Issuer Summary: KB Capital

Report date: 2026-05-14
Issuer: KB Capital Co., Ltd.
Sector: Korean non-bank financial company / specialized credit finance
Primary credit focus: Issuer credit, senior unsecured bonds, foreign-currency bonds, distinction between parent support expectations and standalone non-bank risk

1. Business Snapshot and Recent Developments

KB Capital Co., Ltd. is a Korean specialized credit finance company wholly owned by KB Financial Group. Its core businesses are auto finance, auto leasing, long-term car rental, consumer finance, and corporate/investment finance. For credit analysis, it should be viewed not as a deposit-taking bank such as KB Kookmin Bank, but as a market-funded non-bank financial company that supports operating assets with corporate bonds, CP, borrowings, securitization, and foreign-currency bonds. The KB brand is an important credit support factor, but it is not the same as a debt guarantee from the parent company or the bank itself.

Company IR identifies KB Capital’s business type as 여신전문금융업. The company was established in September 1989, joined Woori Financial Group in 2007, was incorporated into KB Financial Group in March 2014, and became a wholly owned subsidiary of KB Financial Group in April 2017. As of December 2025, it had 17 domestic sales channels and 650 employees. Overseas, it owns KB KOLAO LEASING in Laos and PT Sunindo Kookmin Best Finance in Indonesia, but this report reads the company’s operating asset composition primarily on the separate-company basis used in company IR, excluding overseas operating assets.

Operating assets were KRW 17,270.9bn at end-December 2025. The breakdown was auto finance 52.5%, consumer finance 14.7%, and corporate/investment finance 32.7%; retail assets, comprising auto finance and consumer finance, accounted for 67.2%. KB Capital is therefore an auto finance-focused non-bank, but it is not a single-product company. Its credit assessment needs to cover the automotive market, used car prices, lease/rental residual values, consumer spending, commercial vehicle operators’ liquidity, and individual corporate finance transaction risk, including PF and bridge loans.

The most important recent event was the USD300mn foreign-currency bond issuance in September 2025. In its official release, KB Capital stated that it returned to the global bond market for the first time in five years and issued senior unsecured RegS foreign-currency bonds. The stated purposes were to refinance existing bonds, broaden the investor base, and diversify funding channels. The release also noted the maintenance of Moody's A3 / Stable and the assignment of the same rating to the foreign-currency bonds. This confirms access not only to the domestic corporate bond market but also to foreign-currency markets; however, because the bonds are senior unsecured, parent support expectations and legal guarantees need to be treated separately.

The January 2025 management strategy meeting release set out priorities including strengthening platform revenue generation, restructuring the portfolio with capital efficiency in mind, reducing costs and improving resource allocation efficiency, and upgrading underwriting strategy and operating systems for soundness management. For a non-bank, credit quality is determined less by asset growth itself than by post-growth delinquency, residual values, collections, and credit costs. The company’s explicit emphasis on capital efficiency and soundness management is consistent with flat assets, improved NPLs, and lower funding costs in 2025.

Unless otherwise stated in the text, monetary amounts are in KRW 100mn.

The initial credit reading of this issuer is: “an auto finance-focused, market-funded non-bank with KB group support expectations.” Its strengths are its position within the group as a wholly owned subsidiary, domestic and international ratings, access to corporate bond and foreign-currency bond markets, and NPL/delinquency metrics that improved in 2H25. Its constraints are the lack of a deposit base, exposure of operating assets to the credit cycles of auto, consumer, and corporate finance, the decline in the liquidity ratio, and the fact that parent support is not a legal guarantee.

2. Industry Position and Franchise Strength

Korean capital companies are not deposit-taking banks, but financial intermediaries that support operating assets through corporate bonds, CP, borrowings, securitization, foreign-currency bonds, and similar instruments. KB Capital’s franchise strengths are its status as a wholly owned subsidiary of KB Financial Group, its auto finance platform, and its access to domestic and international capital markets. At the same time, because it does not have the deposit stability of a bank, franchise assessment must always be considered together with asset quality and market funding resilience.

Its position within the group is a clear source of support. KB Financial Group’s official ratings page lists KB Financial Group at Moody's A1 / Stable, KB Kookmin Bank at Aa3 / Stable, KB Kookmin Card at A2 / Stable, and KB Capital at A3 / Stable. KB Capital is rated below the bank, but unlike an independent non-bank, it has support expectations and group brand value as a wholly owned subsidiary. These support expectations help access to the corporate bond and foreign-currency bond markets, but the deposits of KB Kookmin Bank or the capital of KBFG do not automatically become legal protection for KB Capital’s creditors.

Auto finance channels are also a differentiating factor. KB Capital launched the online used car sales platform KB ChaChaCha in 2016, and company IR states that it has strengthened its position in auto finance through long-term partnerships with automakers and its O2O used car platform. Customer touchpoints across vehicle purchase, ownership, and sale can support underwriting, price information, residual value management, and collections. Conversely, if used car prices, residual values, commercial vehicle utilization, or consumer spending deteriorate, the same concentration can push loss rates higher.

Consumer finance and partnership channels offer growth potential, but credit cost management is a prerequisite. Company IR identifies partnership channels including cards, securities, KakaoBank, Finda, and Toss. These channels can improve customer acquisition, but digitally sourced personal loans can show early delinquency quickly in a downturn. KB Capital’s franchise is strong, but it is “strong as a bank-affiliated non-bank,” not “the same risk as a bank.”

3. Segment Assessment

For practical purposes, KB Capital’s operating assets should be read in three segments: auto finance, consumer finance, and corporate/investment finance. Of operating assets of KRW 17,270.9bn at end-December 2025, auto finance accounted for 52.5%, consumer finance 14.7%, and corporate/investment finance 32.7%. A high retail ratio is positive in terms of granularity and collection experience, but if consumer spending, interest rates, employment, or used car prices deteriorate, delinquencies could emerge broadly.

In the following table, operating assets are in KRW 100mn and composition ratios are in %.

Auto finance is the most important segment in KB Capital’s credit analysis. Vehicles are disposable collateral, and price information and resale touchpoints through the platform can also support recoveries, so recovery prospects are better than in unsecured consumer finance. However, risks differ across loans, leases, long-term rentals, and commercial vehicles. When used car prices fall, collateral value declines; in leasing and rental, residual value losses are more likely; and in commercial vehicles, transport demand, fuel prices, construction demand, and SME liquidity affect repayment capacity.

Consumer finance accounts for 14.7% of operating assets and includes personal credit loans, rental deposit loans, mid-rate loans, and cargo-related advance settlement. It raises yield, but delinquency can emerge quickly in a downturn. The company-wide 1+ day delinquency ratio declined to 1.79% at end-December 2025, but product-level delinquency ratios cannot be confirmed from public IR, so it would be risky to judge consumer finance loss rates based only on company-wide indicators.

Corporate/investment finance accounts for 32.7% of operating assets and shows that KB Capital is not merely an auto finance company. Company IR identifies corporate lending, PF, bridge loans, acquisition finance, and investment finance. These businesses contribute to earnings and diversification, but they are less granular than retail assets, and losses from a single exposure can have a non-linear impact on capital and provisions. Restructuring or rescheduling may indicate future losses and longer recovery periods even when the company-wide delinquency ratio still looks small. Public IR does not provide sufficient confirmation of transaction-level balances, collateral, sponsors, PF stage, or sector concentration. Therefore, corporate/investment finance should be recognized as a source of revenue diversification, while the lack of transparency remains an important pending item.

Overseas subsidiaries are growth opportunities, but should be separated from the basic figures used here. According to company IR, KB Capital owns 80% of KB KOLAO LEASING in Laos and 85% of PT Sunindo Kookmin Best Finance in Indonesia. Overseas auto finance carries risks related to local currency, regulation, collection practices, political and institutional frameworks, and local economic cycles. At this stage, further confirmation is needed on how much these overseas subsidiaries contribute to group-wide credit strength and how much capital they require.

4. Financial Profile and Analysis

KB Capital’s financial profile can be summarized as one in which earnings and capital increased from 2023 to 2025, while the company did not expand its asset base materially in 2025 and instead managed asset quality and funding costs. For a non-bank, credit strength is determined by the combination of delinquencies, NPLs, provisions, credit costs, liquidity, and refinancing capacity, more than by operating asset growth itself.

The following table is in KRW 100mn.

Total assets were nearly flat in 2025, and operating assets increased only modestly from KRW 16,985.1bn in 4Q24 to KRW 17,270.9bn in 4Q25. This can be read as a phase in which the company prioritized capital efficiency and portfolio management rather than excessive asset growth. Net income was KRW 237.0bn in 2025, up from 2023 and 2024. Total capital also increased to KRW 2,698.1bn, improving loss absorption capacity.

On a quarterly basis, earnings were not stable. Profit attributable to the controlling shareholder was KRW 69.4bn in 1Q25, KRW 54.7bn in 2Q25, KRW 70.3bn in 3Q25, and KRW 40.7bn in 4Q25, with ROA falling to 0.90% and ROE to 6.07% in 4Q. This indicates that, as a non-bank, the company remains exposed to volatility from credit costs, valuation gains/losses, expenses, and funding conditions. Full-year earnings growth is positive, but it should not be viewed as a simple linear improvement.

Asset quality deteriorated in mid-2025 and then improved in 4Q. Total credit was broadly flat, while NPL balances declined from KRW 455.8bn in 2Q25 to KRW 394.5bn in 4Q25. The NPL ratio improved from 2.85% to 2.48%, and the 1+ day delinquency ratio also declined from 2.51% in 1Q25 to 1.79% in 4Q25.

In the following table, total credit, NPL balances, and loan loss provisions are in KRW 100mn, and ratios are in %.

The most important point in this table is that, while delinquency and the NPL ratio improved, CCR rose to 2.25% in 4Q25. The improvement in delinquency and NPLs suggests the effects of underwriting, collection, and portfolio management, but the expense recognition of credit losses remains volatile. NPL coverage recovered to 130.7%, which appears manageable for a non-bank. However, product-level NPLs, vintage, collateral, and recovery rates are unverified, and a permanent improvement in loss rates should not be inferred from company-wide indicators alone.

The quality of earnings should be viewed in terms of whether the company can absorb credit costs. The FY2025 earnings increase and total capital growth are clearly positive, and the fact that the company maintained full-year profit despite the rise in CCR in 4Q25 is supportive. At the same time, because net interest income is broadly flat, future earnings improvement should not be assumed simply from margin expansion. Rather, earnings stability will be determined by changes in asset mix, collection ability, lower funding costs, and maintained cost efficiency.

For capital, it is more natural to assess the accumulation of total capital together with the quality of risk assets, rather than comparing the company using a single indicator such as a bank CET1 ratio. Total capital of KRW 2,698.1bn at end-2025 increased from end-2023, showing that internal capital generation is functioning. However, if losses arise in corporate/investment finance or overseas subsidiaries, required capital could increase beyond what the headline operating asset mix suggests. Capital thickness is positive, but it does not fully offset the lack of transparency on product-level risk.

Overall, earnings, capital, NPLs, and delinquencies currently support credit quality. At the same time, this is not a credit reliant on stable deposits and low NPLs to the same extent as a bank; it is a credit dependent on market funding and credit cost management. The 2025 figures show a stable profile for initial coverage, but credit assessment would be stronger if product- and vintage-level loss rates could be confirmed.

5. Structural Considerations for Bondholders

For KB Capital bond investors, the first structural point is that the issuer is neither KB Financial Group nor KB Kookmin Bank, but KB Capital Co., Ltd. KB Financial Group is a holding company, KB Kookmin Bank is an operating bank, and KB Capital is a non-bank financial subsidiary. The three share the KB brand, but the debt issuer, regulation, funding sources, creditor protections, and ratings differ.

KB Capital’s senior unsecured bonds should basically be assessed as general obligations of KB Capital itself. Repayment sources include interest, leasing, fee, and collection cash flows from operating assets, refinancing, market funding, and parent support if needed. The parent’s 100% ownership is an important factor supporting expectations of assistance in a stress scenario. However, unless an explicit guarantee is confirmed, it cannot be stated that investors have a legal direct claim against the parent or the bank itself.

This point is also confirmed by the September 2025 foreign-currency bond release. The company stated that it issued USD300mn of senior unsecured foreign-currency bonds in RegS format. The successful issuance, maintenance of Moody's A3 / Stable, and strong investor demand are positive, but this is different from guaranteed debt. Investors need to distinguish issuer credit, parent support expectations, and individual bond terms.

The rating differences within the group also help read the structure. KB Kookmin Bank is rated Moody's Aa3 / Stable, KB Financial Group A1 / Stable, KB Kookmin Card A2 / Stable, and KB Capital A3 / Stable. The bank itself has a deposit base, regulatory supervision, and systemic importance, while the card company and capital company are positioned at lower ratings as non-bank financial companies. KB Capital is a strong group subsidiary, but it is not as safe as the bank itself.

Unverified structural items include the offering circular and pricing supplement for individual bonds, guarantee, negative pledge, cross default, change of control, event of default, collateral, governing law, currency hedging, and access to subsidiary assets. As an issuer report, the broad credit profile can be assessed, but confirmation of these terms is essential for investment decisions on specific bonds.

6. Capital Structure, Liquidity and Funding

KB Capital’s funding structure is market-funded and centered on corporate bonds. Total borrowings at end-December 2025 were KRW 14,124.1bn, with corporate bonds accounting for most of the total. The short-term borrowing ratio was low at 4.2%, so the issuer is not excessively dependent on short-term CP. However, because it does not have a deposit base, confidence in the domestic corporate bond market, CP market, and foreign-currency bond market directly affects credit quality.

In the following table, funding amounts are in KRW 100mn, and ratios and interest rates are in %.

Funding strengths are that the company is centered on corporate bonds and maturities are presumed to be relatively long, that the short-term borrowing ratio is low, and that both the average borrowing rate and the average corporate bond rate declined in 2025. The September 2025 foreign-currency bond issuance is positive as confirmation of investor base diversification and refinancing channels. Domestic AA-, CP A1, and Moody's A3 ratings support this market access.

The key monitoring point is the liquidity ratio. Company IR defines the liquidity ratio as liquid assets within three months divided by liquid liabilities within three months. The 4Q25 ratio of 113.35% is above the 100% regulatory minimum, but it has fallen sharply from 167.45% in 4Q24. The reasons for the decline, the composition of liquid assets, changes in liabilities due within three months, and unused committed lines cannot be sufficiently confirmed from public IR alone. Because short-term borrowing dependence is low, liquidity concern does not need to be the central issue at this stage, but whether the ratio returns to the 130% range or above in 2026, or approaches the 100% area, is an important branch point for the credit view.

The decline in the liquidity ratio should not be judged in isolation as a weak credit signal. Corporate bond balances are large, the short-term borrowing ratio is low, and the company has returned to the foreign-currency bond market, so refinancing capacity can be confirmed at least as of end-2025. However, the decline in the buffer creates a basis for the market to react more sensitively if asset quality deteriorates. If the NPL ratio returns to the high-2% area and the liquidity ratio also falls toward 100%, investors may begin to question funding capacity first.

The maturity ladder, unused committed lines, and breakdown between secured and unsecured funding cannot be sufficiently confirmed from the public IR used here. Therefore, it is appropriate to present funding assessment as a combination of the structural positives of “corporate bond-centered funding with low short-term dependence” and the non-bank constraint of “market-funded structure with a declining liquidity ratio.” For specific bond investments, additional confirmation is needed on maturity concentration, foreign-currency bond hedging, collateral provision, and whether there are explicit parent liquidity support lines. If the liquidity ratio approaches 100%, room for asset sales and refinancing would narrow, and market spreads could widen before any rating change.

For foreign-currency bonds, confirmed access is positive, but refinancing is affected by dollar interest rates, hedging costs, FX, and international investors’ risk appetite. The foreign-currency bond maturity ladder, hedge ratio, investor diversification, and covenants are unverified and should be checked before investing in a specific security. For issuer credit, it is appropriate to evaluate foreign-currency bonds as “funding channel diversification” while also recognizing “refinancing risk in a weaker market environment.”

7. Rating Agency View

External ratings are a useful anchor for assessing KB Capital’s credit quality. Company IR shows domestic ratings of AA- / Stable, CP A1, and an international rating of Moody's A3 / Stable. These were confirmed on KB Capital’s official ratings page on 2026-05-14, and the individual historical dates shown on the page are not treated in this report as the current effective dates of the ratings. KB Financial Group’s official ratings page lists KB Kookmin Bank at Aa3 / Stable, KB Financial Group at A1 / Stable, KB Kookmin Card at A2 / Stable, and KB Capital at A3 / Stable.

This rating positioning indicates three things. First, KB Capital has stronger support expectations than an independent non-bank. This reflects its wholly owned subsidiary status and its ties to the KB group in terms of brand, funding, market confidence, and management control. Second, it is weaker than the bank itself, because its deposit base, regulatory importance, liquidity access, and business stability differ. Third, even within the same non-bank financial group as KB Kookmin Card, its positioning reflects the asset and funding risks of a capital company.

The key point when reading ratings is not to compare domestic and international ratings mechanically by notches. Domestic AA- is a domestic-scale rating showing relative credit strength within Korea, while Moody's A3 is an international-scale rating. Investors should focus not on which is “higher,” but on the fact that investment-grade market access is maintained in both domestic and foreign-currency markets, and that this is premised on both parent support expectations and standalone financial strength.

Moody's full rating rationale has not been confirmed, so this report does not make a definitive statement on the standalone assessment, support notching, or degree of parent support incorporated in the A3 / Stable rating. Given the wholly owned subsidiary status and group positioning, support expectations are considered an important credit factor, but the quantitative extent of that incorporation remains a pending item.

The rating should be used as a starting point for analysis, not as the conclusion itself. Even if A3 is maintained, spreads can move earlier if NPLs, liquidity, funding costs, or parent support assessment deteriorate. Conversely, even without an immediate upgrade, the fundamental credit view would improve if the liquidity ratio recovers, credit costs decline, and product-level delinquencies improve.

8. Credit Positioning

KB Capital’s senior credit is best positioned as investment-grade non-bank credit under a major Korean financial group. It is not a substitute for bank senior debt, but a non-bank financial credit within KB group exposure that should require a higher spread. Strengths are parent support expectations, external ratings, corporate bond-centered funding, and improved asset quality in 2H25. Weaknesses are the lack of a deposit base, the credit cycle exposure of operating assets, the decline in the liquidity ratio, and unverified individual bond terms.

Compared with a bank, KB Capital lacks deposits and a payments base, making it more vulnerable when funding markets close. Compared with an independent capital company, however, its 100% ownership by KB Financial Group, support expectations, brand, domestic and international ratings, and market access are major differentiators. The natural credit view is therefore that it sits in the middle: riskier than a bank, but stronger than an independent non-bank.

This relative positioning also affects how investors should monitor the credit. For bank senior debt, capital, deposits, liquidity regulation, and systemic importance are central. For KB Capital, vehicle collateral and residual values, consumer delinquencies, PF-related exposures, corporate bond issuance conditions, and continuity of parent support are more direct credit drivers.

Within the KB group, the relative positioning of KB Kookmin Bank, KB Financial Group, KB Kookmin Card, and KB Capital should be considered. Senior debt of the bank itself is the most defensive group exposure, while holding company debt requires consideration of structural subordination and group capital policy. Card companies and capital companies are non-bank financial entities, so consumer credit, funding, liquidity, and asset quality need to be scrutinized more closely. Because KB Capital has a high auto finance ratio, it carries residual value, used car, and commercial vehicle risks that differ from those of a card company.

This report has not confirmed live spreads, CDS, bond prices, OAS/Z spread, or yields, and therefore makes no buy, sell, hold, cheap, or rich judgment. Relative value assessment would require comparison with same-maturity KB Kookmin Bank, KB Financial Group, KB Kookmin Card, other Korean non-banks, Korean sovereign/quasi-sovereign issuers, and the broader foreign-currency bond market.

9. Key Credit Strengths and Constraints

Taken together, the strengths and constraints show that KB Capital is an “issuer supported by support expectations and funding capacity, but exposed on a standalone basis to the non-bank financial cycle.” Bond investors should recognize its status as a strong group subsidiary while maintaining the premise that it does not have the same safety profile as the bank itself.

10. Downside Scenarios and Monitoring Triggers

The most realistic downside for KB Capital is a scenario in which asset quality deterioration and more cautious funding markets occur at the same time. If NPLs rise in isolation, they may be absorbed through earnings and provisions. If funding costs rise in isolation, they may be partly absorbed through asset yields and parent support expectations. However, if delinquencies rise, NPLs increase, credit costs rise, and investors in corporate bonds, CP, and foreign-currency bonds become cautious at the same time, the market’s view of non-bank credit can change quickly.

When assessing downside, the 32.7% exposure to corporate/investment finance is as important as auto finance. PF, bridge loans, and acquisition finance have fewer transactions than retail assets and tend to depend on collateral values, sponsor support, restructuring terms, and exit markets. If transaction-level losses emerge, provisions and capital can be materially burdened even when the company-wide delinquency ratio appears modest. Therefore, changes in terms, collateral revaluation, stage classification, and concentration are leading indicators as important as the company-wide NPL ratio.

Specifically, in auto finance, used car price declines, residual value losses, and delinquencies among commercial vehicle operators should be emphasized. In consumer finance, early delinquencies and migration to NPLs should be monitored. In corporate/investment finance, changes in terms and collateral value declines in PF, bridge loans, and acquisition finance should be tracked. Even without deterioration in asset quality, if the liquidity ratio falls toward 100%, the short-term borrowing ratio or CP dependence rises, and refinancing foreign-currency bonds becomes difficult, the market may price in funding risk first.

The credit view would weaken if the NPL ratio and delinquency ratio rise again, CCR remains elevated in the 2% range, the liquidity ratio falls toward 100%, refinancing costs on foreign-currency and domestic corporate bonds rise, and parent support assessment weakens at the same time. Conversely, the credit view would strengthen if the NPL ratio declines to the low-2% range, the delinquency ratio stabilizes in the 1% range, coverage remains above 130%, and the liquidity ratio returns to the 130% range or above.

11. Credit View and Monitoring Focus

The current credit level can be assessed as strong investment-grade non-bank credit supported by support expectations as a 100% subsidiary of KB Financial Group and by manageable standalone asset quality and funding structure at KB Capital. However, the quality of the credit is not deposit-led bank credit like KB Kookmin Bank, but non-bank credit driven by the asset cycles of auto finance, consumer finance, and corporate finance, as well as market funding.

The base case is stable. FY2025 earnings increased, total capital rose, the NPL ratio declined from 2.85% in 2Q25 to 2.48% in 4Q25, and the delinquency ratio improved to 1.79%. On funding, the corporate bond-centered structure, short-term borrowing ratio of 4.2%, declining average corporate bond rate, and return to the foreign-currency bond market are supportive. These factors indicate that, at least as of end-2025, standalone financials were not in a condition that would undermine group support expectations.

At the same time, it is too early to state a strong improvement trend. CCR rose to 2.25% in 4Q25, and the liquidity ratio declined to 113.35%. Product-level NPLs, vintage, recovery rates, PF-related exposures, overseas subsidiary asset quality, and foreign-currency bond terms remain unverified. Even if company-wide NPLs have improved, losses could still emerge with a lag in consumer finance, commercial vehicles, or parts of corporate/investment finance.

For investors, it is appropriate to position KB Capital as a “high-quality non-bank with KB group support expectations.” Senior credit is supported by its position within the KB group, A3 / Stable, AA- / Stable, corporate bond-centered funding, and improved asset quality. However, the required risk premium should be higher than for bank senior debt, reflecting the lack of a deposit base, the credit cycles in auto, consumer, and corporate finance, the decline in the liquidity ratio, and the fact that parent support is not a guarantee.

The monitoring focus is, first, whether the NPL ratio, delinquency ratio, coverage, and CCR can sustain the improvement seen in 4Q25. Second, whether the liquidity ratio recovers to a level comfortably above 100%. Third, whether funding costs and maturity profiles for corporate bonds, CP, and foreign-currency bonds remain stable. Fourth, whether KB Financial Group’s ownership, ratings, and strategy for non-bank subsidiaries remain unchanged. Fifth, product-level and overseas-subsidiary-level loss rates, PF-related exposures, and foreign-currency bond terms should be confirmed further.

At present, KB Capital’s senior credit can be viewed as stable. However, this does not mean it is automatically safe because it belongs to the KB group; rather, it means that as of end-2025, its standalone asset quality, earnings, capital, and funding had not deteriorated materially. Maintaining this view requires confirmation that NPLs, delinquencies, liquidity, and funding costs do not deteriorate simultaneously from 2026 onward, and that its group position as a wholly owned subsidiary is maintained.

12. Short Summary & Conclusion

KB Capital is a Korean auto finance-focused non-bank wholly owned by KB Financial Group. Its credit quality is supported by domestic AA- / Stable, Moody's A3 / Stable, corporate bond-centered funding, and NPL/delinquency metrics that improved in 2H25. The credit view is stable, but the company should be viewed not as a deposit-taking bank like KB Kookmin Bank, but as a market-funded specialized credit finance company. Parent support expectations are strong but are not an explicit guarantee, so investors should continue monitoring asset quality in auto, consumer, and corporate finance, the liquidity ratio, foreign-currency bond refinancing, and individual bond terms.

13. Sources

Company and Primary Sources

• KB Capital, 2025.4Q IR Report Korean, accessed 2026-05-14. Used to confirm company profile, operating asset composition, profitability, asset quality, funding/liquidity, and 2025/2024 summary financials. PDF tables were confirmed from rendered images.
• KB Capital, 2024.4Q IR Report Korean, accessed 2026-05-14. Used to confirm 2024/2023 summary financials.
• KB Capital, 2023.4Q IR Report Korean, accessed 2026-05-14. Used as supplementary comparison for 2023 and earlier.
• KB Capital, Financial Information / Credit Rating page, accessed 2026-05-14. Used to confirm the IR report list, domestic AA- / Stable, CP A1, corporate credit AA- / Stable, and Moody's A3 / Stable.
  https://m.kbcapital.co.kr/aboutus/mnbsInfo/fnafInfo/fnafInfo.kbc?viewTab=01
• KB Capital, "KB Capital successfully issues USD300mn global foreign-currency bonds", September 30, 2025. Used to confirm the first return to the foreign-currency bond market in five years, senior unsecured RegS format, maintenance of Moody's A3, and issuance demand.
  https://m.kbcapital.co.kr/aboutus/cmpgdnc/newsDtl.kbc?blbdSeqno=107943
• KB Capital, "2025 strategy meeting", January 21, 2025. Used to confirm 2025 management priorities, capital efficiency, cost reduction, asset soundness management, and platform revenue policy.
  https://m.kbcapital.co.kr/aboutus/cmpgdnc/newsDtl.kbc?blbdSeqno=107391
• KB Financial Group, Credit Ratings page, accessed 2026-05-14. Used to confirm rating positioning for KB Financial Group, KB Kookmin Bank, KB Kookmin Card, and KB Capital.
  https://www.kbfg.com/eng/ir/credit/rating.htm

Unverified / Pending Items