Sands China Issuer Summary

Report date: 2026-05-15
Issuer: Sands China Ltd.
Ticker: SANLTD
Listed equity reference: 1928 HK
Relevant bond issuer: Sands China Ltd.
Operating concessionaire: Venetian Macau Limited

1. Business Snapshot and Recent Developments

Sands China Ltd. (“Sands China” or “SCL”) is a casino and tourism issuer that owns and operates large-scale integrated resorts in Macao. For credit analysis purposes, it is neither simply a hotel company nor simply a casino operator. Through The Venetian Macao, The Londoner Macao, The Parisian Macao, The Plaza Macao/Four Seasons, and Sands Macao, SCL monetises gaming, hotels, retail malls, food and beverage, MICE, and entertainment as an integrated business model dependent on Macao’s regulated concession framework. Its subsidiary Venetian Macau Limited (“VML”) holds a Macao gaming concession effective from January 1, 2023, with a 10-year term. This concession is central to SCL’s business value, but it is not a government guarantee. It is a regulatory right that entails operating licensing, investment commitments, and tax burdens.

As of end-2025, SCL had 10,487 hotel rooms and suites, approximately 1.63 million square feet of MICE space, a 20,000-seat arena, approximately 2.07 million square feet of retail space, 777 stores, 160 food and beverage outlets, and approximately 1.46 million square feet of gaming space. VML is authorised to operate up to 1,680 tables and 3,700 slots. The 2025 Annual Report states that SCL received approximately 98 million leisure and business visits at its Cotai and Macao Peninsula properties. Scale and asset quality support credit strength, but they also imply capital intensity, requiring ongoing property refreshment, customer reinvestment, labour costs, and concession-related investment.

FY2025 was a year in which Macao demand continued to recover, but the key credit question for SCL was how far the recovery in revenue could absorb the debt burden. Total net revenues in 2025 were US$7.44 billion, up 5.1% from US$7.08 billion in 2024. The company stated that, for Macao as a whole, visits from mainland China to Macao increased by approximately 18.5% year on year and GGR rose by approximately 9.1%. However, SCL’s adjusted property EBITDA in 2025 was US$2.31 billion, down 0.7% from US$2.33 billion in 2024. The company cited higher operating and marketing expenses as the main reason. In other words, SCL is one of the stronger beneficiaries of the market recovery, but as of 2025, revenue growth was not yet translating directly into EBITDA growth.

Looking only at the recovery phase would overstate SCL’s credit strength, so the 2021-2022 stress period must also be used as a starting point. According to the five-year financial summary in the 2025 Annual Report, SCL’s total net revenues fell to US$2.87 billion in 2021 and US$1.61 billion in 2022. Operating losses were US$537 million and US$1.16 billion, respectively, and losses attributable to equity holders were US$1.05 billion and US$1.58 billion. At end-2022, equity was negative US$700 million and total liabilities had risen to US$11.26 billion. The recovery since 2023 has been substantial, but the company’s stress resilience depended not only on a strong asset base, but also on borrowing markets, parent liquidity, bank facilities, and the removal of government operating restrictions.

1Q 2026 should be viewed as a quarter in which Sands China’s revenue recovery reaccelerated. However, this information is not from SCL’s IFRS quarterly financial statements; it is supplementary information extracted from US GAAP disclosures by its parent company, Las Vegas Sands Corp. (“LVS”), regarding SCL and the Macao operations. According to Sands China’s announcement dated April 23, 2026, SCL’s total net revenues in 1Q 2026 increased 23.6% year on year to US$2.10 billion, and SCL’s net income increased 45.5% to US$294 million. LVS’s 1Q 2026 Earnings Release dated April 22, 2026 stated that total net revenues from Macao Operations were US$2.11 billion and adjusted property EBITDA was US$633 million, up from US$535 million in the prior-year quarter. It is positive that the renovation and repositioning investment at The Londoner Macao has begun to monetise. At the same time, LVS also indicated that competition in the premium segment is intense and that investment is needed in service levels, customer reinvestment, employees, and room and suite refreshment.

In short, SCL is an investment-grade credit with one of Macao’s largest integrated resort platforms. However, the source of its credit strength is not government support, but the quality of its Cotai assets, mass and premium-mass demand, the complementary nature of its hotel, retail, and MICE operations, and the operating capabilities of the LVS group. Credit constraints include reliance on a single market and a single concession in Macao, heavy gaming taxes and non-gaming investment obligations, capital intensity, the lack of subsidiary guarantees and structural subordination of SCL’s bonds, and upstreaming of funds to the parent.

2. Industry Position and Franchise Strength

Sands China’s business foundation is supported by scale and asset quality in the specialised market of Macao. Macao is the only region in China where casino gaming is legal and is one of the world’s largest gaming markets. Within that market, SCL is an early mover that has built a large integrated resort cluster in Cotai, with a business model that links hotels, retail, MICE, and entertainment to gaming demand. This report does not recalculate precise property-level GGR share or premium-mass share. However, based on property area, room count, retail space, MICE facilities, and gaming capacity, it can be confirmed that the company has one of Macao’s leading franchises.

The recovery in the Macao market is a tailwind for SCL. Macao GGR increased by approximately 9.1% year on year in 2025, and robust monthly data continued into early 2026. According to a GGRAsia article dated May 1, 2026, citing DICJ, Macao GGR in April 2026 was MOP19.89 billion, up 5.5% year on year. Market recovery supports SCL’s sales volume, hotel occupancy, retail sales, MICE demand, and premium customer acquisition. However, as overall Macao GGR recovers, all concessionaires tend to invest in premium customers, events, rooms, and loyalty programmes, which can also increase competitive costs. The fact that SCL’s EBITDA was flat in 2025 illustrates this cost structure.

The first strength of Sands China’s franchise is its connected cluster of Cotai properties. The Venetian, The Londoner, The Parisian, and The Plaza are mutually complementary both physically and commercially. The Venetian serves large-scale MICE and retail demand. The Londoner appeals to suite and premium customers after renovation. The Plaza/Four Seasons offers luxury retail and high-rate accommodation. The Parisian functions as an upper-midscale accommodation and tourism landmark. The combination of multiple properties gives the group more room to capture customers even if a single property is under renovation or underperforming.

The second strength is the depth of its hotel, MICE, and retail platform. Room revenues in 2025 were US$853 million, up 10.2%, and mall revenues were US$521 million, up 5.7%. Non-gaming businesses are not merely ancillary revenues; they support customer dwell time, in-property spend, premium customer acquisition, and the non-gaming investment obligations under the concession framework. The third strength is the LVS group’s operating know-how and capital markets access. As of SCL’s announcement on April 23, 2026, LVS held approximately 74.8% of SCL’s shares, and SCL indirectly benefits from LVS’s property operations, brand, and capital market recognition. However, this is not an explicit guarantee from LVS.

Regulation is both an entry barrier and a credit constraint for SCL. SCL’s business assets are concentrated almost entirely in Macao, meaning mainland Chinese consumption, border-control policy, capital-movement restrictions, Macao government gaming policy, labour rules, tax rules, and concession terms all affect the business at the same time. SCL competes with SJM, Galaxy, Wynn Macau, MGM China, and Melco, each of which is strengthening property refreshment, premium rooms, events, food and beverage, and loyalty programmes in Cotai or on the peninsula. SCL is a strong asset owner that can benefit from market recovery, but it is not a low-risk company whose profits grow without accompanying costs and regulation.

3. Segment Assessment

Casino operations are central to Sands China’s revenues. However, for credit analysis, rather than isolating casino revenues alone, it is necessary to examine how rooms, malls, food and beverage, MICE, and entertainment contribute to the acquisition and retention of gaming revenues. The table below summarises the 2025 IFRS revenue breakdown and property-level US GAAP supplementary information for 1Q 2026. When IFRS, US GAAP, company-defined EBITDA, and our supplementary calculations are used together, the scope must always be clearly stated.

The casino business is the core of Sands China’s credit profile. Casino revenues of US$5.58 billion in 2025 accounted for approximately 75% of total net revenues. The company’s casino operations are divided into Rolling Chip, Non-Rolling Chip, and slots, with an assumed Rolling Chip win rate of 3.30%. Actual win rates fluctuate by quarter, so short-term volatility in casino revenues should not be equated with changes in demand. The shift toward mass and premium mass may improve revenue quality compared with the former reliance on VIP junkets, but it also entails competition for customers and reinvestment costs.

The rooms business supports SCL’s ability to attract premium customers. At The Londoner Macao, the conversion of Sheraton Grand Macao into Londoner Grand was completed in April 2025, adding 2,405 rooms under Marriott International’s Luxury Collection. Room revenues at The Londoner Macao were US$375 million in 2025, up 24.2% year on year. This indicates that renovation investment has begun to support room rates and customer-mix improvement. However, maintaining room quality requires ongoing capex and service staffing, and part of the revenue improvement will be absorbed by reinvestment.

The mall business is the highest-quality component of Sands China’s non-gaming revenues. Mall revenues in 2025 were US$521 million, with Shoppes at Venetian generating US$254 million and Shoppes at Four Seasons generating US$155 million. Luxury retail is less exposed to short-term win-rate volatility, but it depends on inbound visitors to Macao, high-end consumption, and relationships with brand tenants. MICE, food and beverage, and events are smaller in revenue scale, but they increase reasons to visit the properties and are aligned with the Macao government’s required non-gaming diversification.

By property, The Venetian and The Londoner are the core assets. In LVS’s 1Q 2026 disclosure, The Venetian Macao had net revenues of US$710 million and adjusted property EBITDA of US$238 million, while The Londoner Macao had net revenues of US$754 million and EBITDA of US$223 million. The Plaza/Four Seasons was highly profitable, with net revenues of US$290 million and EBITDA of US$114 million. The Parisian and Sands Macao still have room for profitability improvement. Credit analysis of SCL should look not only at group EBITDA, but also at which properties capture which customer segments and which properties require additional investment.

4. Financial Profile and Analysis

Sands China’s financial profile has normalised materially since Macao reopened from 2023, but as of 2025 it is still difficult to say that the strong recovery has translated directly into low leverage. Revenue, EBITDA, and operating cash flow support the investment-grade foundation. At the same time, borrowings remain sizeable, and net debt, dividends, concession investment, and upstreaming to the parent must be assessed together.

The losses in 2021 and 2022 show that SCL’s business is not resilient to a halt in demand. Conversely, the 2023-2025 recovery shows the strength of the asset base and its ability to capture revenue when the market reopens. For a casino company, the key issue is not only normalised EBITDA, but also how effectively cash, bank lines, the bond market, and parent policy function during the next demand shock.

Note: 1Q 2026 figures are supplementary information extracted from LVS US GAAP disclosures regarding SCL and are not fully comparable with full-year 2025 IFRS figures. Supplementary FCF is our supplementary figure calculated as operating cash flow less purchases of property and equipment, additions to investment properties, and purchases of intangible assets. It is not a company-defined FCF measure.

Looking at 2025 earnings, the revenue recovery was clear, but margins were sluggish. Total net revenues increased 5.1% to US$7.44 billion, while adjusted property EBITDA fell 0.7% to US$2.31 billion and operating profit also declined to US$1.23 billion. Based on our calculation using total net revenues as the denominator and adjusted property EBITDA as the numerator, the EBITDA margin declined by approximately 1.9 percentage points, from approximately 32.9% in 2024 to approximately 31.0% in 2025. This is not a minor rounding issue; it shows that the revenue recovery was materially absorbed by higher costs. Operating expenses in 2025 increased 8.7% to US$6.21 billion. Higher casino expenses included gaming taxes linked to GGR growth, payroll-related costs, and marketing expenses. SCL has moved from a phase of benefiting from low-cost natural recovery into a phase of competition and reinvestment to capture premium customers.

Cash flow is stronger than earnings. Operating cash flow in 2025 was US$2.105 billion, exceeding US$2.072 billion in 2024. Supplementary free cash flow after deducting major capex and related items from operating cash flow was approximately US$1.55 billion. However, this supplementary FCF should not be treated entirely as debt-reduction capacity. SCL paid dividends of US$518 million in 2025 and must execute a concession investment plan of approximately MOP35.84 billion by 2032. Strong operating cash flow is positive, but the allocation among dividends, investment, and debt repayment will determine the direction of credit strength.

The balance sheet is improving. At end-2025, cash and cash equivalents were US$1.505 billion, total borrowings were US$7.141 billion, and net debt was US$5.415 billion. Equity increased from US$1.031 billion at end-2024 to US$1.401 billion at end-2025, and the gearing ratio improved from 85.4% to 79.4%. Even so, the absolute debt level remains large. Net debt / adjusted property EBITDA was approximately 2.3x in 2025, and total borrowings / adjusted property EBITDA was approximately 3.1x. These levels are not excessively high for an integrated resort company, but given Macao single-market concentration, investment obligations, and the resumption of dividends, they are not aggressively conservative either.

In summary, as of end-2025, Sands China had the revenue scale, operating cash flow, liquidity, and capital markets access that underpin an investment-grade profile. At the same time, flat EBITDA in 2025 showed that Macao recovery does not automatically translate into deleveraging. The improvement in 1Q 2026 is positive, but its sustainability still needs to be confirmed. Financially, SCL’s profile supports the credit, but it is more of a recovery-and-reinvestment credit managing investment, dividends, and customer reinvestment simultaneously than a conservative credit focused strongly on debt reduction.

5. Structural Considerations for Bondholders

For Sands China bondholders, the most important structural issue is the relationship between SCL as the issuer of the notes and the Macao subsidiaries that actually operate the business and generate cash flow. SCL’s Senior Notes are senior unsecured obligations issued by Sands China Ltd. and rank pari passu with existing and future senior unsecured indebtedness and ahead of subordinated indebtedness. However, the Senior Notes are not guaranteed by any subsidiary. SCL bondholders are therefore creditors of SCL itself and do not have direct and unconditional access to the assets or cash flow of the Macao operating subsidiaries.

This structural subordination is less visible in normal times. SCL is a listed holding company, and through subsidiary dividends, repayment of intragroup loans, and cash management, SCL can secure funds for bond interest and redemption. On the 2025 company-level balance sheet, SCL itself held US$6.871 billion of notes receivable from subsidiaries, US$1.326 billion of interests in subsidiaries, and US$259 million of cash. In 2025, it received US$979 million of dividend income from subsidiaries VVDIL and VCHL. There is a mechanism for upstreaming subsidiary cash to the parent in normal times.

In stress, however, subsidiary-level debt, regulation, the concession, operating funding needs, and approvals from Macao authorities become important. The Annual Report states that VML is required to obtain approvals from Macao gaming and governmental authorities before raising debt or equity, which restricts its ability to raise additional capital. In addition, the SCL group returned gaming assets to the Macao government without compensation and obtained usage rights during the concession term. Economically, SCL bondholders depend on the operating cash flow of subsidiaries as a recovery source, but legally, that cash flow is subject to regulation and subsidiary-level fund-transfer constraints.

Another structural feature of SCL’s bonds is the relationship with parent company LVS. LVS controls SCL, but it is not an explicit guarantor of SCL’s bonds. LVS’s capital markets access, operating capabilities, brand, and capital-allocation policy affect SCL. The parent’s treatment of SCL as a core asset is positive for credit strength in normal times. At the same time, LVS also has the Marina Bay Sands expansion in Singapore, parent-level debt, and shareholder returns. SCL dividends may become an important funding source for LVS. Bondholders should not assume that SCL’s notes are automatically safe because LVS has good credit quality; they need to examine how cash generated at SCL is allocated among SCL debt, SCL investment, and SCL dividends.

In structural terms, SCL’s bonds are senior unsecured obligations of SCL itself, economically backed by a strong Macao business. In normal times, subsidiary dividends and intragroup receivables provide SCL with capacity to service debt. In stress, the priority of operating-subsidiary fund transfers, Macao regulation, concession investment, subsidiary debt, and parent dividends becomes important. SCL bond credit is supported by the business strength of the Sands China group, but the recovery structure is not that of a direct operating-company bond with subsidiary guarantees.

6. Capital Structure, Liquidity and Funding

Sands China’s liquidity was manageable as of end-2025. Cash on hand was US$1.505 billion, and the undrawn amount under the 2024 SCL Revolving Facility was HK$19.50 billion, or approximately US$2.51 billion. On January 2, 2026, SCL drew HK$6.20 billion from this revolver and, together with cash on hand, repaid US$800 million of Senior Notes on January 8, 2026. After the drawdown, undrawn capacity was HK$13.30 billion, or approximately US$1.71 billion, and in April 2026 SCL repaid HK$2.40 billion. The timely repayment of the short-dated 2026 notes, followed by partial repayment of the revolver, is positive from a liquidity management perspective.

From a maturity perspective, short-term liquidity concerns receded after the 2026 note repayment. Even after the partial repayment in April 2026, the estimated remaining undrawn revolving capacity of HK$15.70 billion provides time to address the US$700 million note maturity in 2027. However, SCL stand-alone cash as of end-March 2026 or after the April repayment has not been confirmed in this report. Over the medium term, bond maturities continue every year from 2027 through 2031, with the US$1.9 billion maturity in 2028 particularly large. Under normal conditions, operating cash flow, cash on hand, the revolver, and bond-market access should be sufficient. However, if Macao demand weakens, rates remain high, and ratings or investor risk appetite deteriorate, refinancing costs and market access would become credit constraints.

Bank liquidity is a strength. The 2024 SCL Credit Facility had substantial undrawn capacity at end-2025 and was actually used to repay the 2026 notes. The revolver carries a margin linked to the consolidated leverage ratio; at the time of the January 2026 drawdown, the margin was 2.50% and the all-in interest rate was approximately 5.12%. The facility also contains financial covenants and restrictions on dividends and other matters, and the Annual Report states that SCL was in compliance with the relevant provisions as of December 31, 2025. The specific thresholds and stress-case headroom need to be confirmed from the bank agreement itself or additional company disclosures.

Capital expenditure and dividends will continue to affect funding. The concession investment plan runs through 2032 and is heavily weighted toward non-gaming investment. SCL paid US$518 million of dividends in 2025, while LVS executed US$740 million of share repurchases in 1Q 2026. Dividends are natural as profit and operating cash flow recover, but from a bondholder perspective they are also cash outflows that could otherwise have been used for debt reduction. For SCL’s credit strength to improve sustainably, EBITDA recovery needs to translate into debt reduction or better refinancing conditions, with dividends and investment not running excessively ahead of deleveraging.

7. Rating Agency View

From a rating perspective, Sands China is positioned in investment grade. S&P Global Ratings’ Research Update dated April 30, 2026 stated that it raised issuer ratings on Las Vegas Sands and subsidiaries including Sands China to BBB/stable and also raised SCL’s unsecured debt rating to BBB. S&P expects LVS to maintain adjusted net debt leverage around 2.5x, with headroom to the 3x downside trigger. For SCL, the S&P BBB/stable rating is positive in that it represents a one-notch move from low investment grade toward mid-investment grade. However, the details of the upgrade rationale are based on an assessment of the LVS group as a whole and do not replace verification of SCL’s lack of subsidiary guarantees or the terms of individual instruments.

For Fitch, Sands China’s 2025 Annual Report states that Fitch upgraded the Company rating to BBB- on February 1, 2024. The report explains that this upgrade reduced the coupon on the Senior Notes by 0.25% per annum. The latest Moody’s rating action text has not been confirmed in this report, so it is not included definitively in the rating table. For investment decisions on individual bonds, the latest full reports from Moody’s, Fitch, and S&P should be rechecked.

Factors that rating agencies appear to be assessing include SCL’s Cotai asset quality, the recovery in the Macao market, the operating capabilities of the LVS group, capital markets access, debt reduction since 2025, and EBITDA improvement in 1Q 2026. Constraints include Macao single-market concentration, the regulated concession, heavy gaming taxes, flat EBITDA in 2025, high gross debt, dividends and parent shareholder returns, and property refreshment and non-gaming investment obligations. Investment-grade ratings provide important external validation, but they should not by themselves determine whether SCL bonds are cheap or rich, or whether specific maturities are sufficiently safe.

The upside factors considered in this report are stable growth in SCL’s adjusted property EBITDA from 2026 onward, net debt / EBITDA moving toward around 2x or below, early clarity on refinancing the large 2028 maturity, and dividends and parent returns not excessively impeding deleveraging. Downside factors include stagnation in Macao GGR, increased premium-competition costs, delayed payback from The Londoner investment, slower debt reduction due to higher dividends, deterioration in refinancing conditions for the 2028 maturity, and adverse concession or regulatory changes.

8. Credit Positioning

This report has not confirmed live bond prices, yields, OAS, Z-spreads, CDS levels, or relative spreads versus similar-maturity bonds. It therefore does not make any valuation judgment or trading recommendation on Sands China bonds. The Credit Positioning section sets out what type of credit SCL should be treated as, based on publicly available information about issuer credit, structure, maturity profile, and sector positioning.

Sands China is an investment-grade Macao integrated resort credit with a strong business base, but with constraints from single-market exposure, regulation, and capital policy. Compared with large developed-market hotel and leisure companies, the earnings power of the Cotai assets and Macao’s gaming exclusivity are attractive, but geographic diversification is limited. Unlike global consumer staples or utilities with more resilient demand, SCL is affected by tourism, premium consumption, border entry, casino policy, win rates, and competitive costs. On the other hand, entry barriers and property scale in Macao are high, giving SCL a stronger franchise than a typical cyclical leisure company.

By maturity, the 2027 and 2028 bonds most directly reflect medium-term refinancing and liquidity risk. The 2028 bonds are large at US$1.9 billion, making refinancing market access and rating maintenance important. The 2029-2031 bonds are more exposed to the latter part of the concession period, non-gaming investment, the Macao market cycle, and parent returns. In comparison with LVS parent bonds, SCL bonds have higher Macao concentration risk but are closer to the cash flow of the Macao business. LVS parent bonds are economically diversified across both Singapore and Macao, but are structurally subordinated to subsidiary debt. This difference cannot be assessed only through rating differences or coupon differences; it depends on which regional, business, and structural risks investors want to take.

9. Key Credit Strengths and Constraints

Sands China’s first credit strength is its scale and asset quality in Macao. It has a connected cluster of large-scale properties in Cotai and can combine lodging, gaming, dining, shopping, and events within one property group to capture customer stay time and spend. Its second strength is the structural entry barrier in the Macao market. Casino operation is limited to six concessions, and VML holds one of them. The third strength is financial normalisation since 2025. At end-2025, total borrowings declined to US$7.14 billion, net debt was US$5.42 billion, and the gearing ratio improved to 79.4%. With the 2026 notes already repaid and revolver capacity still available, short-term liquidity appears sufficient.

The first constraint is Macao single-market exposure and the regulated concession. SCL’s business assets are concentrated almost entirely in Macao and are significantly affected by mainland Chinese consumption, tourism policy, border entry, capital flows, and Macao government gaming policy. The second constraint is the cost structure and competition. In 2025, total net revenues increased 5.1%, but adjusted property EBITDA declined 0.7%. To attract premium customers, SCL must continue to improve rooms, service, events, benefits, and food and beverage.

The third constraint is the capital structure. Net debt / EBITDA at end-2025 was manageable at approximately 2.3x, but total borrowings exceeded US$7 billion and bond maturities continue from 2027 to 2031. The fourth constraint is structural subordination for bondholders. SCL’s bonds are senior unsecured obligations of SCL itself, but they are not guaranteed by subsidiaries. The fifth constraint is shareholder returns. SCL paid dividends in 2025, and parent company LVS is conducting sizeable share repurchases and dividends. If SCL increases EBITDA while also increasing dividends, the pace of deleveraging will slow.

10. Downside Scenarios and Monitoring Triggers

The most realistic downside scenario is one in which Macao GGR growth slows while premium customer acquisition costs and property refreshment costs do not decline. In that case, revenue growth would slow first, gaming taxes would remain a GGR-linked burden, and marketing, labour, service-improvement costs, event expenses, and depreciation would pressure EBITDA. SCL has high fixed costs and capital intensity, so even a modest revenue slowdown can reduce EBITDA margins. The fact that EBITDA declined in 2025 despite revenue growth shows that this scenario is not an abstract risk.

The second downside is refinancing and interest rates. The 2026 notes have been repaid, but bond maturities continue with US$700 million in 2027, US$1.900 billion in 2028, US$650 million in 2029, US$700 million in 2030, and US$600 million in 2031. If SCL can grow EBITDA, reduce net debt, and maintain market access before the large 2028 maturity, the issue should be limited. However, if Macao demand weakens, the rating outlook deteriorates, and US dollar / Hong Kong dollar rates remain high, refinancing costs will rise.

The third downside is concession and regulation. VML’s concession is a 10-year contract through end-2032, and SCL must execute an investment plan of approximately MOP35.84 billion. The Macao government emphasises non-gaming diversification, international tourism, MICE, culture, sports, and community contribution. Spending with less visible short-term EBITDA payback may increase. Changes to tax rules, contributions, gaming table allocations, customer management, capital-movement restrictions, or labour policy would affect margins and fund transfers.

Monitoring triggers should start with DICJ monthly GGR. For SCL’s disclosures, the key items are quarterly SCL total net revenues, property-level net revenues, adjusted property EBITDA, EBITDA margin, room occupancy / ADR / RevPAR, and mall occupancy and tenant sales. On the financial side, cash, revolver balance, short-term debt, bond repurchases and refinancing, net debt / EBITDA, finance costs, capex, and dividends should be checked. Structurally, subsidiary dividends, company-level cash, subsidiary note receivables, bank covenants, and individual bond offering circulars should be reviewed.

Specific conditions that would worsen the credit view include SCL’s adjusted property EBITDA declining continuously from the 2025 level, net debt / EBITDA rising toward 3x, and dividends or investment continuing without visibility on the refinancing plan for the 2028 maturity. Conversely, conditions that would improve the credit view include confirmation in the interim and full-year results that the 1Q 2026 EBITDA improvement is sustained, The Londoner operating at a high margin, declining net debt, early refinancing or debt reduction ahead of the 2028 maturity, and dividends not excessively impeding leverage improvement.

11. Credit View and Monitoring Focus

Sands China’s current credit strength is assessed as having a sufficient business base and liquidity for an investment-grade issuer, but not a capital structure conservative enough to view it as a high-investment-grade credit solely because of its strong business foundation. The direction of credit quality appears to be returning gradually toward improvement in light of the 1Q 2026 performance recovery. However, because EBITDA declined in 2025 despite revenue growth, the pace of improvement depends on cost control and dividend / investment policy. The probability of rapid credit deterioration does not appear high at present, but investment-grade headroom could narrow if the Macao market, premium competition, the large 2028 maturity, and parent returns overlap negatively.

Credit support comes from one of Macao’s largest Cotai integrated resort portfolios, asset quality centred on The Venetian and The Londoner, a non-gaming base including MICE, retail, and hotels, LVS group operating capabilities, EBITDA improvement confirmed in the 1Q 2026 SCL/Macao supplementary information, and liquidity from cash and the 2024 SCL Revolving Facility. The timely repayment of the 2026 notes and reduction of net debt to US$5.42 billion at end-2025 are also positive. S&P’s April 2026 upgrade provides confirmation that SCL is viewed as an investment-grade issuer from a market-access perspective.

Credit constraints include Macao single-market exposure, the gaming concession, the 35% gaming tax and 5% contributions, investment obligations through 2032, higher costs in 2025, the lack of subsidiary guarantees for SCL-level bonds, dividends, and shareholder returns at parent company LVS. The particularly important point is that EBITDA does not automatically increase even in a demand recovery phase. The combination of revenue growth and EBITDA decline in 2025 showed that SCL is both a beneficiary of market recovery and an issuer that bears the costs of customer reinvestment and property refreshment.

The practical view in this report is to treat SCL as an investment-grade credit suitable for continued holding consideration, while avoiding an active relative-value conclusion until maturity and price are checked. Fundamentals are not at a stage where a downgrade to high yield should be viewed as a near-term risk. The 1Q 2026 performance improvement, S&P BBB rating, short-term liquidity, and Cotai asset base are sufficiently strong. At the same time, given the large 2028 maturity, dividends, concession investment, and lack of subsidiary guarantees, SCL does not offer the same safety profile as more diversified utility, telecom, or consumer-goods issuers in the same rating band.

The most important monitoring point going forward is whether the 1Q 2026 EBITDA improvement is sustained in the 2026 interim results. Next, the focus should be on early refinancing or debt-reduction plans for the US$1.9 billion 2028 maturity, SCL dividends, the 2024 SCL Revolving Facility balance, and progress on concession investment. In addition, even if Macao GGR grows year on year, the credit view should become more conservative if SCL’s casino expenses, marketing costs, labour costs, or EBITDA margin deteriorate.

12. Short Summary & Conclusion

Sands China is an investment-grade gaming and tourism issuer with one of Macao’s largest Cotai integrated resort portfolios. Its credit strength is supported by asset quality centred on The Venetian and The Londoner, the depth of its MICE, retail, and hotel platform, and the operating capabilities of the LVS group. The 1Q 2026 performance improvement and short-term liquidity are positive, but in 2025 EBITDA did not grow despite higher revenues, and premium customer competition, concession investment, dividends, the large 2028 maturity, and the bond structure without subsidiary guarantees remain constraints. For investment decisions, EBITDA conversion, net debt, dividends, 2028 refinancing, and individual bond terms should be checked before Macao GGR alone.

Sources

Primary Company Sources

• Sands China Ltd., 2025 Annual Report, published March 31, 2026. https://s28.q4cdn.com/640198178/files/doc_downloads/sands-china-information/2026/03/SCL-2025-Annual-Report.pdf
• Sands China Ltd., Financial Reports page, accessed May 15, 2026. https://investor.sandschina.com/financial-information/annual-reports
• Sands China Ltd., Inside Information - Results of Las Vegas Sands Corp. for the fiscal first quarter ended March 31, 2026, dated April 23, 2026. https://investor.sandschina.com/static-files/4d92b0dc-8b33-463e-970a-53bf441f9a4d
• Las Vegas Sands Corp., 1Q 2026 Earnings Release, dated April 22, 2026. https://s28.q4cdn.com/640198178/files/doc_financials/2026/q1/LVS-1Q-2026-Earnings-Release.pdf

Rating And Sector Sources

• S&P Global Ratings, Research Update on Las Vegas Sands and subsidiaries including Sands China, dated April 30, 2026. https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/-/view/sourceId/101682797
• GGRAsia, LVS, Sands China upgraded to BBB on disciplined financial policy: S&P, published May 4, 2026. https://www.ggrasia.com/lvs-sands-china-upgraded-to-bbb-on-disciplined-financial-policy-sp
• DICJ official statistics page, accessed May 15, 2026. https://www.dicj.gov.mo/web/en/information/DadosEstat/2025/index.html
• GGRAsia, Macau April casino GGR up 5.5pct y-o-y at US$2.46bln: govt, published May 1, 2026. https://www.ggrasia.com/macau-april-casino-ggr-up-5-5pct-y-o-y-at-us2-46bln-govt

Internal Working Files

• issuer_summary/issuers/sands_china/data/sands_china_2025_2026_key_metrics.json
• issuer_summary/issuers/sands_china/working/sands_china_20260515_writing_plan.md

Unverified / Pending

• Latest Moody's and Fitch full rating action reports and explicit rating triggers.
• Individual Offering Circulars and indentures for all outstanding Sands China Senior Notes, including change of control, negative pledge, cross default, reporting covenant, rating step-up, and permitted debt language.
• SCL stand-alone cash, location of cash by subsidiary, and SCL stand-alone bank covenant headroom as of end-March 2026.
• Property-level free cash flow, property-level maintenance capex, and full-year profitability after the Londoner Grand conversion.
• Live bond prices, yields, OAS, and relative spreads versus similar-maturity bonds.