Issuer Summary: Sammaan Capital Limited

Date prepared: 2026-05-21
Issuer: Sammaan Capital Limited
Former name: Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited
Ticker: IHFLIN
Report type: issuer_summary

1. Business Snapshot and Recent Developments

Sammaan Capital Limited is a major Indian non-bank financial company, formerly known as Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited. Its core businesses are housing loans, loans against property, secured finance for small and medium-sized businesses, and commercial real estate-related lending. Company materials describe it as one of the Upper Layer NBFCs designated by the RBI. Because it is not a bank, the credit analysis focuses not on a deposit franchise but on loan asset quality, capital, liquidity, market funding, co-lending and direct assignment, and the expected support from its new controlling shareholder, International Holding Company PJSC (IHC).

This issuer has two distinct timelines: the run-down and clean-up of the loan book from the former Indiabulls Housing Finance period, and a restart after becoming part of the IHC group. Under the legacy loan book, the Indian NBFC liquidity shock after 2018, pressure on real estate-related loans, asset sales, provisioning, and deleveraging weighed heavily on the credit profile. In contrast, on March 31, 2026, IHC-affiliated Avenir Investment RSC Limited became the promoter, bringing together capital injection, governance enhancement, rating upgrades, and the basis for a resumption of growth. This report therefore positions the company as an NBFC that is rebuilding its credit profile under a strong sponsor while working through legacy risks.

The IHC transaction on March 31, 2026 materially changed Sammaan Capital’s credit profile. According to company materials, IHC, through Avenir, paid in Rs 5,652 crore as the initial capital contribution, with the remaining warrant consideration of Rs 3,198 crore scheduled to follow. The ownership percentages should be read separately as follows, because the basis of calculation differs across materials.

IHC’s capital strength, network, and management involvement could materially reinforce the company’s funding capacity and market confidence. Indeed, CRISIL upgraded the long-term rating to CRISIL AA+/Stable on April 9, 2026, and CARE Ratings and ICRA also updated their ratings to the AA+ level in May 2026. However, IHC’s equity investment should not be treated in the same way as an explicit guarantee of Sammaan Capital’s debt. Confirmed materials indicate capital injection, the move to controlling shareholder status, and involvement in the board, risk management, finance, and IT, but not a guarantee of all debt. Bond investors need to distinguish between expected IHC support and the legal protections of each individual bond.

The FY2026 full-year and Q4 FY2026 results announced on May 20, 2026 are very weak on the surface. Consolidated profit after tax in Q4 FY2026 was a loss of Rs 8,101 crore, while the FY2026 full-year loss was Rs 7,145 crore. Q4 included impairment on financial instruments of Rs 2,958 crore and an exceptional loss of Rs 6,499 crore. This appears to include the impact of legacy loan book clean-up and a change in the business model, rather than a simple collapse in ordinary earnings power. However, these losses did reduce capital in practice, so they cannot be dismissed from a credit perspective.

The company describes the “restart loan AUM” at end-FY2026 as Rs 53,160 crore, and states that the gross NPA and net NPA ratios for this balance are zero. This is an important message of improvement, but it is a company-defined balance after compression, provisioning, sale, and reclassification of the legacy loan book. It does not mean that no losses will arise in the future. It should be treated as a reference point to be tested against the performance of the new loan book from FY2027 onward.

From a credit perspective, the recent changes can be summarised as follows: the IHC transaction, AA+ ratings, and large cash and investment balances are clear supports. The constraints are the large FY2026 loss, reduction in capital, limited post-restart track record, commercial real estate-related risk, unconfirmed detailed ALM, and the absence of a confirmed IHC guarantee. Given this combination, the company should be viewed not as a fully established high-quality NBFC, but as an issuer undergoing credit reconstruction under strong sponsor support, with performance still to be demonstrated.

2. Industry Position and Franchise Strength

Indian non-bank financial companies complement banks in housing finance, business finance, loans against property, and small-ticket finance, where banks do not fully reach. At the same time, they do not have a stable, low-cost deposit base like banks and rely on bonds, bank borrowings, CP, co-lending, direct assignment, and securitisation. For this reason, the credit quality of an NBFC is determined not only by the size of its loan book, but also by asset quality, liability maturities, liquidity, capital headroom, and market access under stress.

Sammaan Capital was known as a large housing finance company when it operated as Indiabulls Housing Finance. However, it would be risky to assess its past scale and name recognition as current strengths without adjustment. After the legacy loan book clean-up, the company is less a former high-growth housing finance company and more a finance company rebuilding housing finance, secured business loans, and commercial real estate-related lending under IHC support. The historical branch network and underwriting experience retain some value, but the credit assessment should focus on underwriting, collections, and product-level profitability after the restart.

Entry into the IHC group materially changes the way the franchise is viewed. The company is described as the core Indian investment of Judan Financial, IHC’s global financial services platform. This could add strong reinforcement in areas where the standalone company had been constrained, including capital, market confidence, and governance. However, the size of the sponsor does not replace the quality of the loan book itself. As growth resumes, credit cost will be determined by which products are originated, to which customers, against what collateral, and at what pricing.

The competitive environment is demanding. In prime housing loans, major banks such as HDFC Bank, ICICI Bank, and State Bank of India are strong, supported by low-cost deposits. LIC Housing Finance is a housing finance company with the LIC brand and a domestic AAA rating. Bajaj Finance has strong earnings and a deep funding record as a multi-product NBFC. IIFL Finance, Shriram Finance, and Manappuram Finance have track records in secured small-ticket finance, commercial vehicle finance, gold loans, and similar segments. Sammaan Capital has acquired a new strength in the form of IHC support, but compared with peers, it has not yet demonstrated stable post-restart earnings and low credit costs.

The company has set targets to become one of India’s top three NBFCs by FY2029, to expand its product count from four to more than 15, and to increase its branch network from just over 200 to more than 1,500. This is attractive as a growth plan for equity investors, but it is also an execution risk for bond investors. For an NBFC, the faster the growth, the harder it becomes to manage underwriting, collections, people, systems, capital, and ALM. From a credit perspective, the focus should be not on the growth target itself, but on whether the company can grow while maintaining a strong capital base, containing the tail of the legacy loan book, and managing product-level credit costs.

The provisional franchise assessment is that the company has high potential, but needs to rebuild its track record. IHC support could improve market treatment, but whether Sammaan Capital’s own lending franchise has become higher quality should be judged by AUM growth, collection rates, delinquencies, credit costs, and funding terms from FY2027 onward.

3. Segment Assessment

The company’s disclosed restart loan AUM is Rs 53,160 crore. This is a company-defined managed balance and may not fully match accounting loans or total assets. Therefore, product-level AUM should be used as an entry point for credit analysis, and should ultimately be reconciled against Stage-wise balances, ECL, collateral, sales and direct assignments, and collection performance in the annual report.

Housing finance is the segment that most clearly supports the company’s credit quality. It is collateralised, granular, and has a long repayment history as a product category. As long as appropriate LTVs, income verification, and geographic diversification are maintained, losses are likely to be lower than for unsecured loans or commercial real estate-related lending. On the other hand, competition from banks is intense in prime housing loans, and it is difficult for an NBFC without low-cost funding to sustain high margins. The key issue is how the company uses sales to banks and co-lending, and which loans it retains versus transfers.

Secured business loans and home equity loans support profitability, but are affected by borrowers’ business income and regional economies. Collateral can limit loss severity, but collateral disposal takes time, and collateral values tend to decline in an economic downturn. The collection rates in company materials are high, but until delinquencies, Stage 2, Stage 3, ECL, and write-offs are confirmed in the annual report, headline collection rates alone should not be given a strong credit benefit.

Commercial real estate, projects, land purchase loans, and lease rental discounting loans are elements that warrant caution in the credit assessment. The balance is large at Rs 10,346 crore, and yields are high. High yields are positive for earnings, but the segment depends on developer liquidity, sales velocity, construction progress, rental income, and legal recovery. Because this overlaps with areas where problems were more likely to emerge in the legacy loan book, the extent to which this segment becomes a pillar of new growth is an important monitoring point.

AUM trends need to be viewed on a like-for-like basis. CRISIL describes AUM at end-December 2025 as Rs 64,200 crore, while the company reports restart AUM at end-FY2026 of Rs 53,160 crore. Loans on the balance sheet were Rs 44,914.85 crore at end-FY2025 and Rs 36,026.26 crore at end-FY2026, which differs in definition from managed AUM. This report has not obtained same-basis AUM for FY2024 or earlier, and does not fill the gap with estimates.

The conclusion on segment assessment is that the business combines a defensive element centred on housing finance with more profitable but more volatile elements in commercial real estate and secured business finance. The asset quality of the post-clean-up AUM appears sound in company materials, but the post-restart track record remains short. From FY2027 onward, the pace of product-level AUM growth and the credit cost required to manage that growth will determine the upper limit of the company’s credit quality.

4. Financial Profile and Analysis

The FY2026 results are less a normal full-year set of results and more a set of results that include a major clean-up ahead of the restart after the IHC transaction. In the income statement, the credit focus is on impairment and exceptional losses rather than the decline in revenue.

The Q4 FY2026 loss resulted from the combination of higher finance costs, impairment, and exceptional losses. The company was profitable through Q3 FY2026, so looking only at 9M FY2026 earnings does not suggest an abrupt collapse. However, the Q4 loss materially reduced capital. From a credit perspective, there is room to view this as front-loaded recognition of legacy risk, but it should not be treated as a one-off that can simply be ignored. In FY2027, exceptional losses need to cease, credit costs need to normalise, and the company needs to return to profit.

On the balance sheet, cash and bank balances and investments are large, and short-term liquidity appears to have improved. At the same time, loans declined and equity also decreased.

The company-disclosed gearing at end-FY2026 was 2.7x, up from 1.9x at end-FY2025. On an absolute basis alone, this is not necessarily excessive for an Indian NBFC. However, the company has only a short post-restart track record, and its credit assessment depends heavily on IHC support. The analysis needs to take into account conversion of outstanding warrants, recovery in retained earnings, and the pace at which risk assets increase.

On asset quality, the company describes gross NPA and net NPA for restart AUM as zero. However, this figure depends on the definition of the post-clean-up balance. In the annual report, the key items to confirm are Stage 2, Stage 3, ECL movement, write-offs, collateral recoveries, sale losses, and balances at subsidiaries and affiliates. In particular, it is important to confirm whether delinquencies in commercial real estate-related lending and secured business loans remain low as described by the company.

The provisional conclusion on the financial profile is that short-term liquidity and sponsor capital are supports, but recovery in profitability and capital has not yet been confirmed. The FY2026 results may have materially advanced the clean-up of the legacy loan book, but they also left the facts of a full-year loss and a decline in equity. The first quarterly results for FY2027 will have a significant impact on the credit view.

5. Structural Considerations for Bondholders

Issuer credit and recovery prospects for individual bonds should be considered separately. Sammaan Capital as a whole has support from expected IHC support, AA+ ratings, and cash and investment balances. However, individual NCDs, retail bonds, subordinated bonds, short-term debt, and foreign currency bonds may differ in collateral, ranking, change-of-control provisions, acceleration, collateral cover, cross-default, and foreign currency hedging.

The legal nature of IHC support is the most important structural issue. What can currently be confirmed is IHC/Avenir becoming promoter, capital injection, warrants, board nominations, and involvement in management and risk management. This report has not confirmed an explicit guarantee, keepwell, liquidity support agreement, or bond payment guarantee. It is important not to reinterpret the support expectations embedded by rating agencies as contractual guarantees.

Public materials are also insufficient on collateral and ranking. CRISIL materials list bank facilities, NCDs, short-term NCDs, CP, subordinated debt, retail bonds, and other instruments. Investment risk differs across secured instruments, subordinated instruments, and short-term instruments. This issuer report focuses on the credit of the company as a whole, but actual investment requires review of each bond’s offering circular, trust deed, collateral cover, financial covenants, and change-of-control provisions.

Asset transfers, sales, and reclassifications related to the legacy loan book clean-up are also structural points to watch. Sales of loan receivables and direct assignments can support liquidity and risk reduction, but repurchase obligations, servicing obligations, or residual losses may remain. It is necessary to confirm which assets the company retains on balance sheet, which assets are transferred to banks or investors, and how much risk is retained.

Foreign currency bond investors should consider not only the domestic AA+ rating but also the currency mismatch with Indian rupee assets, foreign currency liquidity, hedging, remittance regulations, and Indian sovereign risk. A domestic AA+ rating is an assessment on the Indian domestic scale and does not imply a high rating on the global scale. This report has not reviewed individual foreign currency bond materials, so this remains an unconfirmed item.

The structural conclusion is that IHC support has materially reinforced the credit of the issuer as a whole, but bondholder recovery depends on the terms of each instrument. The credit view for the issuer as a whole and the investment decision for each security need to be separated.

6. Capital Structure, Liquidity and Funding

At end-FY2026, cash and cash equivalents were Rs 9,027.43 crore, other bank balances were Rs 1,932.99 crore, and investments were Rs 17,518.17 crore, making headline short-term liquidity appear strong. CRISIL also assessed liquidity as strong at end-December 2025, stating that liquid assets of Rs 10,785 crore were adequate against debt repayments of Rs 3,945 crore through end-June 2026. Cash balances had increased by end-FY2026, suggesting that short-term payment capacity is supported.

However, liquidity assessment cannot rely on cash balances alone. For an NBFC, it is necessary to consider 12-month, 24-month, and 36-month maturity walls, refinancing of CP and short-term NCDs, renewal of bank lines, unused committed lines, asset collections, and the liquidity of investments. Detailed ALM at end-FY2026, unused bank lines, foreign currency bond maturities, and hedging status have not been sufficiently confirmed. The capital assessment in this report is a provisional assessment centred on equity amount and leverage; confirmation using CRAR and Tier 1 remains incomplete.

The same caution applies to regulatory capital. As a large NBFC, Sammaan Capital is required to manage capital and liquidity under regulatory supervision, but the end-FY2026 information confirmed in this report mainly consists of equity amount, gearing, and cash and investment balances. These are useful entry points for credit analysis, but they do not directly show capital headroom against risk assets, Tier 1 strength, liquidity coverage, or maturity mismatch. Therefore, after the FY2026 annual report becomes available, CRAR, Tier 1, ALM buckets, the short-term debt ratio, and unused bank lines should be checked as priorities, and the post-IHC growth headroom should be reassessed against capital and liquidity.

The funding structure is heavily based on debt securities and borrowings. At end-FY2026, debt securities were Rs 24,661.23 crore, other borrowings were Rs 23,000.06 crore, and subordinated liabilities were Rs 3,942.53 crore. Because the company is not a bank, market funding costs and refinancing risk can become material quickly when credit concerns arise. The domestic AA+ rating and expected IHC support mitigate this weakness, but do not eliminate it.

Rating upgrades are a major positive for funding. In the domestic bond market, AA+ ratings affect investor demand and issuance terms, so Sammaan Capital may be able to fund on better terms than during the former Indiabulls period. Company materials state that bond yields declined by around 100 bp after the rating upgrades, but this report has not independently verified market data. This should therefore be treated as a company statement and not used as the basis for an investment decision.

At its board meeting on May 20, 2026, the company approved raising up to Rs 10,000 crore through various debt securities in domestic and overseas markets. This is an opportunity to test market access after the rating upgrades. From a credit perspective, not only the amount raised but also tenor, fixed or floating rate, collateral, subordination, foreign currency hedging, maturity diversification, and use of proceeds are important. If the company can raise diversified funding with longer tenors, that would provide evidence of the effectiveness of IHC support.

Combining liquidity and capital, short-term payment capacity appears strong, but the medium-term issue is the balance between growth and capital. Cash and investments are large, and the rating upgrades support funding access. At the same time, the FY2026 loss reduced equity and gearing increased. Until warrant conversion, return to profit, detailed ALM, and the execution terms of the Rs 10,000 crore funding programme are confirmed, liquidity should be treated as “currently substantial, but with structural confirmation still incomplete.”

7. Rating Agency View

Sammaan Capital’s ratings improved materially after the IHC transaction. CRISIL upgraded the long-term rating to CRISIL AA+/Stable on April 9, 2026 and reaffirmed short-term NCDs and CP at CRISIL A1+. CARE Ratings upgraded the long-term rating to CARE AA+/Stable on May 12, 2026, and the company states that ICRA also upgraded the rating to [ICRA]AA+/Stable on May 20, 2026.

CRISIL’s view is the central external basis for this credit assessment. CRISIL gives credit to Sammaan Capital’s strategic importance within the IHC group, expected management, operational, and financial support from IHC, capital reinforcement, the quality of retail assets, and liquidity. At the same time, CRISIL lists as downside factors a reduction in IHC’s shareholding or a change in support stance, GNPA remaining above 3.5% for a prolonged period, RoMA remaining below 1% for a prolonged period, and inability to raise meaningful funding on competitive terms.

These sensitivities indicate that the rating is not based only on standalone FY2026 earnings, but heavily incorporates IHC support and future funding improvement. The AA+ level was maintained or updated despite the large FY2026 full-year loss because the Q4 loss is viewed as legacy loan book clean-up, while IHC capital and expected support are given substantial weight.

The detailed rating reports from CARE and ICRA had not been sufficiently obtained as of the date of this report. The rating levels and timing were confirmed through company materials and public pages, but specific upgrade and downgrade sensitivities, product-level ratings, and the list of rated debt need to be checked next time.

The domestic AA+ rating also needs to be interpreted carefully. It indicates high credit quality on India’s domestic scale and has a major effect on domestic bond investment restrictions and funding costs. However, it does not imply a high rating on the global scale or low risk for foreign currency bonds. Foreign currency bond investors should separately assess the Indian sovereign, foreign exchange, remittance, foreign currency liquidity, and instrument-specific terms.

8. Credit Positioning

Sammaan Capital’s credit position sits between ordinary private-sector NBFCs, where sponsor support is weaker, and government-related policy finance issuers or major banks, where legal support and deposit franchises are stronger. IHC support and domestic AA+ ratings are major supports, but the company is not a bank, not an RBI/NHB-related policy finance company, and not an issuer guaranteed by IHC or the UAE government.

Compared with major banks, the company is weaker because it lacks a deposit base, settlement accounts, central bank liquidity access, and broad revenue sources. Compared with housing finance companies, it is less stable than LIC Housing Finance, which has a domestic AAA rating and is centred on housing loans. On the other hand, there is scope for re-rating through IHC support, capital injection, product diversification, and the use of co-lending and direct assignment. Compared with a high-earning multi-product NBFC such as Bajaj Finance, the sponsor profile has strengthened, but the post-restart track record of stable earnings, lower funding costs, and low credit costs remains short.

Compared with government-related financial issuers, PFC, REC, IRFC, NABARD, and Exim Bank of India have government ownership, policy mandates, and institutional importance. Sammaan Capital has a strong controlling shareholder in IHC, but it is not Indian government-related and does not carry a UAE government guarantee. It should be viewed not as a substitute for quasi-sovereign finance credits, but as a private-sector NBFC with a strong sponsor.

This report does not make a relative-value judgment because it has not confirmed live spreads, bond prices, or yields. If Sammaan Capital bonds trade at spreads close to major banks or government-related financials, investors should check whether IHC support is being overvalued. Conversely, if there is a sufficient premium to similarly rated private NBFCs and investors can give credit to IHC support, liquidity, and the post-clean-up restart of the legacy loan book, there may be room for consideration subject to ongoing monitoring.

In one sentence, the credit position is: a post-legacy clean-up reconstruction NBFC that has been re-rated to domestic AA+ on the back of IHC support. The defensive supports are capital injection, liquidity, rating upgrades, and strategic importance to IHC. The constraints are the FY2026 loss, reduction in equity, limited post-restart track record, commercial real estate-related risk, and the unconfirmed legal nature of IHC support.

9. Key Credit Strengths and Constraints

The largest strength is capital and sponsor support from IHC. The initial capital injection, warrants, promoter status, and involvement in the board, risk, finance, and IT materially improve a credit profile that had been difficult on a standalone basis. The fact that domestic rating agencies moved to the AA+ level in a short period indicates that this expected support may improve funding access. However, actual issuance terms and improvements in bank lines remain items for future confirmation.

Liquidity is also a strength. Cash, bank balances, and investments at end-FY2026 are substantial and provide a buffer against short-term maturities. The potential substantial progress in the legacy loan book clean-up is also supportive over the medium term. By bringing past losses to the surface and recognising provisions and exceptional losses, the company may have created the conditions for a restart.

At the same time, the constraints are clear. The FY2026 loss was large, and equity declined. The company states that the NPA ratio for post-clean-up AUM is zero, but it remains unclear what level of delinquencies and credit costs the post-restart lending will generate. The commercial real estate-related balance, market funding dependence, and absence of a confirmed IHC guarantee are also factors that require risk explanation within the same rating category.

10. Downside Scenarios and Monitoring Triggers

The most important downside scenario is one in which additional losses continue even after the legacy loan book clean-up. If recovery shortfalls, collateral value revisions, sale losses, additional ECL, and exceptional losses continue from FY2027 onward, that would mean the Q4 FY2026 clean-up was insufficient. The monitoring items are quarterly credit costs, legacy loan book or non-core asset balances, recoveries, write-offs, and exceptional gains or losses.

The second scenario is weakening of expected IHC support. If warrant conversion is delayed, the ownership ratio does not increase as expected, board and management involvement remains limited, or strategic importance within the IHC group declines, ratings and funding access could be affected. The monitoring items are ownership ratio, warrant conversion, board composition, rating agency comments, and the presence or absence of additional support.

The third scenario is funding that does not improve as expected. The AA+ rating and IHC support are expected to improve funding terms, but actual terms will depend on market conditions, caution over the FY2026 loss, individual bond terms, and maturity diversification. If the Rs 10,000 crore funding programme can only be executed in short-tenor, high-cost, collateral-heavy form, pressure on profitability and refinancing risk would remain.

The fourth scenario is one in which the pace of renewed growth outstrips risk management. Expansion of products, branches, and customer base increases the burden on underwriting, collections, systems, people, and regulatory compliance. In particular, if the company expands commercial real estate, projects, unsecured business loans, or personal loans over a short period, early delinquencies and credit costs need to be monitored closely.

The fifth scenario is one in which capital becomes insufficient relative to growth. Capital will increase if warrant conversion proceeds, but risk assets will also increase if loan growth is rapid. If balances grow without a return to profit from FY2027 onward, capital ratios are likely to decline. CRAR, Tier 1, gearing, dividends, retained earnings, and risk assets are the monitoring items.

The upside confirmation items are also clear. If warrant conversion proceeds as planned, the company returns to profit in FY2027, credit costs decline, delinquencies in post-clean-up AUM remain low, and the Rs 10,000 crore funding programme is executed with longer tenors and competitive terms, it will become easier to assess the company as an NBFC whose sponsor-supported credit reconstruction has been validated by performance.

11. Credit View and Monitoring Focus

The current credit view on Sammaan Capital is that, if IHC support is incorporated, it can be treated in the Indian domestic bond market as an AA+ category sponsor-supported NBFC, but that it remains in a reconstruction phase when viewed only from standalone FY2026 earnings. The near-term credit direction is improving, but that improvement depends heavily on IHC support, the legacy loan book clean-up, rating upgrades, and expectations of better funding access. It has not yet been sufficiently confirmed as stable earnings from ordinary operations.

The interpretation of the FY2026 loss is the most important issue. The loss reflects not only deterioration in ordinary earnings power, but also the clean-up of the legacy loan book and losses associated with strategic change. At the same time, the loss did in fact reduce capital. Therefore, the results are a credit-negative event in the short term, while potentially creating the conditions for a restart over the medium term. Which interpretation dominates will depend on return to profit in FY2027 and whether additional losses emerge.

IHC support could raise the floor of credit quality. The initial capital injection, warrants, controlling shareholder status, board involvement, and AA+ ratings from three agencies indicate that the capital market may treat the company as a different issuer from the past. However, IHC support is not an explicit guarantee, and the ratings depend on expected support. If IHC ownership, support stance, or strategic importance weakens, downside risk would emerge.

For investment purposes, Sammaan Capital should be treated not as a defensive major-bank credit, but as a post-event re-rating credit. The domestic AA+ rating and IHC support have strengthened the credit enhancement, but given the FY2026 loss, legacy loan book clean-up, commercial real estate-related balance, and limited post-restart track record, this is an issuer that requires risk explanation even within the same rating category. If market spreads overly incorporate sponsor support, caution is warranted. If, conversely, the market applies an excessive discount for post-clean-up legacy loan book risk and offers sufficient spread over same-rated peers, there may be room for consideration subject to ongoing monitoring.

The next disclosures to check are the FY2026 annual report, Q1 FY2027 results, rating agency comments after reflecting the results, and the execution terms of the Rs 10,000 crore funding programme. In the annual report, the items to confirm are the breakdown of exceptional losses, ECL movement, Stage-wise loans, capital ratios, ALM, collateral, and differences between standalone and consolidated issuer figures. In Q1 FY2027, the focus should be on normalisation of credit costs, return to profit, delinquencies in the post-clean-up loan book, and reduction in finance costs.

12. Short Summary & Conclusion

Sammaan Capital is a large Indian NBFC, formerly known as Indiabulls Housing Finance, centred on housing loans and secured lending. Its credit profile changed materially after receiving promoter support from the IHC group on March 31, 2026. The FY2026 results showed a large loss because of legacy loan book clean-up and exceptional losses, but IHC capital injection, domestic AA+ ratings, and substantial cash and investment balances provide support for the restart. However, IHC support is not an explicit guarantee, and until return to profit from FY2027 onward, the presence or absence of additional losses, funding terms, and asset quality in commercial real estate and secured business loans are confirmed, the company should be viewed cautiously as a sponsor-supported reconstruction NBFC.

13. Sources

Key confirmed sources:

• Sammaan Capital Limited, Earnings Update for the quarter and financial year ended March 31, 2026, May 20, 2026: https://www.sammaancapital.com/downloads/SCL_Earnings_Update_20May2026%20%283%29
• Sammaan Capital Limited, Corporate Announcement page, May 2026 entries: https://www.sammaancapital.com/investors/corporate-announcement
• Sammaan Capital Limited, Sammaan Capital becomes an IHC Group company press release, March 31, 2026: https://www.sammaancapital.com/media/uploads/news/ihcsclpressreleasemarch312026_51206.pdf
• Sammaan Capital Limited, About Us page, accessed May 21, 2026: https://www.sammaancapital.com/about-us
• Sammaan Capital Limited, Annual Report FY2025: https://www.sammaancapital.com/media/pdf/sclannualreportfy2025_98453.pdf
• Sammaan Capital Limited, Q3 FY2026 Press Release, February 4, 2026: https://www.sammaancapital.com/downloads/sclpressreleaseq3fy26_48396
• CRISIL Ratings, Sammaan Capital Limited rating rationale, April 09, 2026: https://www.crisil.com/mnt/winshare/Ratings/RatingList/RatingDocs/SammaanCapitalLimited_April%2009_%202026_RR_393429.html
• ICRA public rating page, Sammaan Capital Limited upgrade announcement, May 20, 2026: https://www.icra.in/Rationale/ShowRationaleReport?Id=68476
• Internal structured data extracted from the official sources: issuer_summary/issuers/sammaan_capital/data/sammaan_capital_key_metrics_20260521.json

Unconfirmed items or items requiring additional confirmation:

• Full FY2026 annual report and audit notes. In particular, exceptional losses, impairment, ECL movement, Stage-wise loans, collateral, tax effects, and differences between standalone and consolidated issuer figures.
• Detailed rating report texts from CARE Ratings and ICRA. The rating levels were confirmed through public pages and company materials, but detailed upgrade and downgrade sensitivities were not obtained.
• Offering circulars, trust deeds, collateral cover, change-of-control provisions, cross-default provisions, collateral, guarantees, and ranking for individual NCDs, retail bonds, subordinated bonds, and foreign currency bonds.
• Detailed ALM at end-FY2026, 12-month, 24-month, and 36-month maturity tables, unused bank lines, CP ratio, foreign currency hedging, and liquidity of liquid investments.
• Quarterly return to profit from FY2027 onward, credit costs, delinquencies in the restart loan book, product-level AUM growth, and commercial real estate and project-related balances.
• Live bond prices, yields, OAS, Z-spreads, and comparison with same-tenor, same-rated NBFC bonds.