Genting Group Issuer Summary

Report date: 2026-05-14
Issuer: Genting Group / Genting Berhad
Primary credit scope: Genting Berhad consolidated group
Relevant bond structure reference: Genting Berhad-guaranteed domestic RM debt, GOHL Capital / Genting Overseas Holdings structures, Resorts World Las Vegas debt, LLPL Capital power project notes and related keepwell / guarantee / security arrangements. This report is an issuer-level credit summary and does not verify every individual bond's offering circular, covenant package or secondary-market level.

1. Business Snapshot and Recent Developments

Genting Group ("Genting") is a Malaysia-based diversified holding company led by integrated resort and gaming operations. The parent company, Genting Berhad, controls Genting Malaysia Berhad, centred on Resorts World Genting; Genting Singapore Limited, which owns Resorts World Sentosa; Genting Plantations Berhad; Genting Energy Limited, which is engaged in power generation and oil and gas; US entities related to Resorts World Las Vegas; and GOHL-related financing entities. It would therefore be too simplistic to view Genting merely as a casino operator. Conversely, it is also insufficient to say simply that the group is stable because it is diversified. For bond investors, the central credit issues are tourism and gaming cash flow, the financial flexibility of listed subsidiaries, large overseas investments, regulatory risk, and how the layers of issuer, guarantor and collateral are connected.

By revenue scale, Genting's business is clearly centred on leisure and hospitality. Of consolidated external revenue of RM27.71bn in 2025, leisure and hospitality across Malaysia, Singapore, the UK and Egypt, and the US and Bahamas generated RM22.75bn, or around 82% of the total. On an adjusted EBITDA basis, leisure and hospitality generated RM6.59bn, the majority of total adjusted EBITDA of RM7.99bn. Plantation, Power, Property and Oil & Gas diversify revenue sources and broaden the group's asset and business base, but the first-order determinant of Genting's credit strength remains the Resorts World-branded resort and gaming business.

In 2025, revenue scale was stable, but from a credit perspective it was a year to reassess whether post-recovery earnings capacity could absorb the investment burden. Genting Berhad's full-year 2025 revenue was RM27.71bn, broadly flat against RM27.72bn in 2024, while adjusted EBITDA declined 9% from RM8.78bn to RM7.99bn. Profit before tax declined from RM3.30bn to RM2.20bn, and profit attributable to owners of the parent deteriorated from a profit of RM883.0mn to a small loss of RM11.6mn. The company cited higher costs at RWS, lower visitation at RWLV, weaker Power and Oil & Gas performance, impairments, lower interest income and administrative penalties as the main drag factors. This indicates that the phase in which credit quality automatically improved on post-Covid tourism recovery has ended, and that each resort's competitiveness, cost base, investment payback and regulatory response now need to be assessed individually.

Four important changes have been added to the current corporate picture. First is the increase in Genting Malaysia ownership through a takeover offer. According to published reports, Genting Berhad increased its stake in Genting Malaysia to 73.13% after the offer closed on 1 December 2025. This strengthens control over a core subsidiary, but because it involved financing, including RM-denominated MTN issuance, it is necessary to view the reduction in minority interests and the increase in parent-level debt burden together. Second, Genting Berhad's 4Q25 release dated 26 February 2026 states that RWNYC obtained a full commercial casino licence from the New York State Gaming Commission. This is an important official company disclosure that expands growth optionality in the US Northeast. However, this report has not verified the full terms of the licence, final project budget, funding plan or opening schedule in separate documents, so for credit purposes it is treated as an important step towards commercial casino conversion. Third, Genting Singapore is pursuing the renewal of RWS and seeking to strengthen non-gaming demand through new attractions such as Minion Land, Singapore Oceanarium and WEAVE, but EBITDA was depressed in 2025 by higher costs. Genting Singapore's 1Q26 results, reported on 13 May 2026, showed a weak signal of slightly lower revenue year on year and a sharp decline in net profit. This is treated only as supplementary evidence because it is not Genting Berhad's official consolidated 1Q26 result as of this report date, but it confirms that RWS renewal costs and gaming competition can pressure earnings in the short term. Fourth, in April 2026, a tender offer for GOHL Capital's 2027 US dollar notes and the issuance of subordinated perpetual securities by GOHL Capital Holdings proceeded. What can be confirmed from official announcements is that US$882.462mn of the US$1.5bn 4.25% notes due 2027 was validly tendered and accepted, and that US$750mn of 7.625% NC5.5 and US$500mn of 8.300% NC10 subordinated perpetual securities were priced. This is positive as liability management that partially addresses the large 2027 maturity and extends the maturity profile, but it is not a plain senior refinancing; it is a capital-structure adjustment involving subordination and hybrid characteristics. The post-issuance accounting treatment, rating-equity credit, remaining 2027 notes and interest / distribution burden need to be monitored.

The first point that investors new to Genting should grasp is that it is a global operator of tourism, gaming and resort assets with regulatory licences, but also a holding-company credit in which debt and cash are split across multiple legal entities. The Malaysia and Singapore resorts support business quality, but bondholders of Genting Berhad parent-level debt, GOHL, RWLV or LLPL do not all have the same legal claims. The central line of this report is to recognise the cash flow generated by strong resort assets and regulatory licences, while separately assessing which legal entity generates that cash flow, which creditors can access it, and which large investments absorb it first.

2. Industry Position and Franchise Strength

Genting's business base is supported by integrated resorts, a business model with high barriers to entry. In its 2025 annual report, the group states that it has operations in nine countries, around 55,000 employees, 11 Resorts World properties and more than 18,000 hotel rooms. Licences, land, transport access, brand, relationships with regulators, customer data and operating know-how are difficult to replicate and provide stronger credit support than a single-market casino.

However, the strength of integrated resorts does not mean low volatility. Malaysia is the mature core segment, and FY2025 leisure and hospitality EBITDA was solid at RM2.75bn. Singapore is a high-quality asset, but RWS renewal costs and weak gaming win rates compressed margins in 2025. The US and Bahamas provide upside through RWNYC's commercial casino conversion and RWLV's improvement potential, but EBITDA fell 31% in 2025 due to weak visitor numbers, occupancy and win rates.

The UK and Egypt, Plantation, Power, Property and Oil & Gas provide diversification, but the main drivers of ratings and market valuation remain leisure and hospitality earnings power and the investment burden. From a credit perspective, licences, brand and location should be recognised, but gaming demand, travel demand, regulation, renewal investment, large US developments and the financial flexibility of listed subsidiaries need to be assessed as a package.

3. Segment Assessment

By segment, Genting's credit strength is anchored by Malaysia and Singapore, while its dependence on recovery in the US and Bahamas is increasing. Plantation is a stabilising support business, while Power and Oil & Gas are ancillary businesses with capital intensity, commodity-price exposure and project risk. The table below summarises 2025 external revenue and adjusted EBITDA together with their credit implications.

Malaysia is the most important segment in terms of earnings stability. Revenue and EBITDA increased for the full year in 2025, but 4Q25 alone declined year on year due to gaming volume and costs. Even in a mature core asset, earnings can fluctuate with visitation, win rates, promotions and costs.

Singapore is a high-quality business, but 2025 was a transition year due to RWS renewal costs. Minion Land, Singapore Oceanarium and WEAVE should support non-gaming demand over the long term, but opening and closure costs, IT, marketing and renewal-related expenses pressure EBITDA in the short term. The US and Bahamas have material upside from RWNYC's commercial casino conversion and RWLV's improvement potential, but they also involve development costs, regulation, competition and initial ramp-up costs.

Plantation generated supplementary EBITDA in 2025, but is influenced by CPO prices, weather and downstream margins. Power and Oil & Gas provide diversification through projects such as Banten, Zhoushan, Kasuri and FLNG, but introduce fuel-cost, utilisation, contract, GSA, project-finance and construction risks. Overall, Malaysia and Singapore support the credit, the US provides an improvement option, and Plantation / Energy / Property play supporting roles.

4. Financial Profile and Analysis

When analysing Genting's financial profile, revenue needs to be assessed together with adjusted EBITDA, operating cash flow, capex, total borrowings, cash and profit attributable to owners of the parent. Integrated resorts have high fixed costs, high depreciation and high maintenance / renewal investment. Even when revenue is flat, parent-level profit can move materially due to costs, impairments, interest, FX and administrative penalties. FY2025 was a typical example: revenue was flat, but adjusted EBITDA, PBT, profit attributable to owners of the parent and operating cash flow all weakened.

Note: FY2021-FY2025 revenue and adjusted EBITDA are from the company's Financial Snapshot / Integrated Annual Report 2025. FY2024-FY2025 financial statement items are from Genting Berhad's 4Q25 quarterly report and Integrated Annual Report 2025. Net borrowings are our estimate, calculated by deducting only cash and cash equivalents from total borrowings; restricted cash and financial assets are not deducted. Total borrowings / EBITDA, adjusted EBITDA / finance cost, and operating cash flow - capex for PPE are our estimates and are not rating-agency adjusted metrics.

The most important feature of FY2025 financials is that operating cash flow remained positive, but the cushion to absorb capex and capital policy narrowed. Operating cash flow was RM5.90bn, almost covering capex for PPE of RM5.12bn. However, when dividends, dividends to subsidiary minority shareholders, GENM share purchases, debt repayment, interest and growth investment are included, free cash flow cannot be described as particularly deep. Cash and cash equivalents declined from RM22.40bn to RM18.00bn in 2025. The absolute amount remains large, but the cushion for an investment-grade issuer depends less on the cash balance itself than on the combination of future investment burden and refinancing needs.

The view of the interest burden has also worsened. Finance cost was broadly flat at around RM2.1bn in both 2024 and 2025, but because adjusted EBITDA declined, a simple EBITDA / finance cost ratio declined from around 4.2x to around 3.8x. This is not a level that immediately indicates debt-service capacity stress, but given that the distribution rates on the April 2026 US dollar subordinated perpetual securities are in the 7-8% range, post-refinancing funding costs and hybrid distribution burden could narrow rating headroom if operating recovery is delayed. This report has not separately recalculated lease interest, capitalised interest, the accounting and rating treatment of hybrids, or post-dividend free cash flow, so the interest-cover estimate is only approximate.

Borrowing levels narrow rating headroom. Total borrowings at end-2025 were RM40.81bn, up from RM39.23bn at end-2024. The company cited the issuance of medium-term notes by Genting Vista Berhad, consolidation of Empire Resorts Inc.'s USD300mn Senior Secured Notes, and the offsetting effect of debt repayment and MTN redemption. A crude ratio of total borrowings to adjusted EBITDA is around 5.1x, up from around 4.5x in 2024. Rating agencies independently adjust for leases, hybrids, guarantees, holding-company considerations, cash deduction and subsidiary debt, so a simple comparison is not sufficient. Even so, the direction of leverage clearly worsened in 2025.

Earnings quality also requires attention. FY2025 profit for the period was positive at RM1.02bn, but profit attributable to owners of the parent was a loss of RM11.6mn. Genting has many listed subsidiaries, so there are periods when a large portion of consolidated profit is attributable to non-controlling interests. For bond investors, it is necessary to examine not only the size of consolidated EBITDA but also parent-level disposable cash, subsidiary dividends, capital allocation with minority shareholders and subsidiary debt. Even if the group reports consolidated profit, the assessment of parent-guaranteed bonds and holding-company debt changes if parent-attributable profit or parent cash is thin.

Capex is likely to remain elevated. FY2025 capex for PPE of RM5.12bn was related to Genting Singapore's ongoing development, upgrading at Genting Highlands, additions of new facilities and Genting Energy's FLNG facility, among others. From 2026 onwards, RWS 2.0, RWNYC full casino conversion, enhancement of RWLV's competitiveness, London Trocadero, Kasuri / FLNG and Zhoushan gas power are expected to continue. These are investments intended to create future earnings, but because cash outflow comes first, Genting's credit strength in 2026-2028 is likely to be driven more by pre-investment liquidity and refinancing capacity than by future EBITDA from investment.

Interest rates and FX are also financial constraints. Genting is exposed to multiple currencies, including RM, SGD, USD, GBP, CNY and IDR. In 2025, the strengthening of RM against SGD, GBP and USD depressed revenue and EBITDA. At the same time, there can be periods of unrealised FX gains on translation of GENM's USD borrowings. Currency movements do not have a simple positive or negative interpretation, but without information on mismatches between foreign-currency debt and local-currency earnings, foreign-currency cash, hedge ratios and debt by subsidiary, practical repayment resilience can only be assessed provisionally.

Overall, Genting's financial profile is one of "large scale and cash, but narrower cushion due to rising leverage and investment burden". Because operating cash flow is positive and investment-grade ratings are maintained, a near-term liquidity crisis does not need to be the base case. However, the combination of lower FY2025 EBITDA, parent-attributable loss, higher borrowings, lower cash, investment plans and weaker rating outlooks creates a credit profile that is sensitive to further debt-funded expansionary investment or weak operating performance over the next one to two years.

5. Structural Considerations for Bondholders

The most important structural issue for Genting bond investors is that the size of the Genting Berhad consolidated group does not match the legal repayment source of individual bonds. Genting Berhad is a holding and management company, while major businesses are divided among Genting Malaysia, Genting Singapore, Genting Plantations, Genting Energy, RWLV-related companies and others. Financing is also multi-layered, including domestic RM bonds, GOHL Capital US dollar bonds, RWLV / RWLV Capital US dollar bonds and loans, and LLPL Capital project-related debt. Even if consolidated EBITDA is large, recovery prospects for parent-level bondholders or bondholders of other subsidiaries differ if subsidiary minority shareholders, secured debt, project creditors and standalone creditors of listed subsidiaries rank ahead.

The GOHL 2027 notes are representative for understanding Genting's structure. The official Ratings & Bonds page shows GOHL Capital Limited as issuer of US$1.5bn 4.25% notes due January 2027, with Genting Overseas Holdings Limited as guarantor and ratings of Moody's Baa3 / Fitch BBB. Past annual reports state that these notes have a GOHL guarantee and a Genting Berhad keepwell deed. This is not the same as a straightforward direct guarantee from Genting Berhad. A keepwell is a credit-support element, but its legal enforceability and strength as a payment guarantee need to be checked in the specific documents. The April 2026 tender offer and subordinated perpetual issuance are intended to reduce this maturity risk, and the official announcement states that US$882.462mn was accepted. However, the remaining 2027 notes, post-issuance accounting treatment, rating-equity credit and distribution burden remain items to monitor.

RWLV bonds are more directly tied to the operating asset and financing structure. US dollar debt related to RWLV is more dependent on operating improvement at Resorts World Las Vegas. The official page indicates that subsidiaries of RWLV are guarantors of RWLV / RWLV Capital debt, with ratings of S&P BB+ / Fitch BBB-. Within Genting Berhad's consolidated group, RWLV is part of the US assets, and funding arrangements / keepwell from GOHL or the parent may exist. For individual bondholders, however, RWLV's collateral, covenants, refinancing, operating cash flow and regulatory risk need to be assessed separately.

Minority interests in listed subsidiaries complicate credit analysis. Genting Singapore is 52.6%-owned, while Genting Berhad advanced an additional acquisition of Genting Malaysia in 2025, although the official structure shows a 49.3% stake. Genting Plantations is shown as 55.4%-owned. These entities support Genting's business base through consolidation or shareholding relationships, but as listed companies they have independent shareholders, boards, regulation, capital allocation and dividend policies. The parent cannot upstream cash in the same way as from a wholly owned subsidiary. In particular, Genting Singapore's strong capital and cash indirectly support parent credit, but they are not assets that Genting Berhad's creditors can directly claim.

The positive structural feature is that Genting can access multiple markets and issuers. The ability to combine the domestic RM market, US dollar bond market, hybrids, bank borrowings, subsidiary project bonds and listed-subsidiary dividends provides more flexibility than an issuer reliant on a single funding source. The weak structural feature is that creditor ranking is dispersed and differences in collateral and guarantees are large. In a specific bond investment, Genting Group's overall credit strength is not sufficient unless the issuer, guarantor, keepwell, collateral, negative pledge, cross default, change of control, restricted payments and subsidiary debt limitations are checked.

6. Capital Structure, Liquidity and Funding

Genting's short-term liquidity remains strong based on public financials. At end-2025, cash and cash equivalents were RM18.00bn, restricted cash was RM0.59bn, and short-term borrowings were RM4.10bn. A simple cash / short-term borrowings ratio is around 4.4x, implying headroom against borrowings due within the next 12 months. Operating cash flow was also large at RM5.90bn, and the group appears able to cover ordinary-course interest payments and near-term maturities.

However, Genting's liquidity should not be viewed complacently based only on the cash balance. First, the legal location of cash matters. Cash at Genting Singapore, Genting Malaysia, Genting Plantations, RWLV and Energy-related companies differs in ease of movement depending on each business, regulation, minority shareholders, debt agreements, and local / foreign currency considerations. Second, Genting's investment plans are large. RWS 2.0, RWNYC, RWLV, Genting Highlands, FLNG, Zhoushan gas power and Trocadero are all in the pipeline, so capex from 2026 onwards is likely to absorb operating cash flow. Third, refinancing needs continue even if maturities are smoothed, including the 2027 GOHL notes and domestic RM bonds.

The April 2026 refinancing is positive for liquidity but requires attention from a capital-structure perspective. GOHL Capital launched a tender offer for its US$1.5bn 4.25% guaranteed notes due 2027, stating that the purpose was to extend Genting Group's debt maturity profile. In the final official announcement, US$882.462mn was validly tendered and accepted. Around the same time, GOHL Capital Holdings priced US$750mn of 7.625% NC5.5 and US$500mn of 8.300% NC10 subordinated perpetual securities, which were issued and listed on 29 April 2026. This creates room to address part of the large 2027 senior maturity early, but funding costs are substantially higher, and subordination, optional redemption, distribution deferral, accounting equity credit and rating-equity credit become part of the credit assessment. This is not a simple extension of senior debt; it is maturity management through hybridisation.

On the use-of-funds side, investment from 2026 to 2030 is large. RWS 2.0 is a multi-year resort renewal programme targeting completion in 2030. If completed, it should support non-gaming, MICE and higher-value tourism, but investment and costs come first. RWNYC's commercial casino conversion could improve profitability, but initial investment scale, opening timing, competition, customer acquisition and operating costs remain credit uncertainties. RWLV has room to improve by capturing demand around the Convention Center and premium customers, but if Las Vegas visitation or the competitive environment is weak, it may take time to achieve EBITDA commensurate with the asset value.

The weakness in liquidity is not a near-term cash shortfall, but the need to preserve rating headroom during a period of continued investment burden. As of FY2025, consolidated cash, operating cash flow and market access make a liquidity crisis during 2026 unlikely. However, at the parent and issuer level, cash movement is constrained by subsidiary dividends, listed-subsidiary minority shareholders, regulation, secured debt and project debt. Even after the 2026 hybrid issuance, if adjusted EBITDA does not recover, investment in RWNYC and RWS increases, subsidiary earnings are not sufficiently upstreamed to the parent, and domestic and international funding costs remain elevated, ratings and spreads would face pressure.

7. Rating Agency View

Genting's ratings are investment grade, but headroom is not thick. Genting Berhad's official Ratings & Bonds page shows, as of 14 May 2026, S&P at BBB- / Negative (16 December 2025), Moody's at Baa3 / Stable (8 December 2025), Fitch at BBB / Negative (22 December 2025) and RAM at AA1 / Negative (12 December 2025). The international ratings are close to the lower end of investment grade, while the domestic RAM rating is high, although the outlook is Negative. Domestic ratings indicate relative credit strength within the domestic market and should not be mechanically compared notch-for-notch with international ratings.

RAM's October 2025 release is useful for understanding Genting's credit structure. RAM recognised Genting's strong diversified business base, its footprint in Malaysia, Singapore and the US Northeast video gaming machine market, and some diversification from Plantation / Power / Property / Oil & Gas. At the same time, RAM warned that potential debt-funded cash outflows related to the full privatisation of Genting Malaysia, together with planned capex and investments, could raise group net debt to more than RM27bn by 2027, push net gearing above 0.50x and reduce FFO net debt coverage below 0.35x. RAM still considered this within the rating tolerance at the time, but stated that the scope for additional large investments was limited. This is consistent with this report's view: Genting is not a weak credit, but its cushion against investment burden is narrow.

The rating rationale formally reviewed in this report consists of RAM's published release and the rating table on Genting Berhad's official Ratings & Bonds page. For S&P, the rating and outlook were confirmed from the official regulatory page and Genting's official rating table, but the full detailed rating rationale could not be extracted. The full Moody's and Fitch reports were also not reviewed in this report. Therefore, the discussion of the background to the December 2025 downgrades and outlook changes, including the Genting Malaysia share acquisition, NY licence-related investment, higher leverage, and concerns over RWNYC and investment burden, is based on published articles and this report's analysis, not quotations from each agency's official trigger language.

Rating-agency views should not be substituted for this report's analysis. Rating agencies may have dialogue with the company and non-public information, but bond investors must separately assess each bond's issuer, guarantee, security, maturity, hybrid characteristics, price and liquidity. In Genting's case in particular, Genting Berhad, GOHL, RWLV and LLPL as shown in the rating table are not all the same credit. Rather than reading Moody's Baa3 / Stable and Fitch BBB / Negative as "still investment grade, so sufficient", investors should examine why the outlook is negative and which investments, borrowings and intragroup cash movements are consuming rating headroom.

In this report's analysis, the conditions for stabilising the rating outlook would be: RWS cost increases settling; RWG remaining solid; RWNYC or RWLV generating additional EBITDA; total borrowings / EBITDA declining; and investment plans being funded without undue strain through operating cash flow, hybrids, asset sales or subsidiary dividends. This is this report's credit judgement, not a quotation of official triggers from the rating agencies. Conversely, if RWS or RWLV remains weak, RWNYC investment comes first, additional borrowings rise, funding costs including subordinated perpetual securities increase, and cash outflows from Genting Singapore or Genting Malaysia increase, downgrade risk would rise at the S&P / Moody's levels close to the lower end of investment grade.

8. Credit Positioning

Genting has a strong business base as an Asian tourism and gaming credit, but it is not a simple defensive investment-grade issuer. Its strengths are strong resort assets in Malaysia and Singapore, geographic diversification, investment-grade ratings, listed subsidiaries and capital-market access. Its weaknesses are sensitivity to gaming, tourism and regulation; large investments; group complexity; minority interests; US ramp-up; and increasing capital-structure complexity from hybridisation.

No trading recommendation is made because live spreads, prices, yields, OAS or CDS were not checked. Fundamentally, Genting Berhad / GOHL senior-type risk is best viewed as "a resort holding-company credit between the lower end and middle of international investment grade, with strong assets and brand but thin cushion due to investment burden". RWLV bonds are more sensitive to US assets, collateral and operating improvement, while GOHL subordinated perpetual securities require a separate risk premium from senior bonds because of subordination, optional redemption, distribution deferral and hybrid characteristics.

9. Key Credit Strengths and Constraints

Genting's strengths are integrated resort assets such as RWG and RWS, supported by licences and locations; diversification across Malaysia / Singapore / US / UK / Plantation / Energy; cash of RM18.00bn at end-2025; market access; and the asset value of listed subsidiaries. The April 2026 subordinated perpetual issuance and GOHL tender showed that international market access remains available, although at a high cost.

Constraints are leverage, investment burden, regulation and structural complexity. FY2025 adjusted EBITDA declined, and total borrowings increased to RM40.81bn. RWS 2.0, RWNYC, RWLV, FLNG, Power and Trocadero can create future earnings, but cash outflow comes first and consumes rating headroom. In addition, although consolidated cash and EBITDA appear large, debt is spread across GOHL, RWLV, LLPL, domestic RM vehicles, listed subsidiaries and other entities. Parent-attributable profit, subsidiary dividends, minority shareholders, regulation, collateral, guarantees and subordination need to be assessed individually.

10. Downside Scenarios and Monitoring Triggers

The most realistic downside scenario is one in which investment burden at RWS and RWLV / RWNYC comes first while operating recovery is delayed. At RWS, renewal expenses, system investment, marketing expenses, labour costs and new-attraction ramp-up costs are incurred first. If gaming revenue is weak, VIP or premium customers do not return, and competition including Marina Bay Sands remains intense, it may be difficult for RWS to recover EBITDA even if revenue is flat. At RWLV, if Las Vegas visitation, room occupancy, ADR, premium play, MICE and hotel customer-data utilisation are weaker than expected, fixed costs at a large asset would pressure margins. At RWNYC, if commercial casino conversion investment comes first and opening timing or customer acquisition is delayed, deleveraging would be pushed back.

The second downside scenario is a chain reaction between funding costs and ratings. Genting is investment grade, but it is close to the lower end at S&P / Moody's. If additional investment, weak EBITDA, subsidiary cash outflows, hybrid distributions, higher US dollar rates, RM depreciation and risk aversion in the domestic market coincide, refinancing costs would rise and rating outlooks could deteriorate further. The 2026 subordinated perpetual issuance helps extend maturities, but distribution rates in the 7-8% range are not cheap. Even if equity credit is recognised, the cash distribution burden remains close to interest-payment burden.

The third downside scenario is a regulatory or compliance event. In the gaming industry, AML, customer due diligence, VIP junkets, political and social opposition, taxation, licence conditions, advertising and responsible-gambling regulation are directly relevant to credit quality. Administrative penalties or investigations may end as one-off costs, but they can also affect licence renewal, operating restrictions, customer acquisition, relationships with financial institutions and rating-agency governance assessments. RWNYC and RWLV face intensive US regulatory oversight, while RWS and RWG depend on the regulatory and political environments of Singapore and Malaysia, respectively.

The fourth downside scenario is constraints on cash movement arising from the subsidiary / holding-company structure. Even if Genting Singapore's 1Q26 is weak, it may still have a strong balance sheet. However, if the parent seeks to increase subsidiary dividends or cash movement to fund investments or repay debt, constraints may arise from minority shareholders, independent directors, regulation, ratings, tax and capital policy. Conversely, if a subsidiary prioritises its own investments, its cash will not directly translate into repayment capacity for parent-level debt.

The fifth downside scenario is simultaneous weakness in the supplementary businesses of Plantation, Power and Oil & Gas. If CPO prices, Indonesian refining capacity, weather, fuel costs, power-plant utilisation, crude prices, GSA delays and FLNG construction delays coincide, the offsetting benefit during a weak resort-business period would be reduced. These are not the main businesses, but in FY2025 the decline in Power and Oil & Gas also dragged group EBITDA.

11. Credit View and Monitoring Focus

The current credit level is investment grade, but headroom is not thick. Genting has strong integrated resorts in Malaysia and Singapore, substantial cash, domestic and international capital-market access, and a multi-regional business base, so it is not an issuer whose credit quality is likely to collapse in the short term. However, given the FY2025 EBITDA decline, parent-attributable loss, increase in total borrowings, cash decline, large investments and Negative outlooks from multiple rating agencies, the credit direction is not stable improvement but a weak sideways trend until investment payback and deleveraging are demonstrated. The probability of rapid credit deterioration is not high at present, but if RWS, RWNYC, RWLV, refinancing markets and regulatory events all deteriorate at the same time, rating reactions near the lower end of investment grade could become rapid.

The credit is supported by the quality of business assets. RWG and RWS are integrated resort assets with high barriers to entry in Asia, combining tourism, gaming, hotels, theme parks and MICE. In addition, Genting has RWNYC, RWLV, the UK, the Bahamas, Plantation and Power. Operating cash flow in 2025 was positive at RM5.90bn, cash and cash equivalents were RM18.00bn, and immediate liquidity against short-term borrowings is large. Access to both the domestic RM market and international bond markets is also supportive.

The credit is constrained by investment burden and structure. FY2025 total borrowings were RM40.81bn, heavy relative to adjusted EBITDA. RWS 2.0, RWNYC, RWLV, Genting Highlands and Energy projects are future growth drivers, but they are also upfront investments and refinancing risks. The tender for GOHL 2027 notes and issuance of subordinated perpetual securities are positive for maturity management, but they bring greater capital-structure complexity and high distribution rates through hybridisation. Parent-level creditors need to examine not only consolidated EBITDA, but also which legal entity holds cash, which debts have collateral, guarantees or subordination, and how much subsidiary dividends can be upstreamed.

Conditions for a better credit view on Genting would include RWS renewal costs normalising and EBITDA recovering; RWG remaining solid with Visit Malaysia Year 2026 and facility renewal; RWLV and RWNYC showing additional US EBITDA; and total borrowings / EBITDA declining in FY2026-FY2027. In addition, the remaining 2027 maturity balance after the GOHL tender, accounting and rating-equity credit for the subordinated perpetual securities, funding for RWS / RWNYC capex, subsidiary dividends and parent-level liquidity need to become clearer. If these are confirmed, there would be scope for Negative outlooks to stabilise.

Conversely, the path to a weaker credit view is one in which investment comes first but EBITDA does not recover. If RWS remains weak due to persistently high costs, RWLV does not improve due to competition, visitation or premium-customer capture, and RWNYC is delayed with investment ahead of returns, group deleveraging would be pushed back. If regulatory / compliance events, high US dollar rates, RM depreciation, concerns over cash movement from subsidiaries to the parent and the distribution burden on subordinated perpetual securities are added, downgrade risk would increase for ratings close to the lower end of investment grade.

Bond investors should not view Genting as a single "GENT" credit, but should separate risk by bond. Domestic RM bonds guaranteed by Genting Berhad, GOHL / GOHL Capital US dollar bonds, GOHL Capital Holdings subordinated perpetual securities, RWLV-related bonds and LLPL Capital Power-related bonds differ in repayment source, guarantee, collateral, subordination, maturity and rating. Even if the issuer-level view is that investment grade can be maintained, subordinated perpetual securities and RWLV bonds require additional risk premium depending on their individual terms and asset performance.

The highest-priority items to verify going forward are Genting Berhad's 1Q26 consolidated results, the final capital structure after the GOHL tender / subordinated perpetual issuance, RWS earnings recovery during 2026, RWNYC's concrete investment plan, RWLV's EBITDA run-rate and the next rating-agency actions. Because market data are not available, this report does not conclude whether the bonds are cheap or expensive. For investment decisions, the spread differentials among same-tenor senior bonds, subordinated perpetual securities and RWLV bonds should be checked separately to determine whether they adequately compensate for differences in structure, rating, investment burden and liquidity.

12. Short Summary & Conclusion

Genting Group / Genting Berhad is a gaming-led diversified holding company centred on strong integrated resorts in Malaysia and Singapore, with operations in the US, the UK, the Bahamas, plantations, power generation and oil and gas. The credit remains investment grade, but headroom is not thick due to the FY2025 EBITDA decline, higher borrowings, large investments and Negative outlooks from multiple rating agencies. Key monitoring points are RWS earnings recovery, investment payback at RWNYC / RWLV, the maturity profile and hybrid treatment after GOHL refinancing, the fungibility of subsidiary cash, and regulatory / compliance events.

13. Sources

Primary Company Sources

• Genting Berhad, Integrated Annual Report 2025, annual reports page, accessed 2026-05-14.
• Genting Berhad, Financial Snapshot 2025, accessed 2026-05-14.
• Genting Berhad, 4th Quarterly Report 2025 and press release, 2026-02-26.
• Genting Berhad, FY2025 results press release, 2026-02-26.
• Genting Berhad, Ratings & Bonds page, accessed 2026-05-14.
• Genting Berhad, Group Corporate Structure as at 15 April 2025.
• Genting Berhad / Bursa announcement, GOHL Capital tender offer for US$1.5bn 4.25% guaranteed notes due 2027, 2026-04-20.
• Genting Berhad / Bursa announcement, closing of Genting Malaysia take-over offer, 2025-12-01.
• Genting Berhad / Bursa announcement, pricing of US$750mn 7.625% NC5.5 and US$500mn 8.300% NC10 subordinated perpetual capital securities, 2026-04-23.
• Genting Berhad / Bursa announcement, issue and SGX listing of the subordinated perpetual capital securities, 2026-04-30.
• Genting Berhad / Bursa announcement, final results of GOHL Capital 2027 notes tender offer, 2026-04-30.

Rating / Secondary Sources

• RAM Ratings, "RAM Ratings affirms Genting Group's AA1 corporate ratings; cautions limited debt headroom", 2025-10-22.
• S&P Global Ratings, regulatory article page for Genting Group companies outlook, 2025-12-16. The detailed text was not fully extractable in this work; the official Genting ratings table is used for the rating level.
• Public reports by The Star / KLSE Screener / Linklaters on GOHL 2026 subordinated perpetual securities and Genting Malaysia offer, used as secondary confirmation where full offering documents or rating reports were not reviewed.
• Business Times / public analyst summaries on Genting Singapore 1Q26, used only as a post-FY2025 signal; Genting Berhad 1Q26 consolidated results were not available as of 2026-05-14.

Internal Working Sources

• issuer_summary/instruction/credit_analysis_instruction.md
• issuer_summary/instruction/issuer_summary_template.md
• issuer_summary/instruction/issuer_summary_writing_plan_template.md
• issuer_summary/instruction/report_sample/softbank_group_issuer_summary_20260511.md
• issuer_summary/instruction/report_sample/indofood_issuer_summary_20260511.md
• issuer_summary/issuers/nan_fung_international_holdings/current/nan_fung_international_holdings_issuer_summary_20260514.md
• issuer_summary/issuers/genting_group/working/genting_group_20260514_writing_plan.md
• issuer_summary/issuers/genting_group/data/genting_group_key_metrics_20260514.json

Unverified / Pending

• Genting Berhad 1Q26 consolidated results had not been confirmed as of this report date.
• The full Moody's and Fitch December 2025 rating action reports, upgrade / downgrade triggers and rating-agency adjusted leverage were not confirmed.
• The full offering memorandum, accounting treatment, rating-equity credit and final post-issuance capital structure for GOHL Capital Holdings' 2026 subordinated perpetual securities were not confirmed.
• The GOHL 2027 notes tender acceptance amount of US$882.462mn has been confirmed, but the post-issuance remaining amount, accounting treatment and rating treatment were not confirmed.
• The offering circulars, guarantees, keepwell arrangements, negative pledges, cross defaults, change-of-control clauses, security and financial covenants of individual bonds were not confirmed.
• Project-level funding burden, annual capex and project-finance terms for RWS 2.0, RWNYC full casino, RWLV, Kasuri / FLNG and Zhoushan gas power were not confirmed.
• Live spreads, bond prices, OAS, CDS and same-tenor comparisons were not confirmed.