Export-Import Bank of Thailand (EXIMTH)

At present, EXIMTH’s credit quality is most appropriately viewed as that of a policy-finance quasi-sovereign very close to the Thai government, and internationally as a lower- to mid-investment-grade, government-supported credit linked to the Thai sovereign BBB+ . Looking only at standalone financials, the direction of credit quality is broadly stable, but given the increase in Stage 2, the rise in the NPL ratio at end-March 2026, and the Negative outlook on the Thai sovereign, a somewhat weaker downside monitoring stance should be maintained. The audited 2025 financials show improved net profit, higher equity, and thick NPL coverage, so no rapid deterioration is evident from standalone financials. However, the end-2025 regulatory capital ratios are unconfirmed, and capital headroom should not be viewed too strongly. In the Fitch Thailand Coverage table as of end-March 2026 reviewed for this report, the International Outlook was Negative. The channels through which the credit level or market valuation could change quickly lie less in EXIMTH’s standalone profile than in the Thai sovereign rating, government-support assessment, funding markets, and renewed asset-quality deterioration.

The first factor supporting this view is institutional proximity to the government. EXIMTH is a government-owned policy financial institution supervised by the Ministry of Finance and has a policy mandate to support exports, imports, and domestic and overseas investment. Fitch treats the bank’s policy role, full state ownership, legal status, and record of government capital injections as the basis for its support assessment. EXIMTH’s role as a policy institution supporting Thai exporters, SMEs, new-market development, CLMV, and ESG investment increases the likelihood of government support.

The second factor is that standalone financials are being maintained to a level that complements support expectations. At end-2025, equity was THB29.0bn, net profit was THB1.90bn, the official NPL ratio was 3.66%, and NPL coverage was 261.85%. The improvement in profit depends on lower credit costs, so profitability should not be overestimated, but at least at present there is no evidence of standalone losses that would suddenly require government support. Rather, the next issue to monitor is whether the increase in Stage 2 will lead to future NPLs and ECL.