Issuer Summary: Korea East-West Power

Report date: 2026-05-18
Issuer: Korea East-West Power Co., Ltd.
Ticker: KOEWPW
Relevant bond issuer: Korea East-West Power Co., Ltd. senior unsecured domestic and international bonds
Primary analytical frame: KEPCO wholly owned Korean power-generation subsidiary / government-related utility

1. Business Snapshot and Recent Developments

Korea East-West Power Co., Ltd. (“EWP”) is a power-generation subsidiary established in April 2001 through its separation from Korea Electric Power Corporation (“KEPCO”) as part of the restructuring of Korea’s power industry. KEPCO owns 100% of EWP. EWP should not be viewed as an ordinary private independent power producer, but rather as a government-related, thermal-focused generation company embedded in Korea’s electricity supply framework. The first question in EWP’s credit analysis is how far its generation assets, cost-recovery framework, KEPCO parent linkage, and importance to Korean government power policy can absorb its coal dependence, fuel-price exposure, power-transition investment, short-term borrowings, and the absence of an explicit legal guarantee on individual bonds.

EWP is headquartered in Ulsan and operates domestic power plants mainly in Dangjin, Ulsan, Donghae, and Ilsan. According to EWP’s official English domestic business page and the KIS Credit Opinion, installed capacity was 9,675MW as of end-March 2025, comprising 6,440MW of steam power, 2,972MW of LNG combined-cycle power, and 263MW of alternative energy. Approximately 66.6% of installed capacity is steam power, including coal and anthracite, while LNG combined-cycle power accounts for approximately 30.7% and alternative energy for approximately 2.7%. The thermal-heavy generation mix benefits from institutional stability in generation cost recovery, but leaves sensitivity to carbon policy, environmental investment, retirement of ageing assets, fuel prices, and transmission constraints.

EWP’s scale within the market is meaningful as one of the generation subsidiaries supporting Korea’s overall electricity system. KIS shows EWP’s installed-capacity share at 6.3% as of end-March 2025, with electricity sales of 7,357GWh and a sales-volume share of 5.3% in 1Q2025. At end-2024, installed capacity was 9,675MW, capacity share was 6.3%, electricity sales were 33,328GWh, and sales-volume share was 6.1%. This indicates that EWP is not the largest generation subsidiary within the KEPCO group, but it has a non-negligible scale within Korea’s electricity supply system. KEPCO’s 2025 Form 20-F also indicates that non-nuclear generation subsidiaries accounted for 32.7% of KEPCO’s purchased power, and EWP forms one part of that group.

The customer base is institutionally quite stable. KIS describes EWP as selling all electricity it produces to KEPCO through the Korea Power Exchange (“KPX”), providing it with a stable operating base. The key point is that EWP’s revenue is determined not as a retail utility directly charging end-users, but as a generation company selling to KEPCO through Korea’s power trading and settlement framework. Therefore, EWP’s credit quality needs to be read not only through the lens of a conventional power purchase agreement for a commercial generator, but together with the CBP framework, capacity payments, SMP, settlement adjustment coefficients, KEPCO’s financial position, and Korean government power policy.

From an institutional perspective, based on KEPCO’s Form 20-F, KPX’s official market explanation, and the English translation of the Electric Utility Act, Korea’s electricity policy and power supply-demand planning fall under the supervisory remit of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (“MOTIE”), and generation, transmission and distribution, and sales are operated under the Electric Utility Act and the KPX market framework. The KEPCO Act is an important legal basis indicating the possibility of government guarantees for KEPCO bonds, but it should not be treated as a provision that automatically grants a government guarantee to EWP’s ordinary debt. EWP is an issuer that receives strong credit enhancement through the support route of government -> KEPCO -> generation subsidiaries and through institutional sales to KPX/KEPCO, but it is not a direct obligation of the Korean government.

The most recent changes from 2024 to 2025 were a recovery in profitability and a reduction in short-term debt. In KIS’s public report, consolidated revenue decreased from KRW 5.6222tn in 2023 to KRW 5.3790tn in 2024, but operating profit improved from KRW 152.7bn to KRW 621.1bn. In the DART corrected FY2025 annual report filed on 31 March 2026, receipt number 20260331004279, full-year 2025 revenue decreased further to KRW 5.0512tn, while operating profit was KRW 645.5bn, net income was KRW 443.1bn, and operating cash flow was KRW 1.1118tn. The structure was that lower SMP and reduced sales volumes weighed on revenue, while lower fuel prices and raw material cost burdens supported earnings.

However, this improvement should not be treated unconditionally as a structural improvement. In full-year 2025, operating cash flow exceeded investment cash outflow and simple FCF was positive, but investment in generation, environmental facilities, overseas projects, and renewables continues. Cash and current financial assets at end-2025 were KRW 247.7bn, which was not sufficient on a standalone basis to cover short-term borrowings and bonds of approximately KRW 761.1bn. EWP is not an issuer that absorbs short-term debt solely through on-hand liquidity. It supplements liquidity through a combination of high-grade market access, regulated earnings, and expectations of KEPCO and government support.

Another important recent business development for EWP is investment in the power transition. In 2022, Honam Units 1 and 2 and Ulsan Units 4-6 were closed in line with the government’s policy to retire ageing thermal power plants, reducing installed capacity and sales volumes in the short term. At the same time, investments such as the Eumseong LNG combined-cycle power project are progressing, and the direction over the medium to long term is to maintain a certain level of generation capacity. This has two credit implications. First, a shift from coal and heavy oil toward LNG, renewables, and new businesses could reduce long-term regulatory and environmental risks. Second, the transition itself requires large investment and pressures free cash flow and borrowings.

As an initial coverage report, this note assesses EWP across three layers. First, as a generation company on a standalone basis, EWP is supported by full-volume sales, the cost-recovery framework, and improved earnings, but it faces coal dependence and investment burdens. Second, as a 100%-owned KEPCO subsidiary, EWP has strong business, funding, and policy links with its parent and is likely to receive a support-inclusive assessment above its standalone credit quality. Third, for bond investors, strong support expectations and an explicit Korean government or KEPCO guarantee on individual bonds are not the same thing. Maintaining this distinction throughout the analysis is the most important point in reading KOEWPW.

2. Industry Position and Franchise Strength

EWP’s operating base is supported less by ordinary “competitive advantage” than by its role within Korea’s electricity system. As a generation company, EWP does not sell directly to end-users, but earns generation revenue through the KPX market and KEPCO’s purchases. In Korea, KEPCO is the core entity for transmission, distribution, and retail sales, while generation subsidiaries and independent power producers supply power generation. EWP’s franchise should therefore be assessed not by its pricing power with specific customers, but by its generation capacity, generation portfolio, institutional connection with KPX and KEPCO, and importance to the government’s policy of maintaining stable electricity supply.

The stability of EWP as a generation company comes from the cost-recovery structure under CBP, capacity payments, and SMP. KIS explains that, under the current variable-cost-based market, generation companies recover fixed costs such as investment and operation and maintenance costs through capacity payments, and recover much of their variable costs such as fuel costs through SMP. Because of this structure, the risk that short-term fuel-unit-cost fluctuations or changes in plant utilisation will immediately translate into extreme earnings deterioration, as can occur for private generation companies, is restrained.

However, institutional stability should not be read as a complete profit guarantee. SMP, capacity payments, and settlement adjustment coefficients are affected by earnings distribution among generators, KEPCO’s financial position, the government’s tariff policy, fuel costs, and the generation mix. EWP cannot freely pass through costs to final consumers, and when KEPCO is unable to recover sufficient retail tariffs, pressure can also reach generation subsidiaries through the group’s overall financial burden and the operation of settlement coefficients. In other words, EWP’s institutional franchise is strong, but it is not fully insulated from revenue lags or policy adjustments.

The scale of installed capacity reinforces support expectations for EWP. Its 6.3% installed-capacity share as of end-March 2025 is not so large that EWP is individually irreplaceable in the context of Korea as a whole, but as part of KEPCO’s non-nuclear generation subsidiaries, it is capacity needed for stable supply. Dangjin’s large-scale coal power, Ulsan and Ilsan’s LNG combined-cycle power, and Donghae’s anthracite and biomass-related facilities provide a combination of regional, fuel-source, and load-response functions. While an outage at one generation company could be absorbed by the overall system, disruption to the funding or investment of the generation subsidiaries as a group would have consequences for Korea’s supply stability and power transition.

At the same time, EWP’s franchise is characterised as “strong but carrying a heavy transition burden.” The shares of coal and anthracite are high, and the average age of thermal facilities cannot be ignored. KEPCO’s 2024 Form 20-F generation-facility table for EWP showed the average age of Dangjin coal power at 17.0 years, Donghae anthracite at 25.8 years, Ulsan combined-cycle power at 21.0 years, and Ilsan combined-cycle power at 30.8 years. The 2025 version of the same table needs to be reconfirmed, but it is clear that asset renewal, environmental investment, and fuel switching are EWP’s medium-term capital burdens.

EWP’s competitive positioning is similar to that of KEPCO’s other Korean generation subsidiaries. Together with Korea South-East Power, Korea Midland Power, Korea Western Power, Korea Southern Power, and Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, it forms KEPCO group’s generation base. However, the nature of risk differs from generation subsidiaries such as KHNP, which are centred on nuclear power, low fuel costs, and high policy importance. Because EWP is thermal-focused, short-term earnings are more exposed to fuel costs and SMP, while in the long term, reducing the coal ratio and investing in LNG, renewables, and new businesses are central to the credit analysis.

Overseas business makes EWP’s company profile somewhat more complex. The official overseas business page lists operating projects such as Jamaica Public Service, South Jamaica Power Company, EWP Renewable Corp. in the United States, Indonesia Kalsel-1, and Australia Columboola Solar Farm, as well as construction and development projects such as Saudi Amaala, Guam Ukudu, Guam photovoltaic/ESS, and the Vietnam Bac Ninh clean energy project. Overseas business can provide revenue sources and support decarbonisation and the renewable-energy shift, but it also carries project risk, FX risk, host-country regulatory risk, construction-delay risk, and valuation risk on equity investments. This report does not treat overseas business as the main source of credit enhancement, but centres the analysis on the domestic generation framework and the KEPCO link.

3. Segment Assessment

For EWP’s segment assessment, it is more practical to examine credit contributions and constraints by generation facility than by accounting revenue segment. Dangjin coal power is the core of generation capacity and earnings, but carries coal, environmental, and future closure risks. Ulsan and Ilsan LNG combined-cycle power plants are important transition assets, but are affected by LNG prices, FX, SMP, and asset age. Donghae, alternative energy, and overseas projects are complementary. At present, the main repayment sources are domestic thermal power and institutional sales through KPX/KEPCO.

The most important point in this segment structure is that EWP is a thermal power company in transition. Current credit quality is supported by existing thermal power and institutional sales, but future credit quality depends on whether EWP can invest in LNG, renewables, and environmental facilities while maintaining thermal earnings and avoiding excessive debt growth.

4. Financial Profile and Analysis

EWP’s financial profile clearly recovered in 2024-2025 from the low-profitability period in 2022. In the full-year 2025 DART filing, revenue decreased further to KRW 5.0512tn, while operating profit was KRW 645.5bn and operating margin was 12.8%, maintaining the improvement seen in 2024. Because revenue declined while earnings improved, the main credit driver was not demand growth, but improvement in fuel prices, raw material costs, and the SMP/settlement environment.

Note: FY2021-FY2024 are based on the KIS Credit Opinion, and FY2025 is based on the consolidated financial statements in the DART corrected annual report, receipt number 20260331004279. Unit is KRW 100mn. FY2025 EBITDA, total borrowings and bonds / EBITDA, debt ratio, and borrowing dependence are simple calculations at the time of writing and are not ratios published by a rating agency.

Cash flow improvement is confirmed for full-year 2025. Under DART, operating cash flow was KRW 1.1118tn, investment cash flow was negative KRW 883.9bn, simple FCF was positive KRW 227.9bn, and financing cash flow was negative KRW 176.8bn. This indicates that some internal funding remained even after investment in 2025. However, investment burdens including Eumseong LNG, Dangjin environmental investment, Guam, renewables, and new businesses will continue, so it is too early to conclude from 2025 alone that medium-term FCF has stabilised.

There are two main points to draw from this table. First, EWP is not a low-quality issuer even on a standalone financial basis. The 2025 operating margin of 12.8%, approximate total borrowings and bonds / EBITDA of around 2.7x, and operating cash flow of KRW 1.1118tn indicate adequate stress-absorption capacity for a generation company. Second, as the 2022 operating margin of 0.1% shows, earnings can fall sharply even with large revenue scale if fuel, SMP, settlement, and policy operation move unfavourably. EWP’s financial improvement is positive for credit quality, but it is an improvement dependent on the institutional and fuel-price environment.

5. Structural Considerations for Bondholders

For bondholders, the most important point is not to confuse EWP’s high rating and government-related status with a legal guarantee. EWP is a 100%-owned KEPCO subsidiary and an important generation company in Korea’s electricity supply framework. Rating agencies strongly factor in the likelihood of support from parent KEPCO and the government. However, EWP’s ordinary debt does not automatically become a direct obligation of the Korean government, nor does it necessarily benefit from the same legal guarantee as KEPCO bonds. For an individual bond investment decision, investors need to confirm the issuer, guarantor, ranking, security, covenants, cross default, change of control, and governing law.

The support route should be divided into four layers. First, there is institutional and policy support from the Korean government to KEPCO. KEPCO is the core power company that oversees Korea’s transmission, distribution, retail sales, and major generation subsidiaries, and the government and KDB hold a majority stake. The KEPCO Act also includes a provision under which the government may guarantee payment of principal and interest on KEPCO bonds. However, this is a legal basis relating to KEPCO and should not be asserted as directly applying to all EWP debt. Second, there is parent support from KEPCO to EWP. EWP is KEPCO’s wholly owned subsidiary and has strong generation, cash flow, and policy-execution links with KEPCO. Third, there is institutional cost recovery through CBP, capacity payments, SMP, and settlement adjustment coefficients. Fourth, there are the legal guarantee, ranking, and contractual protections written into individual bonds.

Rating agency views also support this layered understanding. In its public releases, Fitch aligns EWP’s IDR with KEPCO’s rating and assesses KEPCO’s support incentives for EWP as weak in terms of legal incentives but high in terms of strategic and operational incentives. In past releases, Fitch assessed EWP’s standalone credit profile at a mid-investment-grade level and explained the gap with the final rating by the parent link. S&P also views EWP as a core subsidiary of KEPCO and assesses it as playing an essential role in KEPCO’s stable electricity supply. These points indicate that EWP’s rating is not determined by standalone financials alone.

This structure is a strength for bondholders. Even if EWP were to come under severe stress on a standalone basis, KEPCO and the government have strong incentives to maintain stable electricity supply, generation investment, and confidence in the funding market. If generation subsidiaries’ funding were disrupted, it would affect KEPCO’s power purchases, generation capacity maintenance, power transition, and the government’s energy policy. As a result, EWP bonds carry materially stronger support expectations than bonds of ordinary private generation companies.

At the same time, bondholders should be aware of three structural constraints. First, support is not a legal guarantee and works substantially through policy and parent linkage. Second, EWP is not parent KEPCO but a subsidiary, and how funds flow within the group and when and in what form the parent provides support are not necessarily automated by contract. Third, for international bonds, currency, governing law, listing market, tax, paying agent, acceleration clauses, and negative pledge determine the actual protection available to investors.

The structural conclusion is clear. EWP is likely to be treated as a very strong support-inclusive issuer, but individual bonds should not be simplified as government-guaranteed bonds. This report assesses EWP as an issuer credit, while leaving the detailed terms of individual bonds as unverified items. Before investing in a specific issue, investors need to confirm guarantee, ranking, negative pledge, cross default, change of control, tax, and governing law in the Offering Circular or registration statement.

6. Capital Structure, Liquidity and Funding

EWP’s capital structure does not raise high standalone distress concerns, but it is a structure in which short-term debt and investment burdens are refinanced through high ratings, parent linkage, and institutional earnings. Total borrowings increased to KRW 4.7158tn at end-March 2025, but total borrowings and bonds at end-2025 under DART contracted to approximately KRW 3.8604tn. Short-term borrowings and bonds also declined to approximately KRW 761.1bn at end-2025, significantly reducing the short-term burden from the 1Q level.

However, liquidity should not be assessed too strongly. Cash at end-2025 was KRW 216.9bn, and even including current financial assets, the total was KRW 247.7bn, only about one-third of short-term borrowings and bonds of approximately KRW 761.1bn. EWP is not an issuer that covers short-term debt with on-hand liquidity, but one that supplements liquidity through domestic and international bond markets, bank borrowings, institutional earnings, and expectations of KEPCO and government support.

Note: FY2024 and 1Q2025 are based on KIS, and FY2025 is based on the DART corrected annual report. Unit is KRW 100mn. FY2025 short-term borrowings and bonds is a simple figure calculated by deducting bond discount issuance differences from short-term borrowings, current long-term borrowings, and current bonds.

Capital expenditure will determine EWP’s medium-term financial profile. KIS identifies major investments including Eumseong natural gas power generation, the indoor storage project for the Dangjin coal yard, Dangjin environmental facility improvements, Donghae environmental facility reinforcement, Guam Ukudu, and renewables and new businesses. Eumseong LNG combined-cycle power is particularly large, with an investment budget of KRW 1.5402tn, KRW 678.1bn invested through end-March 2025, and remaining investment of KRW 862.1bn from April 2025 onward. This is a significant future funding requirement. It is necessary for decarbonisation and the power transition, but it pressures short- to medium-term free cash flow.

Note: Based on the KIS Credit Opinion. Unit is KRW 100mn. The table above is an extract of major projects and the simple sum of individual rows should not be treated as the total amount in the full KIS table. The centre of the investment burden is the KRW 862.1bn remaining investment in Eumseong LNG.

Funding access is strong. Domestically, KIS maintains EWP’s unsecured bonds at AAA/Stable, and EWP is likely to be accepted in the domestic bond market as a government-related issuer. In the international market, EWP has previously issued USD senior unsecured bonds and green bonds, and high ratings from S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch support market access. EWP’s official ESG Bond page provides sustainability bond and green bond frameworks and reporting, and use of proceeds for renewables and energy-efficiency investment can also be confirmed.

Even so, liquidity assessment should remain conservative. For a high-grade quasi-sovereign issuer, reliance on market refinancing itself is not unusual. However, investors need to confirm what tools remain if markets close: KEPCO, banks, government-affiliated financial institutions, the bond market, asset sales, or investment deferrals. For foreign-currency bonds in particular, KRW depreciation, US dollar rates, hedging costs, overseas investment cash flows, and tax and payment clauses matter.

7. Rating Agency View

Ratings are important for understanding EWP’s credit, but focusing only on rating symbols can be misleading. Domestically, KIS maintained EWP’s unsecured bonds at AAA/Stable in its Credit Opinion dated 17 June 2025. Internationally, S&P confirmed AA/Stable in its Global Corporate Credit Ratings public list dated 21 July 2025. Moody’s confirmed Aa2/Stable in a Cbonds public summary dated 12 December 2025, but the full original Moody’s report has not been reviewed. Fitch confirmed issuer and bond ratings of AA-/Stable in public release mirrors dated 22 April 2022 and 26 June 2023, but the latest full report has not been reviewed.

KIS’s domestic AAA incorporates EWP’s business stability, financial stability, and the possibility of support from KEPCO and the government. KIS identifies as support factors that EWP is a 100%-owned subsidiary separated from KEPCO, that the power industry is highly public in nature and subject to strong government guidance and supervision, and that government and KEPCO exercise strong substantive control through settlement adjustment coefficients and electricity tariff controls. At the same time, KIS also notes that decarbonisation policy and the coal ratio increase business and financial volatility.

S&P’s public list is used to confirm the rating level. In past releases, EWP and the other generation subsidiaries have been treated as core subsidiaries that play an essential role in KEPCO’s electricity supply. Here again, the centre of the assessment is not EWP’s standalone margin, but its function within the KEPCO group and government-related status.

Fitch’s public release mirrors are useful supplementary materials for reading the gap between standalone credit quality and the support-inclusive rating. Fitch aligns EWP’s rating with KEPCO’s rating, while describing legal support incentives as weak and strategic and operational support incentives as high. In past releases, Fitch assessed EWP’s Standalone Credit Profile as bbb, indicating that the gap with the final rating is explained by the parent link.

For Moody’s, EWP’s Aa2/Stable can be confirmed from the public summary. However, because the latest full Moody’s report has not been reviewed for this report, details of support linkage and rating triggers are not asserted.

The most important rating triggers are the Korean sovereign, KEPCO, the assessment of government support, and deterioration in EWP’s standalone financials. Because the support-inclusive rating is high, ordinary operating-profit volatility may not necessarily lead to a large movement in the final rating. However, if a sovereign downgrade, deterioration in KEPCO’s rating, a change in the government’s support stance, and investment burden or earnings deterioration that pushes EWP’s standalone credit quality further below the lower-investment-grade range were to overlap, the ratings and spreads could be affected.

The difference between the rating agency view and this report is that this report does not use market prices. Live spreads, OAS, CDS, and same-tenor peer comparisons have not been checked. Therefore, this report does not judge whether EWP is cheap or expensive relative to rating. Ratings are inputs for assessing default risk and support-inclusive credit quality, and investment decisions require separate confirmation of maturity, currency, issuance terms, guarantee, and relative spread.

8. Credit Positioning

Within Korean quasi-sovereigns close to the sovereign, EWP has strong support expectations, but it is an issuer whose business and structural risks should be reviewed more carefully than those of policy banks or parent KEPCO. Its defining feature is that it is “close to the government but not a direct government obligation, close to KEPCO but not the parent, and important for electricity supply but a coal-centred generation company.”

Investors should separate the rating symbol from support directness, standalone financials, generation mix, investment burden, and individual bond terms. Because live spreads have not been checked, this report does not assert “buy,” “sell,” “cheap,” or “expensive.”

9. Key Credit Strengths and Constraints

EWP’s credit strengths are its embedded position in Korea’s electricity system as a 100%-owned KEPCO subsidiary, institutional sales to KPX/KEPCO, profitability improvement in 2024-2025, and high-grade market access. Its constraints are the coal-centred generation mix, investment burden, thin on-hand liquidity, and the gap between support expectations and legal guarantees.

Taken together, EWP is an issuer with low support-inclusive default risk, but it is a quasi-sovereign whose standalone financials and individual bond terms require careful review. In a portfolio, EWP can be considered as a defensive high-grade Korean credit, but treating it the same as a policy bank or parent KEPCO requires caution because legal guarantee and support directness are weaker.

10. Downside Scenarios and Monitoring Triggers

The most realistic downside scenario is one in which fuel-price increases, adverse SMP and settlement terms, lower generation volume, higher investment spending, and a weaker support assessment overlap. Full-year 2025 improved, but as the 2022 operating margin of 0.1% shows, earnings can decline materially when the institutional and fuel environment reverses. Monitoring should be translated into the following figures, not limited to qualitative news.

The highest-priority items to check next are quarterly financials from 2026 onward, bond maturities, foreign-currency bonds, hedging, bank lines, and capex progress. Because short-term debt declined and FCF was positive in full-year 2025, the next issue is whether this improvement is maintained in 2026.

11. Credit View and Monitoring Focus

EWP’s current credit quality can be treated, on a support-inclusive basis, as consistent with a high-grade Korean quasi-sovereign, given that it is a 100%-owned KEPCO subsidiary and a government-related generation company embedded in Korea’s power system. The direction is stable to modestly improving, supported by full-year 2025 profitability, operating cash flow, and short-term debt improvement, but the pace of improvement will depend on fuel prices, the SMP and settlement framework, and investment burdens such as Eumseong LNG. The probability of rapid deterioration is not high under normal conditions, but if KEPCO or Korean sovereign ratings, fuel prices, and refinancing markets deteriorate simultaneously, support-inclusive assessment and spreads could weaken within a short period. On a standalone credit basis, EWP is constrained by its coal-centred generation mix, power-transition investment, short-term debt, and sensitivity to fuel, SMP, and the settlement framework.

This view is supported by EWP’s proximity to KEPCO and the government, its institutional revenue base through KPX/KEPCO, full-year 2025 operating profit of KRW 645.5bn, and operating cash flow of KRW 1.1118tn. Support-inclusive default risk is low, but EWP should not be treated as a government-guaranteed bond without reviewing standalone financials and individual bond terms.

For investors, the most important point is to treat EWP as a high-grade quasi-sovereign, but not as a government-guaranteed bond. Support expectations are very strong, but legal claims on individual bonds depend on the issuer, guarantee, ranking, and contractual terms. When comparing EWP with parent KEPCO, policy banks such as KDB/KEXIM, and the Korean sovereign, investors need to allow for EWP’s generation business risk, support routed through the parent-subsidiary structure, and coal, LNG, and investment risks.

From a holding-decision perspective, EWP can fit within the stable bucket of high-grade Asian quasi-sovereign credits. However, because live spreads have not been checked, this report does not judge cheapness or richness. If sufficient spread is available over policy banks or parent KEPCO, EWP’s support-inclusive credit quality can look attractive. Conversely, if spreads are extremely close to sovereign or policy-bank levels, investors should assess whether the gap in support directness and power-transition risk is adequately compensated.

Future monitoring should prioritise quarterly financials from 2026 onward, SMP, fuel prices, settlement adjustment coefficients, KEPCO’s tariff and financial trends, Eumseong LNG investment, short-term borrowings, domestic and international bond issuance terms, Korean sovereign / KEPCO / EWP ratings, and individual USD bond terms.

12. Short Summary & Conclusion

Korea East-West Power is a government-related Korean generation company wholly owned by KEPCO, and forms part of Korea’s electricity supply through assets such as the Dangjin coal plant and Ulsan and Ilsan LNG combined-cycle power plants. Full-year 2025 operating profit was KRW 645.5bn and operating cash flow was KRW 1.1118tn, maintaining the profitability improvement seen in 2024. However, its coal-centred generation mix, power-transition investment, short-term debt, and sensitivity to fuel, SMP, and the settlement framework constrain standalone credit quality. On a support-inclusive basis, EWP can be treated as a high-grade Korean quasi-sovereign, but individual bonds may not be government-guaranteed, so expectations of KEPCO and government support need to be assessed separately from legal guarantees.

13. Sources

Primary company and official sources

• Korea East-West Power, official English website, main page / domestic business / overseas business / new and renewable energy / management index / financial report / ESG bond / sustainability report pages, accessed 2026-05-18: https://www.ewp.co.kr/eng/main/index.html
• Korea East-West Power, domestic business page, accessed 2026-05-18: https://www.ewp.co.kr/eng/subpage/content.html?pc=7TX4LX0ULNX34H74YLJG182NCVJ8S7Y
• Korea East-West Power, overseas business page, accessed 2026-05-18: https://www.ewp.co.kr/eng/subpage/content.html?pc=IVPQQGEO35FNGG9WMJPYKNUC89EOI2E
• Korea East-West Power, new and renewable energy business page, accessed 2026-05-18: https://www.ewp.co.kr/eng/subpage/content.html?pc=2IWVCPHX5S4OUWBNLVRIVQFZ2K2UFSK
• Korea East-West Power, management index page, accessed 2026-05-18: https://www.ewp.co.kr/eng/subpage/content.html?pc=XN6VNT51CEF587TSALBNR3ALUFODPJS
• Korea East-West Power, financial report page, accessed 2026-05-18: https://www.ewp.co.kr/eng/subpage/content.html?pc=drpu6t8ines58ewv86ez7efvotuw4fo
• Korea East-West Power, ESG Bond page, accessed 2026-05-18: https://www.ewp.co.kr/eng/subpage/content.html?pc=BAZDJ61IGBW542PSADQC1ANLD5SG9EO
• Korea East-West Power, DART corrected annual report for FY2025, filed 2026-03-31, rcpNo=20260331004279: https://dart.fss.or.kr/dsaf001/main.do?rcpNo=20260331004279
• KEPCO, Form 20-F for FY2025, filed 2026-04-29: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/887225/000119312526190113/d86100d20f.htm
• KEPCO, Korea Electric Power Corporation Act exhibit, SEC filing exhibit: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/887225/000119312523124899/d427740dex151.htm
• Korea Power Exchange, Electricity Market Trading Process, accessed 2026-05-18: https://www.kpx.or.kr/menu.es?mid=a20201000000
• Korean Law Information Center, Electric Utility Act English translation, accessed 2026-05-18: https://www.law.go.kr/LSW/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=232909&urlMode=engLsInfoR&vie=
• ALIO, Korea East-West Power 2025-2029 mid-term financial management plan disclosure page, submitted 2025-10-13: https://www.alio.go.kr/upload/disclosure/2025/10/14/2025101403061607/doc.html

Rating and analytical sources

• KIS Rating, Korea East-West Power Co., Ltd. Credit Opinion, 2025-06-17: https://m.kisrating.com/fileDown.do?fileName=rs20250617-14.pdf&gubun=2&menuCd=R8
• S&P Global Ratings, Global Corporate Credit Ratings list, 2025-07-21: https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/-/view/sourceId/37291
• Asia Economy, S&P assigns AA rating to Korea East-West Power senior unsecured dollar bonds, 2020-04-27: https://cm.asiae.co.kr/en/article/2020042716251131134
• MarketScreener / Fitch mirror, Fitch assigns Korea East-West Power USD green notes AA- rating, 2022-04-22: https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/KOREA-ELECTRIC-POWER-CORP-6494969/news/Fitch-Assigns-Korea-East-West-Power-s-USD-Green-Notes-AA-Rating-40119202/
• MarketScreener / Fitch mirror, Fitch assigns Korea East-West Power USD notes AA- rating, 2023-06-26: https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/KOREA-ELECTRIC-POWER-CORP-6494969/news/Fitch-Assigns-Korea-East-West-Power-s-USD-Notes-AA-Rating-44187888/
• Cbonds public summary, Moody's affirms Korea East-West Power at Aa2 / stable, 2025-12-12, accessed 2026-05-18: https://cbonds.com/news/3719563/

Supplementary checks

• Bridge Economy, Korea East-West Power 1Q2025 profitability article, 2025-05-28: https://www.viva100.com/article/20250528501363
• DART daily filing list, 2026-03-31, used to identify Korea East-West Power corrected FY2025 annual report rcpNo=20260331004279.
• Global Energy Monitor, Eumseong power station page, accessed 2026-05-18. Used only as a project cross-check, not as a primary financial source.

14. Unverified / Pending

1. PL, BS, CF, short-term borrowings and bonds, and cash and current financial assets were extracted from the FY2025 DART filing, but details in the notes on bond maturities, foreign-currency bonds, hedging, commitment lines, and bank lines have not been confirmed.
2. Offering Circulars or registration statements for individual USD bonds and domestic bonds have not been reviewed. Before investment, confirm the issuer, guarantee, presence or absence of a government guarantee, presence or absence of a KEPCO guarantee, ranking, negative pledge, cross default, change of control, tax, governing law, and listing market.
3. The latest full reports from Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch have not been reviewed. Because this report used public lists, public summaries, and release mirrors, detailed upgrade and downgrade triggers should be checked next time.
4. Live bond prices, yields, OAS, Z spread, CDS, and same-tenor comparisons with KEPCO, KOGAS, KNOC, KDB, and Korean sovereign bonds have not been checked. This report does not judge relative-value cheapness or richness.
5. The major capital investment table is treated as an extract of major projects from the KIS public table, and the simple sum of individual rows is not used as the total investment amount. Next time, investment progress as of end-2025 should be reconfirmed through DART notes or company materials.
6. Financials, dividends, equity valuation, project DSCR, and construction progress and delay risk for Guam Ukudu and Saudi Amaala by overseas business have not been confirmed. The body of this report centres on the domestic generation framework and KEPCO support.