's Nomura Holdings AA- / Stable and the location of rating-related releases since 2025.
  https://www.jcr.co.jp/en/ratinglist/corp/8604/

Previous internal sources

• issuers/nomura_holdings/current/nomura_holdings_issuer_summary_20260501.md. Used to carry forward the existing credit story, structural issues, and downside risks.
• Internal issuer notes, compressed knowledge snapshot, and source registry. Used to confirm continuing monitoring points, pending items, and existing sources.
• issuers/nomura_holdings/data/nomura_holdings_20260511_credit_metrics.json. Structured key metrics used in the tables in this update.

Unverified / Pending items