China Great Wall Asset Management Issuer Summary

Report date: 2026-05-18
Issuer: China Great Wall Asset Management Co., Ltd.（中国长城资产管理股份有限公司）
Relevant bond reference: GRWALL / China Great Wall Asset Management / China Great Wall AMC (International) Holdings / offshore financing vehicles, domestic financial bonds, capital bonds and ABS
Primary credit focus: issuer credit, probability of government support after coming under Central Huijin, RMB36.8bn capital replenishment, policy importance as a national AMC, standalone earnings capacity and impairments, post-disposal financial structure after the bank subsidiary disposal, and the bond structure across the parent, overseas subsidiaries and SPVs

1. Business Snapshot and Recent Developments

China Great Wall Asset Management Co., Ltd. (“China Great Wall”) is one of China’s national AMCs responsible for resolving distressed assets in the Chinese financial system. It is not a commercial bank, a conventional investment company, or a simple financial holding company. The starting point for credit analysis is that this is a central financial enterprise maintained by the Chinese government to resolve financial risk; its standalone loss-absorption capacity is weak, but its policy importance and expected government support are major anchors for credit quality. Accordingly, this report separates three issues: 1) China Great Wall’s own capital, liquidity and earnings capacity; 2) its relationship with Central Huijin Investment Ltd. (“Huijin”) and the central government; and 3) the legal protections of individual bonds, including those issued by Great Wall International and offshore SPVs.

China Great Wall traces its origins to 中国长城资产管理公司, which was established in 1999 with State Council approval. Its initial role was to acquire, manage and dispose of non-performing loans in order to support financial-risk resolution and state-owned bank reform after the Asian financial crisis. It was restructured into its current joint-stock company form in December 2016. According to the official company profile, as of May 2026 it had registered capital of RMB46.8bn and 32 branches across 30 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities in China and the Hong Kong SAR. According to official disclosures and rating materials, the company has historically operated as a diversified financial group covering banking, securities, insurance, trust, leasing, investment, offshore business and real-estate-related resolution through Great Wall West China Bank, Great Wall Glory Securities, Changsheng Life Insurance, Great Wall Xinsheng Trust, Great Wall Guoxing Financial Leasing, Great Wall Investment Fund, Great Wall International Holdings, Great Wall Guofu Property and other subsidiaries.

The most important event in 2025 was the change in controlling shareholder and the capital restructuring. On 18 April 2025, the gratuitous transfer of approximately 73.53% of China Great Wall’s shares held by the Ministry of Finance was completed, making Huijin the controlling shareholder. In April 2025, the company was also approved to reduce its registered capital from RMB51.2336bn to RMB10.0bn, and then increase registered capital to RMB46.8bn through shareholder capital replenishment. The official 2024 annual information disclosure report published in July 2025 stated that the RMB36.8bn of capital-increase proceeds had been fully received and that the change in registered capital had been approved by the National Financial Regulatory Administration. Rating materials published by Lianhe Global and China Lianhe after 2025 put Huijin’s post-capital-increase shareholding at approximately 94.343%.

This capital restructuring should not be read as a simple “capital increase” alone. It was a transaction that cleaned up the capital structure impaired by past losses, reduced registered capital in order to compress accumulated uncovered losses, and then replenished capital mainly through Huijin. From a credit perspective, this is clearly positive, and the support channel has become easier to see. However, it should not be read as an explicit government guarantee for all debt. Huijin is an investment company that exercises investor rights in major state-owned financial institutions on behalf of the state, and is an important support provider in ownership, oversight and capital replenishment. However, parent bonds, domestic financial bonds, capital instruments, Great Wall International bonds and offshore SPV bonds may each have different issuers, guarantors, governing law, ranking, cross-default provisions and support agreements. Government support is very important for issuer credit, but the legal claim of each security must be confirmed separately in its prospectus.

Another important event in 2025 was the disposal or deconsolidation of Great Wall West China Bank. Lianhe Global cited the disposal of Great Wall West China Bank as the main reason why China Great Wall’s total assets declined from RMB571.3bn at end-2024 to RMB467.2bn at end-September 2025. This is consistent with the company’s move to streamline subsidiaries and refocus on its core distressed-asset resolution business. At the same time, it materially reduces the comparability of consolidated total assets, customer deposits, revenue composition and liquidity metrics. Customer deposits at end-2024 were around RMB113.151bn according to domestic rating materials, but in Lianhe Global’s September 2025 data, customer deposits had almost disappeared, declining to around RMB0.631bn. This does not simply indicate a deterioration in funding; it strongly reflects the effect of the bank subsidiary being removed from the scope of consolidation.

In the official 2024 information disclosure, China Great Wall reported consolidated total assets of RMB571.276bn, total liabilities of RMB550.166bn, owners’ equity of RMB21.109bn, operating revenue of RMB22.297bn and net profit of RMB1.444bn. The September 2025 figures should, for now, be treated as nine-month rating-agency data rather than official annual disclosure, but Lianhe Global reported total assets of RMB467.157bn, total liabilities of RMB414.398bn, owners’ equity of RMB52.759bn and nine-month net profit of RMB1.365bn. The large increase in owners’ equity was not due solely to retained earnings from ordinary operations; it also reflected the 2025 capital restructuring and capital replenishment.

For full-year 2025, the official annual information disclosure report has not yet been confirmed. Caixin Global reported in May 2026 that China Great Wall and China Orient faced a large increase in 2025 impairment burden, while accounting investment gains from bank equity investments supported profit. This is an important issue for investors, but this report treats it as supplementary press-based information rather than official 2025 annual disclosure. Once the official 2025 annual information disclosure is published, impairments, investment gains, non-recurring gains and losses, capital ratios and parent-only liquidity will need to be reviewed again.

In one sentence, the company profile for initial coverage is that China Great Wall is a “national AMC whose support expectations have strengthened through Huijin ownership and capital replenishment, but whose standalone earnings capacity and asset quality still face clear constraints.” Investors should not assess it through a binary question of whether government support exists or not. The more important questions are which legal entity receives support, when, and in what form, and how much impairment, liquidity, capital and the legal ranking of individual bonds affect investors in the interim.

2. Industry Position and Franchise Strength

China’s national AMCs were established to resolve non-performing loans at state-owned banks and stabilise the financial system. China Great Wall, China Cinda, China Orient and the former China Huarong, now China CITIC Financial Asset Management, are the core players. In recent years, their policy role has again become more important against the backdrop of the real estate market correction, local-government debt-related risks and reform of small and medium-sized financial institutions. Lianhe Global also states that China Great Wall has refocused on risk resolution in small and medium-sized financial institutions, areas related to local-government debt and the real estate sector.

China Great Wall’s franchise consists of its national network and experience in distressed-asset resolution. According to official materials, it has 32 branches across 30 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities in China and the Hong Kong SAR, and has acquired, managed and disposed of more than RMB2tn of distressed assets on a cumulative basis. Access to deals, collateral disposal, judicial procedures and coordination with local financial institutions are strengths, but the same network also exposes the company to broad regional risks.

Second, the company is used as a policy tool for financial stabilisation. Reform of small and medium-sized financial institutions, rescue of real-economy enterprises, capital-market risk resolution and real estate risk resolution are linked not only to purely commercial profitability but also to policy objectives. The basis for expected government support is not merely state ownership, but this policy role.

Third, it has comprehensive resolution capabilities through financial subsidiaries. The ability to combine banking, securities, insurance, trust, leasing, funds, overseas subsidiaries and real estate resolution platforms for distressed-asset acquisition, debt restructuring, asset sales, investment and offshore fundraising is a strength that simple debt-collection operators do not have.

However, this breadth is also a constraint. The deterioration at the former Huarong showed that even government-related financial institutions can see the market question implicit support when governance, non-core expansion, disclosure and capital discipline break down. China Great Wall’s transfer to Huijin control, capital restructuring, return to the main business and subsidiary streamlining can be read as steps to correct these sector-level problems.

The industry environment is not a straightforward tailwind. China’s economic slowdown, real estate market correction, local fiscal pressure and asset-quality deterioration at small and medium-sized financial institutions create deal opportunities for AMCs, but also lead to declining collateral values, delayed recoveries, impairments and capital lock-up. A greater supply of distressed assets does not necessarily mean earnings expansion.

In peer comparison, China Great Wall has more limited disclosure than Cinda or China Orient. Official 2024 information disclosure and rating-agency materials provide the basis for initial analysis, but full-year 2025 official data, parent-only liquidity, individual bond prospectuses and post-disposal segment earnings after subsidiary disposals still require further confirmation.

Therefore, the franchise assessment of China Great Wall has two sides: it is strong in policy terms, but its commercial earnings capacity remains weak. Its national AMC status, Huijin control and national network support the probability of support, while the weak macro environment, longer recovery periods and treatment of past losses prevent it from being treated as sovereign-equivalent.

3. Segment Assessment

China Great Wall’s core business is the acquisition, management, investment and disposal of distressed assets. Its official disclosed business scope is broad and includes debt-to-equity conversion, external investment, securities trading, issuance of financial bonds, interbank borrowing, bankruptcy administration, asset securitisation, custody and liquidation of financial institutions, and non-financial distressed-asset businesses.

The first pillar is financial distressed assets. China Lianhe states that in 2024 China Great Wall acquired around RMB80bn of non-performing loans from small and medium-sized financial institutions. This demonstrates its policy role and expertise, but also means it is taking on risks related to asset quality at local small and medium-sized financial institutions, collateral values, regional real estate markets and recovery periods.

The second pillar is non-financial distressed assets and rescue / restructuring of real-economy enterprises. In real estate risk resolution, real-economy enterprise rescue, local-government financing platform debt-risk resolution and state-owned enterprise-related cases, the company uses debt restructuring, asset restructuring, additional investment and cooperation with industrial investors. Policy importance is high, but recovery periods are long and outcomes are vulnerable to land prices, sales and administrative coordination.

The third pillar is financial subsidiaries. As of end-2024, subsidiaries in banking, securities, leasing, insurance, trust, overseas business, real estate resolution and funds could be confirmed. These contribute to earnings diversification, funding and deal sourcing, but each carries separate regulatory capital, liquidity, customer and market risks, and reduces group-level transparency.

Great Wall West China Bank is particularly important for 2025 financial comparisons. Customer deposits were RMB113.151bn at end-2024, but declined to RMB0.631bn in Lianhe Global’s September 2025 data. This is an important signal that the bank was removed from consolidation. The disposal of the bank subsidiary is positive for refocusing on the main business and reducing risk, but it also changes the appearance of consolidated funding.

Great Wall International Holdings is the platform for international business and offshore financing, and is important for bond investors. Offshore bonds may be issued not as direct obligations of China Great Wall itself, but by Great Wall International or SPVs. Issuer credit and the legal protections of offshore bonds therefore need to be analysed separately.

In the revenue structure, the decline in gains from distressed-asset disposal is important. China Lianhe states that in 2024 net gains from distressed assets were RMB9.425bn, down 27.8% year on year, and accounted for 42.27% of operating revenue. Weakness in the distressed-asset market, which is the company’s core revenue source, shows that returning to the main business does not necessarily mean short-term earnings improvement.

4. Financial Profile and Analysis

When reading China Great Wall’s financials, three layers of data need to be separated. The first is the official 2024 annual information disclosure and audited financials. The second is the March 2025 or September 2025 rating-agency-based data used by Lianhe Global and China Lianhe. The third is press reporting from Caixin and others on full-year 2025 impairments and bank equity investments. This report uses the official 2024 data as the baseline, treats September 2025 data as unaudited or interim rating-agency-based data, and uses full-year 2025 press reports only as supplementary information.

In the official 2024 information disclosure, China Great Wall reported consolidated total assets of RMB571.276bn, consolidated total liabilities of RMB550.166bn and owners’ equity of RMB21.109bn. Owners’ equity / total assets was only around 3.7% on a simple calculation, which is very thin for a financial group. In 2024, operating revenue was RMB22.297bn, operating expenses were RMB21.039bn, net profit was RMB1.444bn and net profit attributable to the parent was RMB1.557bn. The company was profitable, but earnings capacity relative to asset size was low, with ROA only around 0.3%.

Over the past several years, the large loss in 2022 remains an important memory in credit analysis. In Lianhe Global’s time series, total income was negative RMB2.303bn in 2022, credit impairment was RMB20.823bn, fair value changes were negative RMB23.503bn and net loss was RMB45.382bn. This was a period when valuation adjustments and impairments on distressed assets emerged all at once, showing that even a national AMC can see asset-price adjustments severely impair capital. The return to profit in 2023 and 2024 is positive, but the company has not yet shown enough earnings capacity to rebuild the capital lost in 2022 through internal profit alone.

As of September 2025, the capital structure had changed significantly. Lianhe Global reported total assets of RMB467.157bn, total liabilities of RMB414.398bn and owners’ equity of RMB52.759bn at end-September 2025. Owners’ equity / total assets rose to 11.3%. However, this was not an accumulation of profits earned through ordinary operations; it reflected a combination of past-loss clean-up through the reduction in registered capital, the RMB36.8bn capital replenishment mainly by Huijin and changes in the consolidation scope following the disposal of Great Wall West China Bank. The absolute amount and ratio of capital improved, but this does not mean the sustainability of the earnings model improved at the same time.

The first nine months of 2025 were weaker than the headline figures suggest. Lianhe Global reported total income of RMB8.590bn and net profit of RMB1.365bn for the first nine months of 2025, but also stated in the body of its report that, excluding non-operating income, the company recorded an operating loss of RMB47.1bn in January-September 2025. This should not be read as a single simple line item in the ordinary consolidated income statement, but as Lianhe Global’s warning on earnings quality after excluding non-operating income. The final profit was likely supported by bank disposals, other non-operating income and accounting treatment, and in the absence of official 2025 annual disclosure it should not be described as a recovery in the core business. For full-year 2025 as well, Caixin reported that accounting gains from bank equity investments supported profit, so this also remains supplementary information.

Key financial indicators are shown below. The September 2025 figures are nine-month data and are not annualised.

The bridge from 2024 to September 2025 shows that total assets and liabilities declined, owners’ equity increased materially, and customer deposits dropped sharply. This should not be simplistically interpreted as the company weakening because it became smaller, or weakening because deposits flowed out. At the same time, the funding structure and earnings structure after the bank subsidiary was removed need to be reviewed as a different business profile from before.

On the asset side, investment assets were RMB371.066bn at end-2024, accounting for around 65% of total assets. Domestic rating materials show that within investment assets, distressed debt assets were the largest component at RMB236.690bn, followed by bonds, funds, equity investments and long-term equity investments. This shows that China Great Wall’s balance sheet is heavily exposed to distressed debt and financial investments. Assets received in satisfaction of debt were RMB12.070bn at end-2024, and deferred tax assets were RMB11.964bn, indicating the remaining impact of past losses and distressed-asset resolution.

On the liability side, of consolidated liabilities of RMB550.166bn at end-2024, borrowings accounted for RMB289.268bn, customer deposits RMB113.151bn and bonds payable RMB84.284bn. The structure combined borrowings, bonds and deposits derived from the bank subsidiary. On a parent-only basis, of liabilities of RMB333.410bn at end-2024, borrowings were RMB257.217bn and bonds payable RMB52.196bn. Within borrowings, short-term borrowings were large at RMB172.511bn. This indicates that parent-level short-term funding and the turnover of distressed-asset recoveries are important credit considerations.

Data limitations also need to be stated explicitly. Based on currently public materials, the NPL vintage, case-level recovery rates, collateral valuations, parent-only monthly maturity ladder, full offshore bond contracts and full-year 2025 audited capital ratios cannot be confirmed. The analysis therefore uses proxy indicators as follows.

Overall, China Great Wall’s financial profile was clearly strengthened in 2025. However, this was mainly due to external capital and group restructuring, and does not mean that core earnings capacity has sufficiently recovered. Credit quality is supported by policy support and capital replenishment, while constraints include distressed-asset valuation and recovery, thin earnings capacity, parent-level short-term borrowings and limited detailed disclosure.

5. Structural Considerations for Bondholders

For China Great Wall bondholders, the first issue to confirm is which legal entity’s debt they hold. Domestic financial bonds issued by China Great Wall itself, Great Wall International debt, offshore SPV notes, capital instruments and ABS share the same issuer-credit theme, but do not have the same legal claim. Government support expectations, Huijin control and rating agencies’ support assessments support issuer credit, but do not replace the guarantee provisions or support agreements of individual securities.

For domestic bonds, China Lianhe’s 2025 report identifies 19 长城债 01（品种二）, 19 长城债 02BC（品种二） and 21 长城资本债 01BC as outstanding rated instruments. The domestic rating is AAA / Stable, but it is not comparable with global-scale ratings. For capital instruments, interest cancellation, call options, subordination and regulatory loss-absorption provisions need to be checked individually.

For offshore bonds, S&P reinstated the BBB/A-2 ratings on China Great Wall and its core subsidiary, China Great Wall AMC (International) Holdings Co., Ltd., in June 2025. However, the issuer may differ by bond: it may be Great Wall International itself, or a lower-tier SPV. Parent guarantees, subsidiary guarantees, keepwell deeds and EIPUs may also differ by issue.

There are two misreadings to avoid. One is treating all bonds as having the same recovery rate because of Huijin control. The other is treating government support expectations as zero because there is no official guarantee. Issuer credit should incorporate support expectations, while security analysis should separately confirm the legal claim and support agreements.

The current bond-structure matrix is as follows. Because OMs have not been reviewed comprehensively, this should not be used as an investment conclusion on individual bonds.

Structurally, cash movement between the parent and subsidiaries also requires attention. Financial subsidiaries in banking, insurance, securities, trust and leasing are constrained by regulatory capital and liquidity requirements, so consolidated cash and earnings may not be freely available for repayment of parent senior bonds. Change-of-control provisions also need to be confirmed in the definitions and put clauses of individual offshore bond contracts.

6. Capital Structure, Liquidity and Funding

China Great Wall’s funding combines bank borrowings, financial bonds, interbank funding, central-bank borrowings, trust financing, ABS and offshore funding. Lianhe Global notes that the company had around RMB465bn of unused bank credit lines at end-2025 and returned to the public funding market through ABS issuance. This is a positive proxy for funding access, but commitment status, immediate availability at the parent level, collateral, use-of-proceeds and maturity restrictions are unconfirmed, so the full headline amount should not be treated as freely available liquidity.

At end-2024, consolidated liabilities included RMB289.268bn of borrowings, RMB84.284bn of bonds payable and RMB113.151bn of customer deposits. However, after Great Wall West China Bank was disposed of or deconsolidated, the bank subsidiary’s deposit base can no longer be viewed as consolidated liquidity. This is less a deterioration in funding and more a change in the group’s shape.

On a parent-only basis, the share of short-term borrowings is high. According to domestic rating materials, parent-only liabilities were RMB333.410bn at end-2024, of which short-term borrowings were RMB172.511bn, representing 51.74% of total liabilities. The pace of recovery and disposal of distressed assets on the asset side is directly linked to the ability to refinance short-term liabilities.

Factors supporting liquidity include Huijin control and the company’s status as a central financial enterprise, the RMB36.8bn capital replenishment, and the return to public markets including ABS issuance. However, unused credit lines are evidence of funding access, not parent-level cash liquidity itself.

There are also liquidity constraints. Parent-only short-term borrowings are large, distressed-asset disposals take time, and after September 2025, past bank deposits cannot simply be used as a future liquidity buffer. For offshore bonds, foreign-currency liquidity, guarantee structures, capital controls and onshore-offshore fund transfers also need separate review.

Capital was transformed by the 2025 capital restructuring. Owners’ equity was RMB21.109bn at end-2024, equal to only 3.7% of total assets. By September 2025, owners’ equity had risen to RMB52.759bn, and equity / assets had increased to 11.3%. Domestic rating materials also state that the 2025 capital reduction and capital increase materially compressed accumulated uncovered losses and effectively improved capital. At the same time, the same domestic rating materials also point out that the actual capital-replenishment effect of the capital increase still needs to be observed. This is because, even after capital injection, impairments and distressed-asset valuation could again consume capital.

Rating agencies view capital and liquidity together with external support. China Lianhe applies a three-notch support uplift in its domestic rating based on external support. Lianhe Global also assigns a stand-alone creditworthiness of bbb- and assesses external support as strong.

7. Rating Agency View

The rating agencies have broadly similar views. China Great Wall is not an issuer whose high credit quality is explained by standalone strength. Its investment-grade or high domestic ratings substantially incorporate its policy importance as a national AMC, Huijin control, capital replenishment and expected government support.

In April 2026, Lianhe Global affirmed China Great Wall’s global-scale long-term issuer rating at AA- with a Positive outlook. The main reasons were its high strategic importance as a national AMC, Huijin control, the RMB36.8bn capital injection, the NFRA’s policy direction for high-quality development of national AMCs, and access to funding channels. At the same time, Lianhe Global explicitly stated that asset quality remains under pressure, disposal cycles have lengthened, and earnings capacity is weak. In its rating factors, it assigned stand-alone creditworthiness of bbb- and external support of strong.

In June 2025, S&P reinstated the BBB/A-2 ratings on China Great Wall and Great Wall International, with a Stable outlook. S&P’s release indicated that expected government support increased after the transfer to Huijin, and that it views Great Wall as Huijin’s core operating subsidiary with an important role in financial-risk resolution. S&P’s Stable outlook is based on the view that the Chinese government is highly likely to provide extraordinary support if needed over at least the next 24 months.

In July 2025, China Lianhe maintained the domestic long-term issuer rating at AAA with a Stable outlook. The domestic report cites the company’s distressed-asset management capabilities, industry position, government support and large-scale capital increase by Huijin as strengths. It also flags risk management for multi-platform operations, changes in the actual value of existing distressed assets, earnings pressure and the capital-replenishment effect after the capital reduction and increase as areas to watch. The domestic rating is not directly comparable with a global-scale rating, but is important in the context of onshore market access and bank credit.

The key point in reading the ratings is the meaning of notching rather than the rating level itself. Each agency places strong weight on China Great Wall’s policy importance and support expectations, but does not regard its standalone asset quality or earnings capacity as strong. Therefore, the fact that the rating is investment grade should not be used as a reason to stop monitoring distressed-asset impairments or parent-level liquidity.

8. Credit Positioning

China Great Wall is one of the Chinese national AMCs that received the clearest capital restructuring in 2025. Cinda and China Orient also came under Huijin, but at China Great Wall the capital impairment from past losses was large, and the capital repair through a combination of registered capital reduction and RMB36.8bn capital increase stands out more clearly. This is positive as a demonstrated example of support, but it also indicates past standalone weakness.

Compared with Cinda, China Great Wall is smaller and has more limited disclosure granularity. Cinda is Hong Kong-listed, allowing more detailed confirmation of business segments, regulatory capital, subsidiaries and asset composition. China Great Wall’s key indicators can be confirmed through official information disclosure and rating materials, but detailed segment profitability for full-year 2025 and parent-only liquidity remain thin. This disclosure gap could be a discount factor in relative credit assessment.

Compared with China Orient, China Great Wall’s 2025 capital replenishment is more direct, and Huijin’s shareholding is over 94% based on rating materials. At the same time, after the disposal of the bank subsidiary, consolidated scale and composition have changed. Future credit improvement depends on whether the company can stabilise impairments and earnings as a “smaller but more core-business-focused AMC” after the bank disposal.

In comparison with the former Huarong / China CITIC Financial Asset Management, the form of government support is important. Huarong’s past case showed that even a government-related AMC can suffer severe credit deterioration if non-core expansion and governance problems emerge. At the same time, the subsequent restructuring also showed that the central government is willing to reorganise shareholders, capital and business portfolios while maintaining the national AMC function. China Great Wall’s transfer to Huijin and capital replenishment fit this sector restructuring trend.

For investors, China Great Wall should be positioned as a support-driven investment-grade credit rather than a pure standalone credit. Strong support expectations, Huijin’s large shareholding and completed capital replenishment are positive. However, given the limited depth of listed-company-style disclosure, lack of stable earnings capacity and incomplete confirmation of offshore bond structures, careful relative valuation is still needed even within the same support theme.

9. Key Credit Strengths and Constraints

The first factor supporting China Great Wall’s credit quality is its policy importance as a national AMC. The company is involved in resolving non-performing loans of financial institutions, rescuing troubled enterprises and financial institutions, resolving real estate risks and addressing local financial risks. As long as the Chinese government emphasises financial stability, this function is difficult to replace.

The second factor is Huijin control and capital replenishment. The transfer from the Ministry of Finance to Huijin more clearly incorporated China Great Wall into the investment-management framework for major state-owned financial institutions. The RMB36.8bn capital replenishment is not merely verbal support, but actual capital action. This is a significant support signal for bond investors.

The third factor is funding channels. The company has access to funding through bank borrowings, financial bonds, ABS, trust financing and overseas subsidiaries. Lianhe Global estimates unused bank credit lines at around RMB465bn at end-2025. The commitment status of these credit lines and their availability at the parent level are unconfirmed, but restored confidence in the onshore market and access to the public market are important for a parent company with large short-term borrowings.

The fourth factor is the national network and distressed-asset resolution know-how. Distressed-asset resolution requires not only buying cheaply, but also legal recovery, collateral disposal, corporate rehabilitation, asset sales and coordination with local governments and financial institutions. China Great Wall has a long track record in this area.

At the same time, credit constraints are clear. The first constraint is thin earnings capacity. Net profit was only RMB1.444bn in 2024 and RMB1.365bn in the first nine months of 2025. Equity improved after capital replenishment, but the company is not yet in a position where core earnings alone can absorb large impairments comfortably.

The second constraint is impairments and valuation volatility. The large loss in 2022 showed that once an asset-price adjustment occurs, capital can be significantly impaired. Credit impairment in the first nine months of 2025 was RMB5.920bn, already exceeding the full-year 2024 level. Until official 2025 annual disclosure is confirmed, it is not possible to conclude that impairments have peaked.

The third constraint is financial discontinuity and transparency. The disposal of Great Wall West China Bank makes it difficult to compare total assets, customer deposits, liability composition and revenue composition between 2024 and 2025. The parent-only maturity ladder, guarantee structures of offshore bonds and recovery rates on individual assets are also unconfirmed.

The fourth constraint is the discretionary nature of support. Huijin control creates strong support expectations, but which debts receive support, when, and in what form differs from an explicit guarantee. Offshore SPV bonds and capital instruments in particular require confirmation not only of issuer credit but also contractual protections.

10. Downside Scenarios and Monitoring Triggers

The main downside scenario is not that government support expectations weaken, but that standalone deterioration is too rapid despite those support expectations. For example, if large valuation losses arise from distressed assets related to real estate or local financial institutions, and the capital buffer after the RMB36.8bn capital replenishment is again rapidly consumed, this would likely be negative for market valuation. Rating agencies also cite a material deterioration in capital and liquidity or a decline in strategic importance as potential downgrade factors.

The second scenario is a decline in funding-market access. At the parent level, short-term borrowings are large, and refinancing depends on bank credit lines and market confidence. Liquidity risk would rise if access to ABS issuance or the financial bond market closes again, unused bank credit lines shrink, renewal terms for short-term borrowings deteriorate, or offshore bond refinancing becomes difficult.

The third scenario is official confirmation that the quality of 2025 profit was low. If full-year 2025 profit was mainly dependent on equity-method gains from bank stakes, bank disposal gains, non-operating income or accounting-driven one-off gains, while the core distressed-asset business continued to generate large operating losses, standalone assessment would weaken even if support expectations remain.

The fourth scenario is a negative finding on individual bond structures. If offshore SPV bonds lack a parent guarantee, rely only on keepwell or EIPU, and have weak cross-default or support obligations, improvement in issuer credit may not directly translate into better recoveries for bondholders. Offshore investors must confirm the issuer, guarantor and support agreements even for bonds all referred to as GRWALL.

Monitoring items are as follows.

11. Credit View and Monitoring Focus

China Great Wall’s current credit quality should be viewed as investment-grade issuer credit supported mainly by its policy importance as a national AMC, Huijin control and the RMB36.8bn capital replenishment in 2025, rather than by standalone earnings capacity. The credit trajectory improved in the short term after the 2025 capital restructuring, but the pace of improvement reflects a step-change repair through capital injection, not yet a natural recovery in core earnings capacity. Support expectations and capital replenishment should help contain short-term credit deterioration, but if the official full-year 2025 disclosure confirms large core-business losses, additional impairments, liquidity deterioration or a retreat in support expectations, standalone assessment and market valuation could deteriorate relatively quickly.

The reasons to view this issuer positively are clear. China Great Wall is a national AMC involved in resolving NPLs of financial institutions, rescuing troubled enterprises, resolving real estate risk and addressing local financial risk, and its financial-stability role is significant. Huijin becoming the controlling shareholder and holding more than 94% according to rating materials makes the support channel more operationally straightforward than under the Ministry of Finance. The fact that capital replenishment was actually executed also demonstrates support expectations as a track record rather than an abstract assumption. However, the final official confirmation of the 94.343% shareholding needs to be reconfirmed in the 2025 annual disclosure.

Investors should not treat this credit as “done” simply because government support exists. The large loss in 2022, thin profit in 2024, operating loss in the first nine months of 2025, impairment burden and financial discontinuity after the bank subsidiary disposal all indicate standalone weakness. The stronger the support expectations, the more likely additional support becomes in a downside scenario, but the form of support—capital injection, asset transfer, debt restructuring or subsidiary restructuring—remains uncertain.

For bond investors, the most important point is to separate issuer credit from security structure. Domestic senior bonds issued by China Great Wall itself, capital instruments, Great Wall International debt, offshore SPV notes and ABS are exposed to the same group risk, but have different legal claims. Especially for offshore bonds, it is dangerous to rely only on the issuer rating without confirming guarantees, keepwell, EIPU, cross-default, change-of-control and governing law.

The top monitoring priority after initial coverage is the official 2025 annual information disclosure report. Key items to review are: 1) full-year 2025 operating profit / loss and non-operating profit / loss; 2) credit impairments and fair value changes; 3) accounting gains from bank equity investments and their sustainability; 4) capital adequacy and equity / assets; 5) parent-only short-term borrowings, bonds and unused credit lines; and 6) the P&L and consolidation impact of the Great Wall West China Bank disposal. If continued core-business losses and large impairments are confirmed, relative credit assessment would become heavier even if support expectations remain.

The current base case is that China Great Wall maintains capital and funding access under Huijin control and continues its policy role in distressed-asset resolution. However, earnings improvement is unlikely to be rapid, and profit and loss may remain volatile due to asset disposals, impairments, accounting gains from bank equity investments and subsidiary streamlining. As issuer credit, it can be assessed as a support-driven investment-grade profile. At the same time, risks close to domestic parent senior bonds are more likely to track issuer credit, while offshore SPVs, capital instruments and ABS should not be assessed on the same basis before their terms are confirmed.

12. Short Summary & Conclusion

China Great Wall Asset Management is a national AMC whose support expectations and capital buffer have materially improved through the move under Huijin, Huijin’s more than 94% shareholding based on rating materials, and the RMB36.8bn capital replenishment. At the same time, given the large loss in 2022, thin core earnings, impairment burden and financial discontinuity after the bank subsidiary disposal, its credit quality depends heavily on government / Huijin support rather than standalone strength. As issuer credit, it appears to have a support-driven investment-grade profile, but for overseas subsidiary / SPV bonds, capital instruments and ABS, guarantees, keepwell, EIPU and ranking should be confirmed issue by issue.

13. Unverified / Pending

• Official 2025 annual information disclosure report, including audited full-year profit quality, impairment, capital ratio, and Huijin's final post-recapitalization shareholding.
• Parent-only liquidity, committed versus uncommitted bank facilities, maturity ladder, collateral constraints, and debt-by-issuer data.
• Full offshore bond offering circulars, guarantees, keepwell deeds, EIPU undertakings, cross-default, and change-of-control clauses.
• Final terms and financial impact of the Great Wall West China Bank disposal / deconsolidation.
• Latest detailed Moody's and Fitch rating texts, if available.

14. Sources

• China Great Wall Asset Management, official company profile, accessed 2026-05-18.
• China Great Wall Asset Management, 2024年度信息披露报告, published 2025-07-31.
• China Great Wall Asset Management, investor relations publication page for 2024年度信息披露报告, published 2025-07-31.
• Shanghai Clearing House, 中国长城资产管理股份有限公司关于公司完成股权变更事宜的公告, 2025-04-18.
• Lianhe Global, China Great Wall Asset Management Co., Ltd. Rating Report, 2026-04-16.
• Lianhe Global, China Great Wall Asset Management Co., Ltd. Rating Report, 2025-06-17.
• China Lianhe Credit Rating, 中国长城资产管理股份有限公司2025年跟踪评级报告, 2025-07-30.
• S&P Global Ratings, China Great Wall Asset Management Co. Ltd. And Core Subsidiary Ratings Reinstated At 'BBB/A-2'; Outlook Stable, 2025-06-25.
• Caixin Global, China's Bad-Debt Managers Turn to Bank Stakes to Buffer Losses, 2026-05-06. Used only as supplementary press context pending official 2025 annual disclosure.