Issuer Summary: National Highways Authority of India

Date: 2026-05-10
Subject: National Highways Authority of India (NHAI)
Report Type: issuer_summary

1. Credit View and Monitoring Focus

The National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) is a statutory body executing the Indian government’s road policies. It is neither a conventional road-operating company, a private concessionaire, nor a financial institution. The credit view is that NHAI should be assessed as a “quasi-sovereign infrastructure issuer responsible for national highway development in India.” NHAI’s bond credit does not rely solely on standalone P&L or toll revenues; it is heavily influenced by its relationship with the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH), government budget allocations, cess and budgetary support, reinvestment of toll collections, asset monetisation via TOT/InvIT/securitisation, and the continued prioritisation of highway development within India’s growth policy.

The current credit story reflects a transition from a period of high leverage. In the course of accelerating highway construction, NHAI accumulated substantial long-term borrowings, tax-free bonds, bank loans, and 54EC bonds. CRISIL notes that it has not undertaken new borrowings since October 2022. A clear strategy has emerged to reduce debt using government budget allocations, toll revenues, and monetisation proceeds. According to CRISIL data as of March 2026, NHAI’s debt fell from INR 3.75 lakh crore at March 2024-end to INR 2.89 lakh crore at March 2025-end and INR 2.43 lakh crore at December 2025-end. Although debt remains high, the shift from an expansionary to a reduction phase is a significant improvement for bond investors.

The principal credit strength is NHAI’s policy irreplaceability. While national highways comprise only about 2% of India’s road network, they carry roughly 40–45% of traffic, according to CRISIL. NHAI is the central executing agency for the National Highway Development Program, Bharatmala, PM Gati-Shakti, and major port, logistics, and economic corridor connectivity. Disruptions in highway development would directly affect logistics efficiency, intercity mobility, industrial competitiveness, and regional development. The government has strong incentives to support NHAI, and CRISIL incorporates this government support into the rating for timely debt and interest servicing.

However, NHAI bonds should not be treated as equivalent to Indian sovereign bonds. Although it is a statutory body with a very high likelihood of government support, not every bond carries an unconditional, irrevocable guarantee from the Government of India. Investors must consider bond structure, collateral, government guarantees, seniority, tax-free/54EC/taxable bond distinctions, foreign currency or masala bond terms, negative pledge, cross-default, and tax/remittance rules. While the domestic rating of AAA is a strong support factor, it is not synonymous with a legal guarantee.

From an investment standpoint, NHAI can be viewed as “quasi-sovereign Indian highway infrastructure credit.” There is adequate spread relative to the sovereign, and as long as bond terms are acceptable and government budget allocations and asset monetisation continue, it functions as a solid quasi-sovereign bond. Its appeal lies not in high corporate profit growth but in policy importance, government support, debt reduction, and execution capability for highway asset monetisation. Key risks include delays in government funding, reduced policy prioritisation for highways, deterioration in toll systems or monetisation markets, contractor/concession disputes, contingent liabilities, and downward pressure on India’s sovereign rating.

2. Business Snapshot: What is NHAI?

NHAI was established under the National Highways Authority of India Act, 1988, and commenced operations in 1995 as a statutory body of the Government of India. Its mandate is to develop, maintain, and manage national highways delegated by the central government. NHAI does not directly construct or operate all highways; instead, it implements policy using a combination of private players, contractors, investors, and government funding via EPC, BOT toll, annuity, Hybrid Annuity Model (HAM), TOT, InvIT, and similar mechanisms.

This operational profile is critical for credit analysis. NHAI’s P&L does not measure creditworthiness in the same way as a typical toll road company with operating revenue, EBITDA, or net profit. Many highway assets are developed for government policy objectives, and funding sources include the government capital base, cess fund, additional budgetary support, capital grants, maintenance grants, reinvested toll collections, loans for externally supported projects, and market borrowings. Therefore, NHAI’s creditworthiness depends more on the level of government allocation, the proportion of toll and monetisation proceeds applied to debt repayment, and the persistence of its policy role than on operating profit.

The highways managed by NHAI are critical economic infrastructure. Though they constitute a small share of India’s road network, they are essential for long-distance passenger and freight transport, port connectivity, industrial corridors, intercity travel, and defense and border access. CRISIL notes that while highways account for only about 2% of total road length, they carry approximately 40–45% of total road traffic. NHAI’s business generates policy value beyond toll revenue, including logistics cost reduction, economic zone connectivity, regional development, and private investment facilitation.

NHAI is not the government itself. As a statutory body, bondholders rely on NHAI’s credit as a debtor and on individual bond covenants. While the likelihood of government budget allocation and support is high, explicit guarantees, collateral, tax treatment, maturity, covenants, and foreign exchange rules vary by bond. Credit analysis must centralise the government link but still review bond-specific terms.

3. What Changed Recently

The most notable recent change is NHAI’s shift from “accelerating construction via borrowings” to “maintaining high capex using government budget and asset monetisation while reducing debt.” CRISIL’s March 2026 report states that NHAI has not undertaken new borrowings since October 2022. The government has instructed NHAI not to raise funds via internal and extra-budgetary resources (IEBR) from FY2023 onwards. Capital expenditure and debt repayment are now supported by government budget allocations, toll revenues, and TOT/InvIT proceeds.

Debt reduction is evident in the numbers. CRISIL reports that NHAI’s debt, including DME Development Ltd., declined from INR 3.75 lakh crore at March 2024-end to INR 2.89 lakh crore at March 2025-end and INR 2.43 lakh crore at December 2025-end. Approximately INR 98,000 crore of early debt repayment was executed by December 2025. While historical debt levels were high, the peak has passed, providing a clear support signal to existing bondholders.

Business volume remains elevated. According to NHAI’s official April 2025 press release, 5,614 km of national highways were constructed in FY2024-25, exceeding the target of 5,150 km. Capex provisional estimates exceed INR 2.5 lakh crore, above INR 2.07 lakh crore in FY2023-24 and INR 1.73 lakh crore in FY2022-23. This demonstrates that highway investment remains a policy priority even as new borrowings are restrained.

Monetisation continued in FY2025-26. PIB reported on 30 March 2026 that NHAI mobilised INR 28,307 crore through a combination of Public InvIT, Private InvIT, and TOT, nearing the government target of INR 30,000 crore. In InvIT Round-5, over 310 km of highways were monetised for INR 6,366.98 crore, and TOT Bundle-18 awarded Odisha NH-16 for INR 3,087 crore. These mechanisms are critical for debt reduction and recycling funds for new investment.

On ratings, CRISIL maintained NHAI’s tax-free bond and long-term borrowing programs at CRISIL AAA / Stable on 26 March 2026, while withdrawing some ratings on redeemed debt. This aligns with the gradual redemption and reduction of outstanding bonds. The rating stability reflects strategic importance in highway policy and government support, while constraints remain in the form of high debt and contingent liabilities.

4. Industry Position and Franchise Strength

NHAI’s industry position should be measured by policy irreplaceability rather than market share among road operators. Private toll road concessionaires are evaluated on individual road traffic, tolls, concession life, O&M costs, and debt service coverage. NHAI, in contrast, is the policy agency responsible for the overall network development, maintenance, contracting, and monetisation. While private concessionaires operate individual roads, NHAI functions more as the designer, contractor, and asset owner of the national highway market.

This position is strong. NHAI coordinates multiple highway functions, including Bharatmala, PM Gati-Shakti, high-speed corridors, MMLP, wayside amenities, electronic tolling via FASTag, road safety, network surveys, and asset monetisation. Highway development is directly tied to India’s growth strategy, manufacturing, logistics efficiency, urbanisation, and interregional connectivity, providing strong rationale for continued government utilisation.

Compared with other quasi-sovereigns, NHAI should be assessed alongside IRFC, PFC, REC, HUDCO, Exim Bank of India, and Food Corporation of India. IRFC finances the railways, PFC/REC focus on power sector, HUDCO on housing/urban infrastructure, Exim Bank on policy financing/export credit, and FCI on food policy. NHAI is the most directly responsible for “physical transport infrastructure development and asset monetisation.”

NHAI’s strength lies in the public nature and policy visibility of its assets. Government budgets, construction targets, monetisation goals, and FASTag/toll policies are market-transparent. Its policy importance is clear, with government support highlighted as a central rating factor by CRISIL. Weaknesses include the complexity of reading standalone cash flows from financial statements and sensitivity to construction costs, land acquisition, contractor claims, monetisation markets, and timing of government funds.

5. Segment Assessment

For practical purposes, NHAI’s business should be segmented by credit risk source rather than accounting lines. The four segments are: (1) highway construction and development, (2) existing road maintenance and operations with tolls, (3) asset monetisation, and (4) related project companies/InvIT/DME Development and other peripheral entities. All are policy-related but carry distinct credit implications.

Highway construction and development underpin NHAI’s policy importance. In FY2024-25, 5,614 km were constructed, with capex exceeding INR 2.5 lakh crore. FY2025-26 reportedly reached 5,313 km, surpassing targets. High construction volumes indicate government prioritisation and reinforce NHAI’s strategic role. Construction carries risks: land acquisition, permits, material costs, contractor capacity, contract variations, disputes, and environmental/social factors. C&AG audits note internal control, accounting, internal audit, ERP, and risk management issues, showing that government support alone does not eliminate operational risk.

Maintenance, operations, and tolls provide a debt repayment buffer. Tolls are an important self-generated resource, with FASTag improving collection transparency and efficiency. NHAI’s 2023-24 annual report notes a 98.5% FASTag toll collection rate. Electronic collection reduces leakage, enhances data, and increases predictability. However, tolls are influenced by political/regulatory factors—rate changes, exempt vehicles, traffic, road quality, local resistance, and election cycles—so tolls alone do not fully define creditworthiness.

Asset monetisation is central to current credit improvement. TOT, InvIT, and securitisation transfer future toll cash flows of completed highway assets to private capital, allowing NHAI to recycle funds. FY2024-25 monetisation reached INR 28,724 crore; FY2025-26 reached INR 28,307 crore. This is crucial for balancing construction investment and debt repayment without new borrowing. Monetisation depends on market conditions, investor demand, interest rates, traffic outlook, and asset quality; adverse conditions could reduce proceeds.

Related entities and project companies can present hidden credit risks. CRISIL integrates DME Development Ltd. into NHAI analysis, as NHAI provides letters of comfort and operational/financial support due to strategic importance. In such structures, investors must review not only explicit issuer debt but also related companies, guarantees, letters of comfort, operational support, contractor claims, arbitration awards, and land acquisition liabilities.

6. Financial Profile

NHAI’s financial profile should be assessed based on funding sources, debt levels, government support, and execution capability for monetisation, rather than conventional profitability metrics. Operating revenue or net income on the P&L does not fully reflect its credit strength as a policy-driven highway agency. Even CRISIL’s key financial indicators show minimal operating income for FY2024 and FY2023, with PAT reported as zero. The critical factor is which funding sources NHAI uses to service debt and finance capex.

The FY2023-24 annual report lists funding as of March 2024: capital INR 7,08,177.58 crore, capital grants INR 15,907.38 crore, secured loans INR 1,98,931.05 crore, and unsecured loans INR 1,36,442.15 crore. Compared with March 2023-end secured loans of INR 2,04,978.52 crore and unsecured loans of INR 1,38,135.71 crore, borrowings had already declined. CRISIL data indicates continued debt reduction, reaching approximately INR 2.43 lakh crore by December 2025.

Government support is explicit. CRISIL notes that NHAI’s budget allocation for FY2027 increased roughly 10% to INR 1.87 lakh crore from the FY2026 revised estimate of INR 1.70 lakh crore. Government funds are allocated to debt repayment, capex, and operations. CRISIL classifies NHAI’s liquidity as “Superior,” explaining that the government budget is sufficient to cover INR 40,000–50,000 crore of debt obligations over the next two fiscal years through FY2028.

Financial improvements are evident in both debt reduction and diversification of funding. NHAI has not raised new borrowings since October 2022, and InvIT proceeds are earmarked for debt repayment under cabinet approval. CRISIL reports that by March 2025, NHAI had mobilised approximately INR 57,000 crore via TOT, INR 46,700 crore via securitisation, and INR 59,000 crore via InvIT. Monetisation in FY2025-26 reached INR 28,307 crore, enabling continued construction while reducing debt.

Constraints remain: absolute debt levels are still high, and contingent liabilities cannot be ignored. CRISIL highlights significant contingent liabilities arising from disputed claims by contractors and developers, which may affect NHAI’s cash flow in timing and magnitude. Additionally, the FY2023-24 C&AG audit pointed out scope for improvement in accounting manuals, internal audit, risk management, ERP systems, and hedging policy. These do not immediately impair short-term repayment capacity but represent operational risks for a large policy agency.

7. Structural Considerations for Bondholders

The most important structural consideration for NHAI bonds is distinguishing issuer credit from government guarantees. NHAI is a government-adjacent issuer, and CRISIL incorporates potential government distress support. However, not all NHAI bonds carry the same legal payment obligation as Indian sovereign debt. Bondholders hold claims on NHAI; absent an explicit guarantee, direct claims against the government do not exist.

Existing bonds include tax-free bonds, taxable bonds, 54EC capital gains exemption bonds, long-term borrowing programs, bank loans, and past masala bonds. CRISIL’s March 2026 report lists multiple ISINs, coupons, maturities, issue sizes, and complexity levels. Variations in tax treatment, maturity, investor base, collateral/guarantee, liquidity, and price formation mean that treating all NHAI bonds under a single risk profile based solely on the issuer name is simplistic.

Related entities, such as DME Development Ltd., also require assessment. CRISIL incorporates DME into NHAI’s analysis because NHAI provides a letter of comfort and support due to strategic importance. This indicates that NHAI’s credit may extend beyond standalone debt to related project support or letters of comfort. Investors should distinguish NHAI’s own debt, guarantees, letters of comfort, InvIT links, and project company borrowings.

From a bondholder protection perspective, at least four points in individual prospectuses merit review. First, the presence and wording of government guarantees. Second, seniority and collateral. Third, treatment of negative pledge, cross-default, acceleration, tax gross-up, change in law, and force majeure clauses. Fourth, for foreign currency or masala bonds, applicable law, listing venue, paying agents, FX and remittance regulations, and hedging policy. NHAI’s issuer credit is strong, but bond-specific covenants affect recoverability and pricing.

8. Capital Structure, Liquidity and Funding

NHAI’s capital structure comprises government capital, capital grants, outstanding debt, and toll/monetisation proceeds. It is not measured by equity, dividends, or leverage ratios typical of listed corporates; rather, the government provides capital and budget for policy execution, and NHAI manages highway assets and debt. In FY2023-24, capital amounted to INR 7.08 lakh crore, reflecting accumulated government capital and asset creation.

Liquidity is assessed as very strong. CRISIL’s March 2026 report notes that NHAI receives funds from cess allocation, additional budgetary support, tolls, and TOT, with government budgets fully covering INR 40,000–50,000 crore of obligations through FY2028. NHAI reportedly does not utilise overdraft limits, indicating low short-term debt repayment risk.

In terms of fundraising, NHAI has a substantial domestic bond issuance track record. Tax-free and 54EC bonds are widely held by retail investors, and taxable bonds are accessible to institutional investors within government-backed issuance limits. NHAI is among a limited set of issuers authorised to issue Section 54EC capital gains tax exemption bonds, broadening its investor base and strengthening capital market access relative to ordinary corporates.

However, the current strategy prioritises government budget and monetisation over new borrowings. This is credit-positive but creates alternate dependencies. Delays in government budget, shortfalls in toll collections, weak TOT/InvIT bids, or adverse securitisation conditions may require NHAI to adjust capex, slow debt repayment, or seek additional government support. In periods of market scepticism, the timing of government budget execution is more critical than the AAA rating of outstanding bonds.

Asset monetisation serves both funding and portfolio management purposes. By transferring completed highways via TOT or InvIT, NHAI receives upfront funds while transferring a portion of future toll cash flows to investors. While monetisation supports short-term liquidity and debt reduction, ongoing assessment of residual asset profitability, network maintenance responsibilities, service quality, and contract oversight remains essential.

9. Rating Agency View

CRISIL maintained NHAI’s tax-free bond and long-term borrowing programs at CRISIL AAA / Stable on 26 March 2026. The rating reflects NHAI’s strategic importance to the Indian government and strong financial flexibility underpinned by government support. The constraint noted is high debt, indicating that the domestic AAA rating does not imply standalone profitability but rather “very high likelihood of timely repayment incorporating government support.”

CRISIL expects NHAI to receive government distress support due to its strategic role in executing national highway programs. The government provides flexibility through cess funds, additional budgetary support, capital gains and tax-free infrastructure bonds, reinvestment of toll revenues, and institutional frameworks for asset monetisation—all supporting the rating.

Key rating weaknesses include debt and contingent liabilities. CRISIL notes that although debt has declined, it remains large, with disputed claims by contractors and developers potentially affecting cash flows. Rating stability depends not only on government support but also on debt reduction, dispute management, and timing of fund allocation.

Downgrade triggers are clear. CRISIL identifies changes in highway policy that reduce NHAI’s strategic importance or delays in government fund receipt as negative factors. This underscores that NHAI’s credit risk is more focused on government relations and funding effectiveness than on traffic or short-term earnings. Investors should monitor government budgets, policy documentation, MoRTH fund allocations, and responses to CAG audit observations, in addition to domestic AAA stability.

Other domestic rating references include some CARE AAA / Stable bonds in circulation, but this report primarily uses CRISIL’s March 2026 rationale. ICRA also reaffirmed NHAI’s rating in April 2026, though full details were not available. Future updates will compare CRISIL, CARE, ICRA, and India Ratings releases to provide a cross-sectional view of government support and individual debt amounts.

10. Credit Positioning

Among quasi-sovereign Indian issuers, NHAI represents one of the most policy-execution-intensive infrastructure credits. While IRFC, PFC, REC, and HUDCO are government financial institutions extending funding, NHAI directly develops, maintains, and manages physical highway assets. This creates both strengths and weaknesses: strength from policy importance and direct government support; weakness from residual operational risks in construction, land acquisition, contracts, disputes, and asset management.

Compared with the Indian sovereign, NHAI is very close in credit profile but not legally identical. Indian government bonds are direct sovereign debt; NHAI bonds are its own obligations. Hence, a spread relative to the sovereign is warranted. Spread adequacy varies by guarantee, liquidity, tax treatment, maturity, collateral, investor base, and currency. Domestic tax-free or 54EC bonds have tax advantages affecting pricing, making direct comparison with taxable bonds less straightforward.

Compared with IRFC, NHAI focuses on roads, IRFC on railways, both central to transport infrastructure policy. IRFC holds lease/lending assets, while NHAI manages highway assets and construction contracting. IRFC’s credit centres on asset recovery for the Ministry of Railways, whereas NHAI relies on government budget, tolls, and asset monetisation. Both enjoy strong government support, but NHAI’s construction, contracting, and monetisation risks are more directly exposed.

Compared with PFC, REC, and HUDCO, NHAI has more concentrated sector exposure. PFC/REC focus on power sector lending portfolios, HUDCO on housing/urban infrastructure, where borrower asset quality is critical. NHAI’s risk assessment revolves around highway assets, government budget, debt levels, contractor claims, and the asset monetisation market. Tighter pricing of NHAI relative to these financial issuers likely reflects proximity to government and policy importance, though if pricing approaches sovereign levels, legal guarantees and liquidity differences should be reassessed.

Comparison with NHAI-related InvITs/NHIT/RIIT is also important. While NHAI itself is an issuer with government support and policy function, InvITs depend on specific road asset toll cash flows, concession life, O&M, traffic, DSCR, and leverage. NHAI sponsorship is a credit strength, but InvIT bonds are not equivalent to NHAI standalone bonds. Relative value analysis should consider NHAI bonds primarily for government support, and InvIT bonds for asset cash flow and structural protection.

11. Key Credit Strengths and Constraints

NHAI’s primary strength lies in its strategic importance to the Indian government. National highways form critical infrastructure for logistics, commuting, intercity travel, port connectivity, industrial corridors, and defense/border access, and NHAI is the central agency responsible for their development, maintenance, and management. Without government support, highway investment plans and broader economic growth policies would be significantly affected. This policy relevance underpins its domestic AAA rating and market access.

The second strength is debt reduction through government funding and asset monetisation. NHAI has not undertaken new borrowings since October 2022 and has significantly reduced debt from March 2024-end to December 2025-end. The fact that InvIT proceeds are earmarked solely for debt repayment is clear to bond investors. Monetisation exceeding INR 28,000 crore in each of FY2024-25 and FY2025-26 demonstrates tangible fund-recovery capability.

The third strength is investor base and funding track record. NHAI has issued tax-free bonds, 54EC bonds, taxable bonds, bank loans, and past masala bonds. Among domestic investors, NHAI is well-known and easily treated as a government-linked AAA issuer. Even in periods of restrained new borrowing, the liquidity and market recognition of existing bonds support credit.

Constraints include, first, the absolute debt level. Although reduced from its peak, debt of approximately INR 2.43 lakh crore as of December 2025 remains substantial. While manageable as long as government budget and monetisation continue, delayed allocations, expanding road investment, or emerging claims could slow debt reduction.

Second, contingent liabilities and disputes. Highway construction entails land acquisition, contract modifications, delays, cost overruns, contractor claims, and arbitration awards. CRISIL highlights disputed claims as a key monitoring area. Even if not immediately reflected as accounting liabilities, they can affect future cash flow.

Third, the distinction between government support and legal guarantees. While government support is highly probable, it is separate from explicit bond guarantees. For foreign currency bonds, masala bonds, tax-free bonds, 54EC bonds, bank loans, or related-entity debt, investors must verify legal protections and support channels individually.

12. Downside Scenarios and Monitoring Triggers

The most realistic downside for NHAI is not a sudden collapse in standalone tolls, but a scenario where delays in government funding, weakening monetisation markets, crystallisation of contingent liabilities, and renewed expansion of road investment collectively halt the debt-reduction story. Currently, government budgets and monetisation are functioning, keeping credit stable, but for quasi-sovereign issuers, even minor delays in fund allocation can affect spreads.

Scenario one is a decline in the effectiveness of government support. If NHAI’s highway policy role shifts to other agencies, MoRTH budgets are cut, debt repayment inflows are delayed, or the government does not explicitly support existing NHAI bonds, ratings and spreads would be directly impacted. CRISIL identifies a decrease in strategic importance and delayed government funds as negative factors.

Scenario two is slowing asset monetisation. TOT / InvIT / securitisation are central to debt reduction, but investor demand may fluctuate. Rising interest rates, weaker traffic forecasts, higher road maintenance costs, concerns over concession terms, or weaker InvIT market supply-demand conditions could reduce proceeds. Insufficient monetisation would complicate the balance of debt reduction, capex, and maintenance.

Scenario three is the crystallisation of claims and operational risks. Highway projects frequently face land acquisition, environmental/forest clearance, design changes, material costs, construction delays, traffic regulations, and contract disputes. Delays in implementing improvements noted in C&AG audits may affect transparency and investor confidence. While NHAI’s policy importance remains strong, operational weaknesses would heighten dependence on government support.

Scenario four is deterioration on the Indian sovereign side. NHAI’s credit is closely linked to government support, so sovereign fiscal deterioration, rating outlook downgrades, rising government bond yields, rupee depreciation, or adverse foreign currency financing conditions would affect NHAI spreads. Even with a domestic AAA, international investors may price sovereign linkage first.

Monitoring items:

In conclusion, NHAI is a core candidate among Indian government-linked issuers for direct exposure to highway infrastructure policy. Credit is strong, but analysis should focus not on corporate earnings but on government support, debt reduction, asset monetisation, contingent liabilities, and individual bond terms. Current trends are stable, but investment decisions should not stop at “close to government = safe”; investors must review actual budget inflows, monetisation pricing, repayment schedules, and guarantee wording.

13. Short Summary & Conclusion

NHAI is the central statutory agency responsible for India’s national highway network development, maintenance, and management. Supported by strategic policy importance, government budget allocations, domestic AAA rating, debt reduction, and asset monetisation via TOT, InvIT, and securitisation, it is a very strong quasi-sovereign infrastructure credit. Its trajectory is stable as long as government funds are delivered as planned and monetisation proceeds support debt reduction. However, NHAI is not an Indian sovereign bond. Investors should assess it as a core exposure to highway policy while reviewing individual bond guarantee language, tax treatment, liquidity, maturity, investor base, budget delays, monetisation demand, dispute claims, continuity of debt reduction, and India sovereign spread.

14. Sources

Key Verified Sources

• National Highways Authority of India, Annual Report 2023-24, accessed May 10, 2026
    https://nhai.gov.in/nhai/sites/default/files/2025-09/NHAI-Annual_Report_2023-24_English.pdf
• NHAI official press release, “NHAI Achieves Robust Growth in National-Highway Construction During FY 2024-25,” April 2, 2025
    https://nhai.gov.in/nhai/sites/default/files/2025-04/NHAI_Press_Release-NHAI_Achieves_Robust_Growth_in_National-Highway_Construction_During_FY-2024-25.pdf
• CRISIL Ratings, “National Highways Authority of India: Rating reaffirmed at 'Crisil AAA / Stable',” March 26, 2026
    https://www.crisilratings.com/mnt/winshare/Ratings/RatingList/RatingDocs/NationalHighwaysAuthorityofIndia_March%2026_%202026_RR_391751.html
• Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Road Transport & Highways, “NHAI Poised to Achieve FY 2025-26 Monetisation Target, Realises over Rs. 28,300 Crores Through InvIT and TOT Models,” March 30, 2026
    https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2247011
• Economic Times, “NHAI surpasses target; constructs 5313 km in 2025-26,” April 1, 2026
    https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/transportation/roadways/nhai-surpasses-target-constructs-5313-km-in-2025-26/articleshow/129954210.cms
• Economic Times, “NHAI raises Rs 28,307 crore through monetisation in 2025-26,” March 30, 2026
    https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/infrastructure/nhai-raises-rs-28307-crore-through-monetisation-in-2025-26-hopeful-of-achieving-the-rs-30000-crore-target-for-fy26/articleshow/129904514.cms
• Indian Infrastructure, “NHAI reduces debt by 27 per cent in 2024-25,” May 26, 2025
    https://indianinfrastructure.com/2025/05/26/nhai-reduces-debt-by-27-per-cent-in-2024-25/
• ICRA rating rationale page search result, “National Highways Authority of India: Rating reaffirmed,” April 1, 2026
    https://www.icra.in/Rationale/ShowRationaleReport?Id=104560
• Existing comparison: issuers/indian_railway_finance_corp/current/indian_railway_finance_corp_issuer_summary_20260507.md
• Existing comparison: issuers/housing_and_urban_development_corporation/current/housing_and_urban_development_corporation_issuer_summary_20260510.md

Pending / Additional Research Items

1. FY2024-25 Annual Report: Official audited FY2024-25 report not yet confirmed; CRISIL notes FY2025 report is unpublished as of March 2026.
2. Individual bond covenants: Tax-free, taxable, 54EC bonds, bank loans, masala bonds, and related-entity debt guarantees, collateral, negative pledge, cross-default, tax gross-up, and foreign currency regulations need review.
3. DME Development Ltd. and related entities: NHAI letters of comfort, support obligations, and DME debt maturities, covenants, and cash flow need further verification.
4. Contingent liabilities / claims: Disputed contractor and developer claims, arbitration awards, estimated amounts, and payment timing require quantification.
5. FY2026-27 budget and debt repayment schedule: CRISIL cites FY2027 budget allocation, but detailed repayment schedule and actual budget inflow timing need confirmation.
6. Detailed rating agency reports: Obtain full CARE, ICRA, and India Ratings rationales to compare government support, downgrade triggers, and debt amounts.
7. Live spreads: Comparison of same-tenor spreads for India sovereign, IRFC, PFC, REC, HUDCO, NHAI, NHIT / RIIT not yet performed.